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Abstract  
Cases of violence involving extremist religious sentiment occur all too frequently in Indonesia, 
particularly after the collapse of the New Order Regime of President Suharto in 1998. Even 
during the post-New Order Reform Era, this trend of inter-faith discord continued, particularly 
during the last 10 years. Recent reports and surveys by non-governmental organisations such as 
the Setara Institute, the Wahid Institute and the Human Rights Watch provide detailed evidence 
of this disturbing reality. Violence against religious minorities remains problematic, particularly 
when viewed in the context of broader historical change, the end of the authoritarian regime and 
the onset of democratic governance.  
This thesis aims to examine religious citizenship practices in Indonesia, employing a case 
study approach in two cities, Yogyakarta and Surakarta (also known as Solo). Despite some 
similarities in terms of diversity, population and cultural backgrounds, these two cities differ in 
many ways, most notably in relation to how inter-religious matters are approached. This research 
project asks three main questions: (i) how is religious citizenship conceptualised and 
implemented in the context of Indonesia’s diverse socio-political landscape?; (ii) to what extent 
do certain discursive constructions of citizenship affect its daily practices among different 
religious communities in both cities?; and (iii) how can the different approaches adopted in 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta form the basis for developing a more inclusive and democratic 
citizenship in Indonesia? 
The data collected for this project includes individual interviews with three purposely 
selected groups: the NGO activists, the leaders/representatives of religious communities and 
government officials. This thesis found that the conceptualization and practices of citizenship in 
the two research sites have been derived from multiple sources including culture, religion and 
the constitution. These different sources and interpretations, by and large, have impacted the 
way they practice citizenship. Consequently, when it comes to religious practice, persisting 
tensions and conflict remain which, sometimes, end up in with violence, particularly in the case 
of Yogyakarta. While both cities share similar characteristics, the relationship between different 
groups in Surakarta in recent years has been relatively more peaceful compared to that in 
Yogyakarta. The social, political and cultural change over time in both cities, particularly after 
the collapse of the New Order Regime, has by and large shaped the current status quo in both 
cities. Effective local leadership at the governmental and non-governmental level has contributed 
to the relative peace between different communities. This does not necessarily mean that there 
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has not been any kind of conflict between groups but tensions have not developed into fully 
fledged violence.                  
Overall, key research findings show that contested religious practices are framing 
citizenship debates and at the state, civil society and individual levels. Contestations over this 
issue has often led to violations of and restrictions over the basic rights of minority groups.  The 
existence of regulations and Laws in particular those pertaining to blasphemy, building places of 
worship and targeted groups such as Ahmadiyah, has emboldened hardliners and extremists to 
exercise even more violence and discriminatory behaviour towards minority groups. This thesis 
argues that extremist groups often operate by seeking to assert authority in parallel to the state, 
with the result that minority groups feel even more vulnerable and powerless to seek redress 
from key state institutions.                  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Objective  
This project aims to understand the religious dimensions of citizenship practices in the 
multi-faith society that is Indonesian society, drawing on the case studies of two cities, Yogyakarta 
and Surakarta (also known as Solo). The Republic of Indonesia has experienced dramatic social, 
cultural and political changes throughout its history and this has shaped an evolving sense of what 
it means to be Indonesian. The world’s most populous Muslim country is also renowned as one 
of the most diverse countries in the world. Indonesia is home to more than 265 million people, 
with around 1,340 ethnic groups and 2,500 local languages (Na’im and Syaputra 2011, p. 5-6). 
The vast majority of Indonesians – around 87% -- profess to follow Islam but sizable minorities 
identify as being adherents of Protestant Christianity (7%), Catholicism (3%), Hinduism (1.7%), 
Buddhism (0.27%) and Confucianism (0.05%) (Na’im & Syaputra 2011, p. 7). Through the case 
studies in Yogyakarta and Surakarta this project seeks to better understand how citizenship in 
Indonesia is conceptualised, developed, and practiced. The ways in which different religious 
communities practice citizenship will be studied in order to reflect and learn about the possibility 
of forging a more plural and democratic society in Indonesia.  
This study will use a theoretical framework based on Turner (1993) and Isin (2008; 
2015), who approach citizenship in a more performative sociological sense rather than in a 
narrowly normative or juridical one. Citizenship, within this approach, is viewed as a set of 
practices or acts, rather than strictly a proclamation of rights and obligations. As citizenship is 
expected to minimise class divisions and conflict among different communities, it is, therefore, 
framed as a process, rather than a mere end-product: a process in which the state and civil society 
interact, compete and negotiate with each other in the course of defining rights and practices. 
The project takes a qualitative semi-ethnographic approach employing critical discourse analysis 
as a tool for interview and content analysis. This allows an examination of how certain discourses 
(stemming from religion, culture, social and political spheres) have shaped, produced, and 
constructed certain concepts of citizenship, and how such concepts affect the way various 
communities practice citizenship in their daily lives. 
Theoretically, this research provides significant original conceptual insights into the 
interplay of culture, religion and citizenship in a culturally and religiously diverse society. 
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Empirically, this project’s findings aim to account for opportunities and challenges that shape the 
daily lives of religious minorities within a culturally and religiously diverse society. The research 
findings contribute to the discussion over the shaping of specific policy recommendations aimed 
at fostering a more inclusive and democratic citizenship, so that people from different 
backgrounds (religious, ethnic, social, and political affiliations) can live together in peace and 
harmony.  
  
1.2 Research Context 
The Human Rights Watch’s report (the HRW report) on violence against minority 
groups in Indonesia (2013) reports that many religious minority groups have experienced 
violence, not only in its physical forms, but also non-physical ones such as discrimination and 
harassment aimed at their religious institutions where rituals and practices are conducted. 
Intolerant actions toward religious minority groups have even led to some human casualties as 
well as the destruction of public and religious buildings. Yet, no specific measures or actions were 
taken by the majority groups (authorities) in order to stop this. Instead, the violence continues 
across many areas in Indonesia, with religious minority groups still being targeted on a regular 
basis. This is documented in the reports issued annually by leading non-governmental 
organisations concerned with the issues of religious freedom and beliefs, such as the Setara 
Institute and the Wahid Institute in Jakarta.  
Reporting these incidents to the state authorities has, so far, not resulted in dramatic 
changes. Rather, in several cases, the state apparatus has instead been involved in pressuring 
these minority groups not to disclose such acts of violence, resulting in further institutional 
discrimination (Human Rights Watch 2013, p. 4). In most cases, it is difficult for non-Muslim 
communities to build places of worship due to the pressures of some hardliners within various 
government circles. Instead of protecting the minorities from the aggressors, the state apparatus 
typically fails to make serious interventions. More commonly, the solution has been to relocate 
minority groups to different locations (Human Rights Watch 2013, p. 3), thereby appeasing the 
hardliners. A further complication is the fact that local governments all too frequently urge that 
buildings erected by religious minority groups be shut down, despite meeting all requirements in 
terms of planning and building approvals (Human Rights Watch 2013, p. 3). 
The HRW report echoes the findings of several studies by non-governmental 
organisations such as the Setara and The Wahid Institute. Based on the Setara Institute’s report 
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(2010), there were 185 cases related to religious violence in 2007. A year later, this number 
almost doubled, reaching 367 reported cases. In 2009, the number of cases reported, while 
reduced, remained very high at 291. Four years later, the number of cases had decreased but was 
still a concern with 222 cases of intolerance reported (Halili & Bonar Tigor Naipospos 2014, p. 
16). In 2010, the Wahid Institute noted that there were 135 cases of violence related to religious 
issues in 13 observation areas, and in a follow-up report four years later, the number had 
increased to 185 cases (The Wahid Institute 2014). These figures, combined with the recent 
violence experienced by the Shia community in Madura, East Java and the Ahmadiyyah 
community in Java and Lombok, along with the way the government deals with such assaults, 
pose a serious question as to how the state can ensure the safety and rights of its minority groups.  
These questions come against a background where Indonesia has been regarded as one 
of the countries where religion and democracy have able to combine quite successfully (Hefner 
2000; Effendi 2003; Barton 2010). Indeed, the instrumental use of religious symbols in political 
affairs has been viewed unfavourably by the Indonesian people. A survey conducted by Lembaga 
Survey Indonesia (LSI, the Indonesian Survey Institute) revealed Islamic parties were preferred 
by just 8% of respondents, while the nationalist-secular parties gained 52% of the preferences 
(Lembaga Survey Indonesia 2007). Indonesia is also known as a country where religious 
moderation is preached and people are comfortable with the values of secularity and democracy 
over narrowly-framed interpretations of Islamic law, or sharia (Buehler 2009, p. 52). The findings 
of Lembaga Survey Indonesia revealed that only 33% of Indonesian people prefer sharia derived 
laws while 57% prefer secular law (Lembaga Survey Indonesia 2007). Indonesia is also known 
for its vibrant civil society organisations. However, despite these positive indicators about levels 
of tolerance amongst the majority of Indonesians, the violence aimed at religious minorities by a 
small number of extremists does not seem to be waning.  
Expressions of intolerance towards religious minorities remain problematic when viewed 
in the context of historical change, the end of the authoritarian regime and the onset of 
democratic governance. Many Indonesia analysts and observers thought this would allow a re-
examination of the past discriminatory policies and human rights abuses (Zurbuchen 2005, p. 
4). Indeed, significant advances are clear in the new laws on human rights and human rights 
courts that have been passed in 1999 and 2001 respectively (Sulistiyanto 2007, p. 80-3). The 
1998 fall of the ‘smiling general’ Suharto, to borrow the term used by O. G. Roeder (1969), 
signalled a new era in Indonesian politics with the hope of greater freedom for all Indonesians. 
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Yet, the continued violence towards religious minority groups poses serious questions about the 
nature of nation-building and citizenship in contemporary Indonesia. 
From a more theoretical perspective, cases of inter-religious intolerance seem to justify 
part of Furnivall’s thesis about Asian pluralism, where in such deeply divided societies lacking a 
common social platform, anarchy is almost unavoidable (Furnivall 1944, cited in Hefner 2001, 
p. 6). Furnivall’s argument is based on his observations of colonial-era British Malaya and the 
Dutch East Indies. While both seemed to be blended in terms of market activity, they still lacked 
a common social-cultural vision. Thus, with the rise of the nationalist movement, combined with 
the loose control of the European occupiers which enabled the countries to obtain 
independence, Furnivall predicted that these factors would lead to state disintegration: 
nationalism would fail to support and nurture diversity, and instead would end up deepening the 
differences and divisions among various groups. However, the post-colonial state still stands, and 
as Hefner noted ‘the native leadership proved more skilled at operating the machinery of 
government than Furnivall had imagined’ (2001, p. 7). 
Indeed, throughout its history, Indonesia has been coloured by communal and ethno-
religious conflicts. One of the most violent conflict in the history of the republic was the 1965 
tragedy during which the Indonesian Communist Party was shut down and those associated with 
it were hunted-down, tortured and killed. The death toll of this bloody conflict is estimated to 
have reached at least 500,000 (Cribb 2001). In the 1970s, Indonesia has suffered from further 
ethno-religious conflict, particularly between Muslims and Christians. Following that, the end of 
the New Order Regime was marked by the outbreak of communal conflicts that involved 
religious, racial and ethnic-related issues. During these critical episodes, Indonesia was faced with 
significant social and political challenges.  
Indeed, during these turbulent years, Indonesia’s ‘political institutions and principles of 
national models [were] renegotiated’ (Bertrand 2004, p. 10). This critical juncture was the result 
of ‘the embedded tensions in past institutional compromise’ and significant events such as 
economic crisis, war or regime changes (Bertrand 2004, p. 15). Bertrand (2004) argues that three 
critical junctures have been salient in the Indonesian history: the first took place during the state 
formation of Indonesia during which Indonesian nationalism competed with other political 
ideologies (Bertrand 2004, p. 18). This critical juncture ended by 1950 when Indonesia decided 
to become a unitary modern nation-state. The second juncture started in the mid-1950s and 
ended by the establishment of the New Order Regime in the 1968. During this period, Bertrand 
argues, the Indonesian political architecture was reshaped with a view to establish ‘homogenous 
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social, political, developmental, and even some cultural characteristics’ for the diverse 
community of Indonesia (2004, p. 18). The third critical juncture began when the New Order 
regime collapsed in May 1998. In the period that followed, in the so-called Reform Era, 
‘negotiation and struggle over inclusion’ have taken place and are still in progress today.  
Compared to the first and second critical junctures, the third features a fundamental 
change in institutional and political approaches that did not appear during the two previous ones: 
the adoption of the decentralisation policy. This was a drastic change from the old regime when 
the political architecture was centralised and controlled by the government. The legislation of 
this new policy with its regional autonomy dimension was drafted in 1999 and implemented in 
2001. In this legislation (Law No. 22/1999 and Law 25 10/1999, and subsequent laws 32/2004 
and 33/2004), it is stated that the regions shall be administered at the levels of province, districts 
and municipalities and that these will have the autonomy to ‘govern and administer the interests 
of the local people’ within the boundary of a ‘unitary State of (the) Republic of Indonesia’.  
In these critical junctures, nation-building and the concept of citizenship have been 
revisited, contested and negotiated. Some significant themes appeared such as ethnic 
representations, their access to ‘power and resources’ and cultural preservation (Bertrand 2004, 
p. 19). Another important theme that will be the focus of this project is the role of religion (in 
particular Islam) in defining the character of the Indonesian nation and its key institutions and 
laws in particular citizenship. Some propose that Islam needs to be included in the consideration 
of political membership of the nation, while others choose to defend the notion of an Indonesian 
nation-state as one open to all its religious and cultural communities (Bertrand 2004, p. 19). This 
is not to say some issues related to ethnic representation and cultural preservation are not 
important, since these will relate and intertwine with the issue of religion.  
But the fact remains that the number of violent acts perpetrated against religious minority 
groups has remained quite high. This is especially true of the two sites selected for this project 
(Yogyakarta and Surakarta), both of which are predominantly Javanese. For this reason, this 
research project will be situated both theoretically and empirically at the heart of the unfinished 
debates over the role of religion in nation-building and citizenship contestation in contemporary 
Indonesia.  
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1.3 Situating the Research Project   
Indonesia is considered to be one of the most diverse countries in the world with a 
population of more than 265 million people, and no less than 1,340 ethnic groups, 2,500 local 
languages, and six officially recognised religions (Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, and Confucianism (Na’im and Syaputra 2011). The challenge to manage such 
cultural-religious diversity and the associated politics of identity has been significant. Indeed, the 
history of modern Indonesia has been dominated by ongoing negotiations and contestations over 
national identity narratives and citizenship frameworks. 
Apart from these six official religions acknowledged by the state, Indonesian people hold 
other forms of faith that are considered ‘aliran kepercayaan’, or ‘traditional beliefs’. More 
interestingly, within each of the six official religions, there is significant internal diversity with 
many different practices within each one, making the overall religious landscape even more 
complex. Because Indonesia consists of many different ethnic and language groups, an 
Indonesian citizen may possess multiple identities reflecting membership of a particular religious 
group, an attachment to an ethnic or language group, as well as a membership of certain social 
or political organisation.  
The Indonesian constitution treats every citizen as equal and with similar rights and 
obligations. Every group is entitled to decent work and livelihood1, equal opportunities in 
accessing education2, protection from any violence and harmful action.3 They are also free to 
associate and affiliate with any organisations or communities.4 In the context of religious practice, 
a citizen is also guaranteed the right to ‘embrace religion and to worship in accordance to his 
religion or belief’ [memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agama dan 
                                                     
1 UUD 1945 (the 1945 Constitution) Article 27 (2): Tiap-tiap warga Negara berhak atas pekerjaan dan 
penghidupan yang layak bagi kemanusiaan (Every citizen shall have the right to work and to earn a humane 
livelihood). 
2 UUD 1945 (the 1945 Constitution) Article 31 (1): Setiap warga negara berhak mendapat Pendidikan (Every 
citizen has the right to receive an education). 
3 UUD 1945 (the 1945 Constitution) Article 28 G (1): Hak atas perlindungan diri pribadi, keluarga, kehormatan, 
martabat, dan harta benda, Hak atas rasa aman dan perlindungan dari ancaman ketakutan untuk berbuat atau 
tidak berbuat sesuatu yang merupakan hak asasi manusia. (2): Hak untuk bebeas dari penyiksaan (torture) dan 
perlakuan yang merendahkan derajat martabat manusia dan berhak memperoleh suaka politik dari negara lain 
((1): Every person shall have the right to protection of his/herself, family, honour, dignity, and property, and shall 
have the right to feel secure against and receive protection from the threat of fear to do or not do something that 
is a human right. (2): Every person shall have the right to be free from torture or inhumane and degrading 
treatment, and shall have the right to obtain political asylum from another country.) 
4 UUD 1945 (the 1945 Constitution) Article 28 E (3): Hak kebebasan untuk berserikat, berkumpul dan 
mengeluarkan pendapat (Every person shall have the right to the freedom to associate, to assemble and to express 
opinions).  
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kepercayaanya itu]. With this guarantee, the different religious minority groups should in theory 
face no challenges in expressing their religiosity and practicing their faith.  
In practice, however, this ideal is far from being achieved in reality. The trends of 
discriminatory actions against these religious minority groups have remained high over the years. 
However, it is also important to note that in some areas, the violence against religious minority 
groups remains relatively low. Yogyakarta and Surakarta, the focus of this research project, are 
an example of two cities that have vastly different experiences in terms of religious violence and 
intolerant actions against minority groups. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
The two case studies selected for this project, Yogyakarta and Surakarta, are 
predominantly Javanese, are under the same jurisdiction and policies regarding citizenship, but 
differ in terms of the relationship between different religious communities. As such, the research 
project asks: 
(i)  how is religious citizenship conceptualised and implemented in the context of 
Indonesia’s diverse socio-political landscape?  
(ii)  to what extent do certain discursive constructions of citizenship affect its daily 
practices among different religious communities in both cities?  
(iii)  how can the different approaches adopted in Yogyakarta and Surakarta form the 
basis for developing a more inclusive and democratic citizenship in Indonesia? 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure  
This thesis is divided into six chapters with the first introducing the background of the 
study. In this chapter the context of the research is outlined, which is the significant number of 
violent cases regarding religious minority groups in Indonesia. The number of cases remains 
high from year to year as reported by surveys of non-governmental organisations such as the 
Wahid Foundation, the Setara Institute and the Human Rights Watch. This remains a puzzle 
when the Constitution guarantees every citizen’s rights to perform their religious rituals and 
obligations. This chapter also sketches briefly the history of contestation over the national 
 19 
political design that has led to a ‘critical juncture’ (Bertrand 2005) to situate and understand the 
recent violence cases, in which religious arguments in particular are used to justify the actions. 
Following this is Chapter 2, which discusses the theoretical framework. This chapter is 
divided into two parts with the first of two outlines the literature review. The literature review 
reveals the discussion over religion and citizenship at the global and local level. The discussion 
on the global level provides information on studies over the issue and how this relationship 
between religion and citizenship is being conceptualized. The outline of the discussion at the 
local level delves into the history of Indonesia and how the state conceptualises and manages the 
issue of citizenship in the biggest Muslim country by population in the world. The literature 
review section ends with discussion on the gap on the studies and the contribution of this 
research. 
The second part of this chapter discusses the theoretical framework used in this thesis. 
This part is divided into three sections: the first discusses the concept of citizenship in Islam, 
outlining this history of Islamic polity and how citizenship has been conceptualised and exercised 
throughout history. Following this is a discussion over the citizenship concept in Javanese 
tradition since the two research sites of this project are predominantly Javanese. A global 
discourse on citizenship, religion and culture in the global world is outlined in the third section, 
including the challenge of religion and culture seeking recognition. Adding to this is a critical 
discussion on key concepts of multicultural citizenship, differentiated citizenship, religious 
citizenship and performative citizenship. The end of this section summarises the previous 
discussion and outlines the approach used in this project to investigate citizenship practices. 
The third chapter unpacks the methodology employed in this thesis. It starts with a 
discussion of the approach of this research and considerations on the choice of the two research 
sites. Following this is an explanation of data collection, which was conducted primarily from 
observation and interviews, and data analysis, which involved critical discourse analysis to unpack 
the power operations underpinning the citizenship practices in two cities. 
The fourth chapter discusses the findings of this research. This chapter is divided into 
five parts. The first part provides a contextual analysis of the two cities. Following this is the 
outline of the citizenship practices in the two cities, which are coloured with tensions and 
violence. The extent to which these citizenship practices are exercised is discussed in the 
following section on the discourse of citizenship. This section reveals the discursive construction, 
based on religious, social, cultural or political factors, of such practices in the two cities. The 
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following part features the key comparative findings of the two cities to offer insights on cultivating 
a more inclusive and democratic citizenship.  
Chapter 5 discusses findings and connects them to the theoretical framework outlined in 
this project. This chapter is divided into seven parts, with the first being an introduction to the 
chapter. The second part discusses the religious citizenship that is practiced and used to compete 
against each other at the nation-state, civil society and individual levels. The next part sketches 
the role of culture in navigating citizenship practices in two research sites. Following this is a 
discussion of the performative dimension of citizenship, which takes the form of habitus and acts 
of citizenship. The contestation over defining and claiming a (civic) virtue is delved on in the fifth 
part. Finally, the sixth part discussed how this competition and contestation over religious 
citizenship practices impact the religious minority management in Indonesia under Pancasila (the 
five principles) as a state foundation. The last part is the conclusion, which summarizes the 
chapter.  
The last chapter of this thesis, Chapter 6, concludes the discussion of this project. The 
chapter presents a summary of the study and outlines its significance, theoretical and empirical 
contribution and limitations of this study. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of this project for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction  
As this project interrogates the practices of citizenship in a society where diverse religious 
communities exist and interact with each other, this chapter focuses on the issue of religion and 
citizenship. The first section of this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part locates 
briefly the discussion over the challenges of religion in relation to political membership within 
the global context. The second part focuses the discussion over religion and citizenship in 
Indonesia. The topic of religion and citizenship covers many issues and thus resulted in a large 
number of reports, books or journal articles. For the purpose of this research project, however, 
the discussion is limited to highlighting key studies and briefly discussing the issue of religion and 
citizenship in the Old Order Regime, the New Order Regime and in the Reform Era. The 
purpose of this discussion is to explore the extent to which there is continuity or discontinuity 
over citizenship conceptualisation in the three different eras, and what can be learned from this 
brief history. The last part of this section discusses the gaps, or what has not been explored in 
the previous studies, to identify the place this research among the broader literature, as well as 
its contribution to the ongoing debates about religion and citizenship in Indonesia.  
The second section of this chapter discusses the theoretical framework used in this 
research project. This section is divided into five parts. The first part briefly sketches the history 
and meanings of citizenship in the critical literature in order to develop a clearer sense of how 
this term will be used throughout this research project. This research project is situated in 
Indonesia, the largest Muslim country by population in the world, and will examine how the 
challenges coming from Muslim groups over national political design and thus of citizenship 
keep occurring, as the history records. The discussion over citizenship within Islamic and Arab 
tradition is highlighted in the second part. Furthermore, since the research sites of this project 
are located in Central Java, and both cities are predominantly Javanese, a discussion follows in 
the third part about the ways in which citizenship is conceptualised in Javanese culture and 
tradition. The fourth part delves with more conceptual details into the concept of citizenship 
from a global predominantly Western perspective. The fifth and last part synthesises the overall 
discourse around religion and citizenship and how these are to be examined in this study.   
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2.2 Literature Review  
2.2.1 Discussion on Religion and Citizenship 
 
2.2.1.1 Religion and Citizenship: A Global Context 
The end of the Cold War was marked by a significant shift within political discourse at 
the international level. The triumph of ‘liberal democracy’ that marked ‘the end of history’ 
(Fukuyama 1992) did not accurately encapsulate what really occurred in the world as the 
problems related to culture and religion had proliferated to every corner of the globe. The 
association of certain religions and cultures with ‘illiberal practices’ was framed in some 
discourses (e.g. Huntington 1993) as posing a serious challenge to the liberal world view. While 
this seems to be particular to modern liberal democratic states, this challenge is also occurring 
elsewhere (Gutmann 1994, p. 3).  
The new politics of recognition captures some of these new cleavages that modern states 
face, marked by complex forms of cultural and religious diversity. Huntington, in his influential 
Foreign Affairs article ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, forecast that culture and religion, or 
civilizations (he used these terms interchangeably) would be a new threat to the world that was 
likely to lead to a clash of civilizations: ‘The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines 
of the future’ (Huntington 1993, p. 12). He predicted that conflict would likely occur between 
eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin 
American and African. This thesis was widely criticised, due largely to the simplification of the 
terms culture, religion and civilizations. Also, the predicted conflict was supposed to occur 
‘between’ different cultures, religions and civilizations and not ‘within’ them. Yet, as recent events 
have shown, many of the bloodiest conflicts are occurring ‘within’ the same tradition, as is the 
case with sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Islam across the Middle East (Reese 2013; 
Helfront 2013). 
In the context of citizenship and political membership, the challenge posed by culture 
and religion, particularly in modern liberal states, has been vigorously debated in the literature 
(example e.g. Young 1990; Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995 2001; Parekh 1997; Barry 2001; 
Benhabib 2002). Much of this literature varies in terms of positioning and conceptualising the 
challenge posed by religion and culture, but could be summarised in terms of two levels: global 
and national (nation-state). At the global level, the challenge mainly manifests from the 
‘cosmopolitan’ agenda in the form of global human rights movements that go beyond the 
boundary of the nation-state. This is a challenge not only to authority and sovereignty of the state, 
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but also to its very basic concept of citizenship. A similar kind of challenge is posed by the 
resurgence of radical religious groups at the international level that call for a global movement in 
the name of religion (jihad), a ‘globalized Islam’ (Roy 2006). The 9/11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon were considered a manifestation of this kind of movement. The 
emergence of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) represents a more recent 
example of how this movement has attracted many fighters around the world who joined it as 
members of a worldwide caliphate.  
Against these rising fissures and conflicts, and at the nation-state level, the demand for 
recognition has taken place in many countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and Australia. Minority groups demand recognition of their cultural and 
religious practices in the context of a hostile liberal secular state policy. The headscarf affair in 
France is an example of how religious practices have challenged the state policy on managing 
religious minority groups and on the prohibition of wearing religious symbols in public schools 
(Meiers 2007). This struggle for recognition has sometimes involved excessive violence, as is the 
case with the persecution of the Muslim Rohingya community in Myanmar. This group has been 
pushed out by majoritarian Buddhist groups who consider them a threat to the state; the latter’s 
various security organisations have remained largely silent on this issue. In short, the positioning 
of citizenship as an articulation of political membership framed in terms of culture and religion 
has become increasingly contested in recent times, with Indonesia being no exception.  
   
2.2.1.2 Religion and Citizenship: An Indonesian Context 
2.2.1.2.1 Nationalism and the Rise of the Indonesian Nation-State  
Nationalism and citizenship are interrelated concepts. The rise of nationalism has given 
birth to the nation-state and within this, the idea of citizenship in its modern form was crafted. 
Moreover, citizenship has been viewed as ‘a project of nation-building in which the creation of 
the national citizen is the primary project of the nation-state’ (Turner 2006, p. 125). It is largely 
through citizenship that the relationship between citizens and the state is formulated and, as 
Turner (2006, p. 126) argues, expected to overcome ‘the divisions of social class’. Consequently, 
the idea of citizenship is associated with a democratisation process, since it can be argued that 
the more democratic the citizenship, the more inclusive the diverse political community would 
be. With the close relation of nationalism and the creation of citizenship, it is important here to 
sketch briefly the birth of nation(alism) in Indonesia.  
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As a nation-state, Indonesia is a product of the twentieth century. Prior to the twentieth 
century there was no ‘Indonesia’ and thus ‘Indonesian’, though the term ‘Indonesia’ had been 
coined earlier, in 1850, by George Samuel Windsor Earl, an English traveller and social observer 
(Elson 2008, p. 1). This word was first used in the ethnographic sense to describe ‘the brown 
race of the Indian archipelago’ (Elson 2008, p. 1). Elson argued that, at the time, this word was 
used in a very general fashion. Elson’s colleague James Logan pointed out that the word more 
accurately refers to a geographical area (the Indian archipelago) than to an ethnic group (Elson 
2008, p. 1-2). In fact, ‘Indonesia’ was not used to describe both the geographical and cultural 
(people share the same culture) until the Dutch ethnologist, G.A Wilken, first did so in 1885 
(Elson 2008, p. 1-3).  
The origin of Indonesia as a political community is signalled by at least two 
developments: the first one relates to the recognition of the previously politically independent 
archipelago becoming part of the Dutch controlled territories during 1870s. From then on, the 
Netherlands of the East Indies would become ‘roughly united’ and ‘economically integrated’ 
(Elson 2008, p. 4). The second one refers to the transport infrastructure developments that 
ensured this vast archipelago area would be well connected and potentially integrated. The 
railways and roads of Java, together with ports and coastal shipping, accompanied by a unified 
currency taxation and legal system, made other places connected. This made it possible for 
people from different areas to make contact with each other and to communicate. As a result, 
the major language of trade in the archipelago, Malay, was spread more broadly (Elson 2008:7), 
to the point where, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it had become a very 
effective lingua franca. The emergence of innovative Malay newspapers such as Bintang Hindia, 
Retnodhoemilah, and Pewarta Prijaji, contributed to the fostering of a new identity for one nation 
in what is now a more unified and integrated archipelago.  
The next development of this process that brought together the idea of ‘one nation’ and 
‘one community’ was the emergence of organisations such as Sarekat Islam, Budi Oetomo and 
Indische Partij (Indies Party, IP). Indonesian students that studied overseas brought back with 
them an idea of modernity that challenged traditional epistemologies. The exchange between 
these emerging leaders then led to the creation of a new sense of nationhood that overcame the 
differences between religion, ethnicity, class and other social affiliations (Elson 2005). The Youth 
Pledge [Sumpah Pemuda], which was declared by Indonesian nationalist youth on 28 October 
1928, had been the manifestation of what becoming one political community means: being 
committed to ‘one nation, one language and one motherland.’ The rise of nationalism and the 
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national movement that led to independence in 1945 gave birth to Indonesia as a modern nation-
state (for more detail on this, see Elson 2008; Elson 2005).  
From this short history, the creation of Indonesia as one nation seems to initially reflect 
the idea of an ‘imagined community’ as proposed by Benedict Anderson (1991). Anderson 
argues that a nation is ‘an imagined political community’, being ‘imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign’ (1991, p. 6). It is imagined because the members of this political 
community never know all of the people living in the nation, nor meet them all, yet they see them 
as fellow citizens in the ‘image of their communion’ (Anderson 1991, p. 6). It is limited because 
it covers a certain territory with a definite boundary and it is a community because individuals 
see each other as sharing ‘a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson 1991, p. 6). Lastly, it is 
sovereign because it is imagined as a free political community (Anderson 1991, p. 6).  
Nationalism here can be understood as something awakened from the process of 
imagining the nation, the community. Here, Anderson differs from Gellner (1964, cited in 
Anderson 1991, p. 6) who believes that nationalism ‘invents’ the nation ‘where they do not exist’; 
it is not ‘the awakening of nations to self-consciousness’. Nationalism is different from the politics 
of ethnicity due to two kinds of seriality produced by modern imagined communities: unbound 
seriality and bound seriality (Chatterjee 2004, p. 5). Unbound seriality, Anderson argues, is 
exemplified by ‘such open-to-the-world plurals as nationalist, anarchists, bureaucrats and 
workers’, while bound seriality is exemplified by finite notions of ethnicity such as Asian-
American, Hutu, Tutsi, and so on (Anderson 2002, p. 19). Unbound serialities are ‘potentially 
liberating’, while bound serialities ‘can operate only with integers’ (Chatterjee 2004, p. 5).  
Robert Hefner pointed out that nationalism in Indonesia differs from nationalism in 
European countries, since nationalism in Indonesia is more plural and multi-ethnic, while in 
most of Europe it is more ‘a single ethnic prototype’ (2000, p. 14). Despite the fact that the vast 
majority of Indonesians are Muslim, the founding fathers (and mothers) of Indonesia deliberately 
chose not to frame the nation as a religious state (an Islamic state), nor as a purely secular one, 
because of the heterogeneity of the population in terms of religion, ethnical background, 
language and other ideological and political attributes. On this, Indonesian nationalism does not 
seem to fit into the strict distinction of civic and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism connected 
people through a common civic culture, laws, equal set of rights and obligations, while ethnic 
nationalism ties people in the name of language, religion, ethnic pre-existing customs or tradition 
(Smith 1991 and Ignatieff 1993, cited in Shulman 2002, p. 556).  
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Bowen (2005, p. 166-167) notes that nationalism and citizenship claims within 
Indonesian context might deliberatively derived from three sources of normative pluralism: 
firstly, the claim to self-governance in the name of political independence. Secondly, the claim 
in the name of adat (indigenous) norms which have been there and were used to govern the 
social cultural practices before the birth of modern Indonesia. Thirdly, the religious norms with 
reference to Islamic law pertaining to family issues such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance 
that have been enacted as positive law. These three sources have shaped the claims of citizenship 
within the current Indonesian context. It is here that the full complexity of Indonesian nation 
building and citizenship project is to be found. This will be explored in the sections that follow. 
 
2.2.1.2.2 Citizenship in the Old Order Regime 
As citizenship is deliberately projected to overcome conflict among different social 
groups and class division, it plays a significant role in nurturing the democratisation process within 
the state. Citizenship can be viewed politically as an ‘administrative tool’ of the state to control 
the population. Citizenship provides a framework for the government to manage the population. 
Drawing on Foucault (1991), citizenship can be seen as a tool to govern, i.e. it engenders a notion 
of governmentality, where through a certain type of governmental technology the population is 
directed to be socially and economically productive (Turner 2006, p. 126). It is at this point that 
‘citizenship is characterized by an ambiguity: it is a conduit of individual rights but also reflects 
the growth of state power over civil society’ (Turner 2006, p. 127).  
In the process of crafting citizenship in Indonesia, the debate over citizenship was rather 
polarising particularly during the 1950s, which represents the first critical juncture (Bertrand 
2004; Hefner 2001). There was a debate among the leaders of Indonesia at that time in relation 
to the legislative design of this important national law. While most Muslim groups, together with 
other religious groups and secular-nationalist ones, rejected the idea of an Islamic state and 
‘advocated a plural and democratic nation-state’ (Hefner 2000, p. 15), there were others within 
certain Muslim groups who demanded an Islamic state or proposed the idea to bring Islam into 
the state. They argued that ‘the end of colonialism heralded a new age of cooperation with the 
state’ and ‘Muslims’ ascent into government…was the answer to their prayers for a deeper 
Islamization of state and society’ (Hefner 2000, p. 15). The debate concluded that Indonesia 
would be founded as a modern democratic nation state, and would not have a state religion but 
nor would it fail to recognise the importance of religion.   
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Despite this fact, Hefner (2001) states that religion has been a vital element in the 
discussion of citizenship in Indonesia. Rather than focus on whether citizen’s rights should be 
differentiated by ethnicity as is the case in Malaysia, the debate during that time was whether the 
rights should be differentiated by religion. The Jakarta Charter, which requires the state to 
implement the Islamic law for all Muslims, was an example of this debate (Feillard 1995, cited 
in Hefner 2001, p. 34). This charter was rejected and Pancasila (Five Principles) minus the 
demand of the Jakarta charter was proclaimed to be the state ideology.  
Pancasila neither recognises certain religions as being state religions nor regards them as 
being merely private issues. Instead, it recognises religion as being an important element that 
constitutes the nation and places ‘believing in the one and only God’ [Ketuhanan Yang Maha 
Esa] as its first principle. However, the meaning of ‘believing in the one and only God’ has been 
the subject of multiple interpretations, particularly between Muslims, and between Muslims and 
non-Muslims, including nationalist groups. Some Muslim scholars such as Hamka tended to 
interpret it in line with monotheism associated with the meaning of tawhid in Islam. While non-
Muslim or nationalist groups rather tended to define that phrase more broadly insisting that the 
word God (Ketuhanan) does not refer to ‘belief in “God” in persona’ but rather into bringing 
‘the sacredness’ or ‘the concept of divine’ rather than God (Tuhan) per se. With this space for 
ambiguity and ambivalence in interpretation, the phrase then could openly and variably be 
interpreted according to individual and group belief systems (Ropi, 2017, p. 91-94; Howell 1982, 
p. 522-523). 
The defeat of Islamic groups in the Jakarta Charter debate did not constitute a total 
failure. The omission from the Jakarta Charter was compensated by the creation of Department 
of Religious Affairs in 1946 (Hooker 1999, p. 102). This department was initially intended to 
attend solely to the affairs of Muslim groups, but following allegations of discrimination, other 
recognised religious communities went on to be represented by the department (Intan 1996, 
cited in Seo 2012, p. 1051; Seo 2013, p. 49). This recognition of other religions is shaped by the 
debate over the meaning of religion (agama) and whether it includes all religions and beliefs or 
simply refers to some religions with certain characteristics. Six years after its creation, the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs introduced ‘a minimal’  definition of ‘religion’ that required recognised 
religions to contain core elements such as the prophet and a holy book but this definition, from 
the outset, was likely to ‘exclude’ mystical  groups since these tend to emphasize more the inner 
aspect of belief in which the God may reveal ‘himself directly into the heart of a man’ rather than 
‘through intermediaries such as prophets and holy books’ (Mulder 1980, p. 4). It is worth noting 
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that in 1953 there were more than 360 mystical groups in Indonesia in which Yogyakarta and 
Surakarta have been the important sites (Howell 1982, p. 532). This proposition was put on hold 
due to the rejection of the Balinese Hindu (Mulder 1980, p. 4) even if the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs persisted with defining religion in this manner.      
In 1954, an institution called Interdepartmental Peninjauan Kepercayaan-kepercayaan 
Didalam Masyarakat (Interdep PaKem: the Interdepartmental Institution for Monitoring of 
Beliefs in Society) was established (Howell 1982, p. 532-533; Kholiluddin 2009, p. 184-186). Its 
function was to investigate the religious practices and aims of ‘local belief’ movements (aliran 
kepercayaan) (Mulder 1980, p. 4; (Kholiluddin 2009, p. 184-186). A more detailed 
understanding of this institution was developed by the Indonesian national court (Kejaksaan 
Agung) by creating two divisions: one focused on ‘religious movements’ and the other on ‘local 
belief movements’. Part of their function was to monitor any symptoms or movements that might 
hamper the national development project. Thus, particular attention was paid to any signs of 
teachings or movements that might give rise to public disorder or otherwise create problems in 
society (Kholiluddin 2009, p. 184-186).  
In 1957, leading mystical groups demanded that the government recognize mysticism as 
an official religion, but this demand was not granted, instead President Sukarno warned them 
about the klenik, black magical expression of mysticism. The discourse over mysticism needing 
to be treated equally as other religions has coloured the debate in the late 1960-s (Mulder 1980, 
p. 5). A more rigid definition of religion was proposed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 
1961 and with this the mystical groups would be likely denied. To avoid any unexpected 
consequences such as social unrest and to keep social order in place, Sukarno decreed that there 
were ‘six officially and legally recognized religions’ (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and Confucianism) (Mulder 1980, p. 6). As a result, any groups or activities that are 
considered to be threatening to the ‘established religions or the stability of society’ could be 
‘prohibited and dissolved’ (Mulder 1980, p. 6). It was with these concerns in mind that the 
Blasphemy Law, the Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965 on the prohibition of abuse and 
desecration of religions [Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama], was finally 
introduced in 1965 (Kholiluddin 2009, p. 184-186). This decree ‘prohibited individuals from 
being hostile toward other religions or committing blasphemy of a religion’ (Human Rights 
Watch 2013, p. 13).  
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2.2.1.2.3 Citizenship in the New Order Regime   
The Indonesian political landscape underwent a dramatic change brought about by 
regime change, from the Old Order under Sukarno to the New Order under Suharto. Under 
the New Order regime, soon after the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was shut down in 
1965-1966, religion was considered as a potential threat to the state (Sutanto 2011, p. 128). This 
was evident in the policy issued, which is commonly known as SARA: Suku, Agama, Ras dan 
Antar Golongan (Tribe, Religion, Race, and Class) which effectively prohibits defamatory 
statements and prejudicial actions that touch upon sensitive social matters. With this policy, the 
activities of religious communities were tightly monitored by the government. Any conflict that 
emerged between religious groups would be seriously dealt with by the government. It was this 
logic that framed policies taken by the New Order Regime to resolve the conflict involving 
different religious communities. 
As part of this control and monitoring process, several other policies that dealt with the 
life and activities of religious communities were passed. Whilst during the Old Order, six major 
religions were officially recognised by the state, the New Order institutionalised this recognition 
by officially acknowledging five religions namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism 
and Buddhism. Confucianism – the spiritual tradition that many Indonesian Chinese identify 
with, in part or in whole – was no longer part of this set of officially sanctioned religions. This 
institutionalisation could be seen from the obligation to fill in the form of religion in national 
identity card where each person should choose one among five religions. This can be seen from 
the Circular (Surat Edaran) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs number 477/74054 issued in 1978.  
Earlier, in 1969, as the logic of the blasphemy law continued to affect the way the state 
regulated religious affairs, a joint decree was issued by the Ministers of Religious and Internal 
Affairs regarding the ‘Implementation of Government Mandates for Ensuring Law and Order 
and the Effective Administration of Religious Development and Worship by Religious 
Followers’ (Keputusan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 
1/BER/MDN-MAG/1969 tentang Pelaksaan Tugas Aparatur Pemeritahan Dalam Menjamin 
Ketertiban dan Kelancaran Pelaksanaan Pengembangan dan Ibadat Agama oleh Pemeluk-
Pemeluknya). Known as the Old Decree, it aimed to resolve the issues related to the building of 
places of worship, particularly in regions heavily dominated by other recognised religious 
communities, as these could be the potential source of social and religious conflict (Crouch 2007, 
p. 98). Instead of resolving the conflict, this ‘Old Decree’ is seen as being the source of conflict 
itself (Crouch 2007, p. 98).  
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As noted above, the New Order regime recognised and institutionalized five official 
religions – Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism (Confucianism is 
recognised in the Reform Era) that all Indonesian people are required to align with. At the same 
time, religion was made part of the educational curriculum and students in government schools 
were required to partake in religious education for at least two hours a week. Furthermore, 
religion was made part of the public and official record via the national identity card (Hefner 
2001, p. 35). This is one aspect of how the New Order regime dealt with religious matters. While 
the proposal of citizenship being differentiated on the grounds of religion was rejected, the New 
Order regime, by and large, both recognised and institutionalised religion.  
 
2.2.1.2.4 Citizenship in the Reform Era  
The end of New Order regime is marked by the ethno-communal-religious violence that 
broke out in many areas. The collapse of the New Order regime and transition to the 
Reformation Era signalled the third critical juncture in the institutional design of Indonesia. One 
of the dramatic changes that took place was in the political architecture, through the 
decentralisation policy that authorised local government to administer their region. Crouch 
(2009) notes that this change has significantly impacted regulation, particularly in relation to 
religious communities. Crouch notes that since being implemented in January 2001, the 
Decentralisation Laws ‘handed government control to the 400 regencies rather than thirty 
provinces (at that time)’ (2009, p. 55).   
This decentralisation process also facilitated the governance and implementation of 
religious regulation at the district level in the form of regional regulations – peraturan daerah – 
commonly known by the contraction ‘perda’. Based on the Law 10/2004 on Law Making 
[Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan], the district governments cannot directly issue 
any regulation related to religion since they need to submit it to the national parliament for 
approval. The perda appear in different forms such as Letters from the Governors [Surat 
Gubernur], Instructions [instruksi] of the Mayor, Circulars [Surat Edaran] and Appeals 
[Himbauan] of the Regent (Crouch 2009, p. 56-57). With these kinds of forms, religious 
regulations have been issued in the majority of provinces; at least three quarters of the total 
provinces have passed such laws (Crouch 2009, p. 58). These regulations mainly regulate public 
order and social issues, religious skills and obligation, and religious dress codes (Bush 2008, p. 
176). Crouch argues that these regional regulations often have pernicious consequences for 
vulnerable minority groups.  
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Religious regulation at the national level is also problematic. Regulations relating to places 
of worship both in 1969 and the subsequent one issued in 2006 have led to a number of 
difficulties for minority groups wishing to build places of worship (Crouch 2007, p. 97). The 
continuing attacks on Christian churches are an example of how the new regulation, which is 
aimed at fostering harmony among religious groups, can precipitate violence. Places of worship 
are no longer being respected as sacred, but rather have become sites of violence. Crouch (2007, 
p. 114-115) states that this regulation has been used by the elites to maintain support from 
Muslim voters. In other words, this regulation was applied in ways that favour protesting 
members of the Muslim community.  
In this third critical juncture, the national discourse on citizenship has been renegotiated 
and redefined. Eddyono’s study (2013) on the construction of ideal citizenship found that it is 
highly contested among different communities. She compares three civic education books 
produced by three different institutions: government institution Lemhanas (the National Defense 
Institute) (book 1), State Islamic University Jakarta (book 2), and Universitas Muhammadiyah 
Purwokerto (book 3). The three books produced by these different institutions are listed as 
national textbooks. In these three books, Eddyono found three different conceptions of ‘ideal 
citizenship’. In Lemhanas’s book, ideal citizenship refers to a secular understanding of 
citizenship framed within the conception of Pancasila/national citizenship, whilst book 2 idealises 
a pious multicultural citizen within the framework of religious-multicultural citizenship. Book 3 
considers and promotes a strictly pious-Islamic citizenship. This shows how complex the 
relationship between religion and citizenship runs in Indonesia. These divergences reflect how 
the idea of forging multicultural ‘religious citizenship’ that is mainstreamed though religious 
education in schools – as proposed by Parker and Hoon (2013) – remains a challenging one. 
 
2.2.1.3 Research Gaps 
Several key studies (Hefner 2001; Crouch 2007; 2009; Bush 2008; Kholiluddin 2009; 
Sutanto 2011; Soe 2012; Eddyono 2013; Parker and Hoon 2013) have shown how the issue of 
religion has influenced the construction of nation building and citizenship in Indonesia. Of 
particular note is the fact that the New Order regime closely monitored the affairs of religious 
communities. Religion was considered a potential threat to the stability of the state. Thus, it 
needed to be controlled, resulting in the issuance of a number of regulations related to religious 
affairs. The collapse of the military-backed authoritarian Suharto regime was marked with violent 
conflict involving religious communities. A number of regulations relating to religion were passed 
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to manage the contestation and negotiation process in the crafting of citizenship at the national 
and local level.  
Some gaps remain, however, in our understanding of these issues. For example, many 
studies (Crouch 2007; 2009; Bush 2008; Sutanto 2011; Soe 2012; Parker & Hoon 2013) seem 
to focus only on regulation and law. Indeed, while these play a role in crafting and defining 
citizenship, this does not necessarily mean that citizenship practices will be determined by them. 
This is because the reasons or justifications for certain actions might go beyond mere law and 
regulations arguments (i.e. religious messianic or primordial ethnic ones). Another gap in the 
research is that other studies (Hefner 2001; Sutanto 2011; Eddyono 2013; Parker & Hoon 2013) 
tend to focus only on the debate over the legislative framing of citizenship. This might be 
important to see how certain laws and regulations are passed and certain concepts of citizenship 
need to be crafted. Also, this might help to understand how an ‘ideal citizen’ is imagined and 
expected to behave. Nevertheless, the ideal and the real do not always align and, to some extent, 
they might contradict each other.  
What has been particularly lacking from previous studies (Hefner 2001; Crouch 2007; 
2009; Bush 2008; Sutanto 2011; Soe 2012; Eddyono 2013; Parker & Hoon 2013) is the empirical 
interrogation of how citizenship is conceptualised, developed and practiced by different 
communities in the ever-changing political climate in Indonesia. It is important to note here that 
crafting citizenship is a dynamic process where the structure (state) and the agent (civil 
society/individuals/minority groups) interact, negotiate, and affect each other. In short, it is not a 
one-way process, but rather a complex procedure where the state and civil society navigate their 
ideals and interests in the crafting of citizenship. Furthermore, in reality, religious minority groups 
are vulnerable in some areas but not others. It is at this point that this research aims to address 
these gaps and provide an important contribution on the discourse and practice of citizenship in 
Indonesia. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
2.3.1 Citizenship: A Brief History of its Plural Meanings 
The term ‘citizen’ is derived from the word cite via the Anglo-French citeseyn, citezein, 
or sithezein (Turner 2006, p. 227). Its origin lies with ancient Greek and Roman societies and it 
is associated with the formalised participation of men in public matters, to the exclusion of 
women (Turner 2006, p. 227; Shafir 1998, p. 4). In ancient Greece, citizenship signals ‘liberation’ 
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from ‘tribal loyalties’ to come into ‘a voluntary civic community’ (Shafir 1998, p. 3). Those who 
participate in public life are called citizens. In its pre-modern form, citizenship is associated with 
the city, not the nation-state, since the latter itself is, in its modern form, the product of the 
Westphalia Treaty in 1648. Citizenship is also associated with the bourgeois class, who ‘lives in 
the city and enjoys the legal privileges of an autonomous urban community’, which differentiates 
them from those living in rural areas (Turner 2006, p. 227). 
The modern form of citizenship comes to the fore as a political product of major 
revolutions, such as the English civil war (1642-1651), the American War of Independence 
(1775-1783) and the French Revolution (1789-1799). There are some similarities between these 
revolutions such as ‘the evolution of citizenship, involving a set of exclusionary rights that 
established claims to collective resources, and contributing to the formation of the state and then 
the nation’ (Isin and Turner 2007, p. 6). The creation of nation-states in Europe in the 
seventeenth century led to the creation of homogeneous populations, while in ‘a less violent 
form’ there were various political and social pressures to create civil societies in the basis of 
common language, common religion, ethnicity and identity (Turner 2006, p. 127-228). This 
process, Turner argues, is the basis for the creation of citizenship, which functions to weaken 
class divisions, identity politics and differences (Bendix 1964, cited in Turner 2006, p. 127). 
At the same time, citizenship is often defined in a more juridical sense as a set of rights 
and obligations. However, the meaning of citizenship has since evolved and transformed. It can 
be viewed as a status that denotes the ‘formal state membership and the rules of access to it’; as 
rights which are about ‘formal capacities immunities’ that are connected with ‘status’, and as an 
identity that brings a sense of collectivity where individuals ‘act and conceive’ themselves as part 
of it (Joppke 2007, p. 38). 
 Citizenship can also be understood as ‘a set of practices (juridical, political, economic 
and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a 
consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups’ (Turner 1993, p. 1). The 
key to this definition is practices, which in a sociological sense differentiates it from the juridical 
framing, and focuses on ‘the dynamic of social construction of citizenship which changes 
historically as a consequence of political struggles’ (Turner 1993, p. 1); or acts (Isin 2008) that 
particularly investigates the dynamic of practices that demand changes. In short, the meaning of 
citizenship has evolved historically to refer in recent times to participation, interaction, civic 
engagement and public protest in everyday lives. 
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2.3.2 Citizenship in Islamic/Arabic Tradition 
The concept of citizenship, together with the idea of nationalism and nation-state, has 
been the subject of considerable debate among Muslim scholars. Some believe that citizenship 
ideas are alien to the Islamic tradition, while others argue that they are not inimical to, but are in 
fact part of Islamic teachings. Indeed, these concepts did not clearly appear within Islamic 
tradition, particularly in the classical literature (Kamali 2009, p. 121); within fiqh (Islamic law) 
literature for example, there is no clear definition of citizenship. However, this does not 
necessarily mean there is no such concept within Islam resembling that of citizenship. 
Some significant attempts have been undertaken by Muslim scholars in recent times to 
place the discourse of citizenship within Islamic tradition. Typical of these attempts is the 
tendency among Muslim intellectuals to subsume the idea of citizenship under the banner of dar 
al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (the abode of war) (Kamali 2009, p. 121-122). 
Those who live in dar al-Islam are considered as citizens while those that live in dar al-harb are 
regarded as aliens unless they migrate to dar al-Islam. Subsuming the idea of citizenship under 
the banner of two opposite territorial forms of governance is unhelpful considering the 
developments in the last couple of decades, as many Muslims today do not live in the so-called 
as dar al-Islam, but live in many different nations and have become their citizens. Furthermore, 
the world has changed with international treaties and bilateral or multilateral agreements between 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries to the point where it is difficult to differentiate between dar 
al-Islam and dar al-harb. 
Tracing back the history of Islam, the concept of citizenship has long been understood 
and applied within Islamic tradition, going back as far as the Constitution of Medina (623 CE) 
(Kamali 2009, p. 122). Not only in terms of its legal framework as a set of rights and obligation 
that bind people and the government in a certain territory, this Constitution has forged a common 
platform that bounds different communities together as one. The Constitution of Medina is 
considered the first constitution written in the history of Islam (Yildirim 2006, p. 110). Although 
the initiator of this constitution was Prophet Muhammad, it is mentioned that the draft was 
consulted and discussed by the leaders of the different groups before being signed and 
implemented (Albayrak 2010, p. 6). The prophet is understood to have acted as an arbitrator in 
dealing with the demands and needs of the various religious and tribal leaders. Because the 
prophet himself was involved in mediating conflicts between warring clans, this document is also 
sometimes referred to as a ‘conflict resolution charter’ (see for example Yildirim 2006).  
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Furthermore, this charter is considered as having marked a change in dealing with 
religious and ethnic diversity within Islamic tradition. Before the Constitution of Medina, people 
were living under different tribal laws with no central government nor a single common 
community. As a result, conflict occurred quite often among different groups at that time 
(Armstrong 2006, p. 19). The Constitution of Medina could be seen as chartering new relations 
for diverse communities in Medina at that time. Under this constitution, people were treated 
equally by the state, even those who were not Muslims, such as Jews. They had the same 
obligation and duty in terms of security, and protection, and the defence of the land where they 
lived from outside threats. The freedom of religion was guaranteed and protected (article 30) 
and religious minorities (in particular people of the book i.e. Jews and Christians) were treated 
as a community among the believers. 
Those living in Medina, it was noted, ‘shall help each other in time of war’ (article 45), 
while at the same time, they were prohibited from fighting and killing each other (Article 49). 
With this, an equal protection of life is granted by the state as long as people do not do any harm 
to their fellow citizens. Whenever conflict occurs between these people, they are required to 
partake in a mutual reconciliation. Kamali (2009, p. 125) notes that with the Constitution of 
Medina, the Prophet did not place Islam as ‘a precondition of citizenship’; instead, as it is 
mentioned in many clauses within this constitution, the Prophet acknowledged other believers 
such as Jews as part of one community. 
Centuries later and acting in the same spirit, the Millet system in the Ottoman Empire 
made it possible for religious minority groups such as Orthodox Christians, Gregorian 
Armenians, and Jews to live peacefully under the protection of the Empire as long as they 
performed their responsibilities and duties (for example paying the poll tax and maintaining 
internal security) and did not threaten the government (McCharty 2001, cited in Yetisgin 2007, 
p. 145). The word millet (religious community) as used by the Ottoman Empire may refer to 
religion, religious community, and nation (Ursinus 2015). In its implementation, the central 
government did not intervene in the life of religious minorities, as each community managed 
their affairs such as welfare and schools autonomously (McCharty 2001, cited in Yetisgin 2007, 
p. 145). Although they lived under the Islamic law, there was no coercion to convert to Islam; 
instead they were granted the right to practice their religious obligations, and to protect their 
cultural heritage. They were governed by their internal laws and headed by their own leaders 
(Earle 1925, cited in Ozturk 2010, p. 74; Ozturk 2014, p. 4; Pears 1917, cited in Yetisgin 2007, 
p. 146). 
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Within the Millet system, the religious community could be seen as the basis for inclusion 
in the broader political community for non-Muslim groups. Instead of leading to social and 
political segregation, both Muslim and non-Muslim communities lived ‘next to each other’ in 
relative peace and harmony (Berkes 1998, cited in Ozturk 2010, p. 73; Ozturk 2014, pp. 2-3). It 
is worth mentioning that while being governed under Islamic law, there was no difference in term 
of rights between Muslims and non-Muslims. To access jobs in the public sector, for example, 
the Ottoman Empire did not discriminate against non-Muslim groups, with some non-Muslims 
holding high offices such as state Ministers (Vezirs) or Prime Ministers (Grand Vezirs). This 
approach to equal citizenship among various ethnic and religious communities within the 
Ottoman Empire was described as ‘the great discovery’ of the time (Ozturk 2010, p. 76; Ozturk 
2014, p. 6). 
The practice of citizenship within Islamic polity, as can be seen from the Constitution of 
Medina, focussed not only on the issue of ‘right and obligation’ toward ‘the state’, but also forged 
and fostered a sense of belonging and social bond among different communities. The 
Constitution of Medina introduced the notion of ummah (a single united community). With 
ummah, it became possible for different communities living in Medina to be united not in the 
name of tribe or kinship but in the name of a new political community, ummah. Here, scholars 
differ as to what ummah means and to what extent it ties the community. Some scholars tend to 
interpret it in the sense of religion, while the others choose to define it in the context of socio-
cultural settings.  
Al-Baghdadi and Al-Mawardi are typical examples of Muslim jurists who believe that 
having ‘unity’ instead of ‘multiplicity’ among believers under one (religious) political leadership 
is a more effective way to manage the community (Ayubi 1991, p. 14-15). By this, unity means 
can be understood as being under one big religious community. Al-Mawardi believes that since 
the integration of ummah cannot be achieved politically then it must be achieved religiously. 
Thus, the term of ummah and millah are used interchangeably. Ayubi comments that the 
interpretation of ummah with the emphasis on religion is, by and large, due to the social and 
political situation of the time, when the Sunni-Abbasids dynasty was potentially threatened by the 
rise of Imamite Shi’ism and Isma’ili Fatimism (1991, p. 14-15). Thus, both groups inclined 
toward religion to, supposedly, integrate the ummah under its banner (Islam Sunni group). 
Differing from those two classical Muslim Jurists, other Muslim scholars interpret the 
meaning of ummah more in terms of socio-cultural-historical settings. Al-Farabi, for example, 
sees the word ummah as synonymous as community, jama’a, or jam’, and it has something related 
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to the city. Furthermore, he characterises ummah as having: ‘a physical character, natural traits, 
and a common tongue’, thus it differs from millah as ‘a set of views and deeds’ (Ayubi 1991, p. 
14). Al-Mas’udi defined the umma in term of millah, but different from Al-Baghdadi and Al-
Mawardi since this millah is not specific to Islam. As a consequence, one ummah may consist of 
several millah. Furthermore, he emphasises that this ummah has some characteristics such as 
physical appearance, common tongue and one king (Ayubi 1991, p. 14).  
Another progressive interpretation of ummah comes from Ibn Khaldun. For him, 
ummah is different from millah, and is more related to race or group of people. The concept of 
Islamic community that classical jurists usually refer to as ummah is not accepted by Ibn Khaldun 
since for him ummah is more ‘a longer term’ than dynasty or dawlah; thus he spoke of Egyptians, 
Persians, Greeks, and so on (Ayubi 1991, p. 14). The term millah, not ummah, is used by Ibn 
Khaldun in reference to Islamic community (Ayubi 1991, p. 16). Another important feature of 
ummah in Ibn Khaldun’s interpretation is when he relates this term with watan (Ayubi 1991, p. 
16), which has the connotation of state in the era of nation-state where it also implies the specific 
relationship between a certain group to a certain territory. With this kind of interpretation, the 
term ummah is compatible with that of nationalism, nation-state and, thus, citizenship.   
The interpretation of ummah from the socio-cultural-historical settings is more similar to 
the Western idea of citizenship since it does need to be based solely on one single religion but 
also groups and diverse communities, and even a state in its territorial sense. On the contrary, 
defining ummah in terms of one religion could be seen as unrealistic considering the fact that 
there is now no single unity called as Islamic country whose power and legitimacy covers the 
whole Islamic community in the world. By the time the Ottoman Empire fell, any notion of 
Muslim political community has disintegrated, and it re-emerged as fifty-odd separate Muslim 
nation-states. Moreover, these countries have their own regulation and administrative systems 
including citizenship laws. 
Based on the Constitution of Medina and the Millet System, it could be said that while 
acknowledging community rights and entitlements, Islam also guarantees individual rights. As 
can be seen from these practices, non-Muslims have been protected, and have had the same 
obligations and rights as Muslims; within the Millet System they were able to rise to high 
positions, even while being under the Islamic law. Islam respected the freedom of religion. It is 
mentioned in the Qur’an, surah al-Baqarah [2:256]: laa ikraha fid-Deen (there is no compulsion 
in religion), that there should be no coercion to embrace any religion. Islamic polity practices as 
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seen in the Constitution of Medina and the Millet System also show that the practices of religious 
obligation among different religious communities are endorsed and acknowledged. 
Discussing the concept of citizenship in Islam/Arab tradition is important because in 
most contemporary cases, the violence and intolerant actions against minority groups were 
committed by religious (Islamic) groups who claim to be acting in the name of Islam and often 
use religious (Islamic) arguments to justify their actions. Words such as infidel, heresy, kafir, are 
often used to refer to the religious minority groups, who are of different denominations or have 
different understandings of religion. Furthermore, Islamic accounts of citizenship may open new 
possibilities regarding the way the concept was conceived and can be developed in the context of 
the case studies in this project.  
 
2.3.3 Citizenship in Javanese Tradition 
As noted above, since the research sites are the two Central Java old royal cities of 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta, both being predominantly Javanese, it is important here to sketch 
briefly the concept of citizenship in Javanese tradition. These two cities are lying at the heart of 
‘the court civilization of the Javanese’ (Koentjaraningrat 1989, p. 11) or are the places where ‘the 
heart of the Javanese tradition beats’ (Shiraishi 1990, p. 38). The term of modern citizenship 
may not appear in Javanese language and culture, but it is believed that the cultural practices of 
Javanese tradition have partly shaped the construction of politics, culture and social relations in 
Indonesia (Antlov 2005, p. 43). Javanese norms such as mutual assistance [gotong royong], 
consensus [musyawarah], respect [hormat], family-ness [kekeluargaan], Javanese spiritualism 
[kebatinan], and the whole man [manusia seutuhnya] have shaped the idea of national identity 
(Antlov 2005, p. 44). These values bring the notion of solidarity, togetherness and the way the 
Javanese interact with each other and other people. 
In terms of the relationship between citizen and the government, the concept of kawula 
(servant) and gusti (lord) might help to illuminate how the King or the Government are seen in 
Javanese culture. While this concept is found to be expressed in religious terms to signify the 
relationship between human beings and God, this concept is also used when Javanese people 
interact with the King (Mudjanto 1986, p. 106-107). Kawula refers to the people, the governed 
subjects, while gusti refers to the lord, the rulers (Mudjanto 1986, p. 107). Together with this is 
the concept of acceptance [narima] that describes how citizenship is conceptualised in Javanese 
culture. In the words of Darmaputera (1982, cited in Antlov 2005, p. 49),  
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every puppet is assigned a specific role to play. That is why narima, the voluntary 
acceptance of one’s assigned role, is one of the most important virtues for the 
Javanese.  
Due to narima, they obey and serve the government, gusti [lord] and do their role without 
any burden because it is ‘a blessing’ (Darmaputera 1982, cited in Antlov 2005, p. 49).  
The concept of narima constitutes an important part in Javanese polity where a president 
symbolises Bapak [father], a person who nurtures the children and whom the children should 
respect to ‘apprehend social harmony’ (Antlov and Hellman 2005, p. 11). This metaphor may 
illustrate the position of ruler in Javanese tradition. The idea of narima is associated with 
commoners [wong cilik] (Darmaputera 1982, cited in Antlov 2005, p. 49) while power may refer 
to the ruler. This shows that the notion of citizenship within Javanese society is hierarchical. 
However, it is ‘characterized by harmonious reciprocity, even great satisfaction’ (Antlov 2005, p. 
50). This is because the king or the ruler within Javanese tradition is conceptualised as ‘a man of 
many good deeds’ (Mudjanto 1986, p. 103), someone with a pure heart. Ideal governance in 
Javanese culture is associated with negari ingkang apanjang-apunjung, pasir wukir loh jinawi, 
gemah ripah, karta tur raharja, Javanese concepts that resemble the idea of ‘prosperity, wisdom, 
justice, and the emphasis on public welfare’ (Mudjanto 1986, p. 105).  
With this idealised concept of governance, the Javanese polity also highlights the 
important role of power. Anderson (2007, p. 5-8) argues that the concept of power in Java is 
different from that of the European one. One of the main distinctions is that power in Javanese 
culture is concrete, not abstract. While in the West power is used to describe ‘a relationship or 
relationships’, in Java, it is ‘an existential reality... intangible, mysterious and divine energy that 
animates the universe...and is manifested in every aspect of the natural world’. Following on from 
this, the Javanese conception of power is understood to be ‘homogenous’, not ‘heterogeneous’ 
like the European construct; in the latter, relationships are not seen as unitary, but multiple, are 
classified in different forms and patterns, and thus are a different source of power. In Javanese 
tradition, as all power derives from ‘divine energy that animates the universe’, there is no 
difference whether the power relates to the individual or a group of people. There is no such 
division of power in Javanese polity, rather it is characterised by totality (Mudjanto 1986, p. 104). 
Furthermore, in Javanese culture, power ‘does not raise the question of legitimacy’ since it comes 
from the ‘single homogenous source’, thus the differentiation of power based on wealth or 
weapons for example, and whether which one is legitimate and illegitimate, is not recognised.   
With this conception, power in Javanese polity can be possessed by individual persons 
but it is ‘never created or altered by them’; rather, it ‘flows from a radiating centre and spreads 
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like circles on the water’ (Antlov 2005, p. 51), or it can be seen as ‘a cone of light cast downwards 
by a reflector lamp’ (Anderson 2007, p. 12). Anderson (2007, p. 13) notes that instead of 
demonstrating the use of power, Javanese polity emphasises ‘the signs of Power’s concentration’ 
that can be represented in ‘the person of the Power-holder and in society in which he wields his 
Power’. Furthermore, the closer people are to the centre, the greater the power they can sense. 
Conceptualising power in this manner implies that the greater the spiritual power a person 
possesses the higher social position they attain (Antlov 2005, p. 51). 
Nevertheless, the use of power in Javanese tradition should be understood more than 
‘the idea of power per se’ but also ‘the justifications and explanations of the elite’s superior 
position and righteous rule’ (Antlov 2005, p. 59). Consequently, in Javanese tradition, the King 
or the rulers are illustrated as always being concerned with the welfare of the people (Mudjanto 
1986, p. 105). In actual political practice, power may be seen as ‘flowing from the exchanges of 
goods and services’; it may take in the form of authoritative power ‘personified by the armed 
soldier placed in each Indonesian village’; or a ‘pluralist, democratic conception, in which 
community leaders (headman and village council members) are elected in power’ (Antlov 2005, 
p. 58). The different conceptualisations of power and politics in Java comes from the historical 
development of fragmented ideologies. This is evident in popular movements in Java, class 
struggles and ideological competitions.  
The Javanese norms and how they contribute to the construction of national identity, the 
relationships between the ruler and the ruled, and thus of citizenship, point to the important 
relation between culture and politics. The use of cultural symbols in legitimising political powers 
and practices could be the best example of how culture plays an important role in defining powers 
and politics. The extent to which culture may affect the way politics is conducted may depend 
on the social, political and cultural circumstances. Even in Java, Antlov notes, people do not 
conceptualise culture and power in a single form (2005, p. 56). They have contested the meaning 
of power, how it should be conceptualised and how the relationship between the ruled and the 
rulers can be defined (Antlov 2005, p. 56). This is due, as Keontjaraningrat (1989, p. 11) notes, 
to Javanese culture not being a single homogenous one, but recognises regional diversity. 
In term of social life, Javanese culture is characterised by ‘harmonious social relations’ 
whereas every decision requires ‘consensus, without conflict’ (Antlov and Hellman 2005, p. 12). 
This ‘harmonious’ and ‘consensus’ relation can be seen from how Javanese people emphasise 
more on the interest of the people, the community, over individuals. The concept of gotong 
royong, which stresses ‘common endeavour, mutual help mutual understanding’ 
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(Koentjaraningrat 1989, p. 461) implies how the community or communal bond priority describe 
Javanese people’s conceptualisation of the relationship between community and individual. 
Thus, the idea of collectiveness or togetherness is central to Javanese tradition. As 
Koentjaraningrat (1989, p. 461) notes, the development of this concept in Javanese tradition may 
restrict the individual emphasis of liberal tradition.  
The relationship between citizens and government, the ruled and the ruler in Javanese 
culture remains contentious and may take different forms in different cities. Therefore, looking 
at the citizenship practices in Yogyakarta and Surakarta opens the possibility to see what kind of 
cultural understanding may assist in comprehending how citizenship is conceptualized and 
developed and, furthermore, how this conceptualisation of citizenship may affect everyday 
practice. 
 
2.3.4 Citizenship in Western Traditions  
Thomas H. Marshall (1992) introduced three forms of rights that constitute citizenship: 
political rights, civil rights, and social rights. Civil rights, such as the rights of property, were born 
in response to the absolutisms in the seventeenth century. Political rights developed in the 
following century, the eighteenth, with the evolution of modern parliamentary democracy, while 
social rights developed as the latest form of citizenship during the twentieth century with the 
advent of the welfare state as its political embodiment. Marshall argues that social rights, including 
health entitlement and unemployment benefit, are the latest evolution of rights and thus of 
citizenship. 
Marshall’s account of citizenship, while being referred to as the foundation of liberal 
citizenship, has also been a subject of criticism. It is worth noting that the notion of citizenship 
developed by Marshall was a response to problems of class and social divisions due to the growing 
working class in Britain at that time (Turner 1993, p. 6). One of the criticisms is the evolutionist 
nature of citizenship, wherein it is difficult to explain how civil and political rights should come 
before social rights. In certain cases, it is possible to see where social rights have been granted, 
but the civil and political rights are underdeveloped, as is the case with women for example. 
Another important critique is that social rights are considered as the final form, in spite of the 
fact that the challenge on citizenship has been continually growing in the last decade, with the 
rise of cultural or communal and/or religious demands for recognition.   
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The basic tenet of the liberal tradition of citizenship is ‘individual’, while the argument 
proposed by the diverse cultural groups resonates more at the ‘collective’ level. Thus, the 
demand for recognition is in line with the idea of collective rights, which is not acknowledged in 
any significant way by many conservative liberal theorists. 
Taylor (1994) in his seminal work on the ‘Politics of Recognition’ argues that  
identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition 
of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining 
or demeaning… picture of themselves.  
Therefore, ‘non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’ (Taylor 1994, 
p. 15). Since individuals grow up in certain social contexts, to some extent individual identity 
relates to their social groups or culture. Thus, understanding people or groups may require 
understanding their culture. It is at this point that the demand for recognition lays the foundation 
for potential conflict, as with the basic idea of ‘colour blindness’ within modern liberal tradition 
implying that individuals (and groups) are equal before the law.  
On this tension, Taylor sees that the politics of citizenship within liberalism is 
inhospitable to cultural differences, due to an application of uniformity with ‘the rules defining 
the rights, without exception’ and differences being ‘suspicious of collective goals’ (1994, p. 60). 
Taylor (1994, p. 62) argues that some Muslim groups believe that there is no separation between 
religion and politics, which is the hallmark of Western civilization. Therefore, liberal values may 
not serve as the basis to judge other cultures since liberalism is a product of a certain culture or 
civilization. To judge conflict in relation to different cultural and religious values is to potentially 
‘violate’ the cultural differences, and thus the values of citizenship.  
In response to the challenge of culture and religion within citizenship, a quite distinct 
account is offered by Kymlicka (1995), who proposes to grant cultural or religious groups a 
degree of cultural recognition rights. He begins his argument by defining what culture is since 
this is fundamental for his theoretical argument on minority rights. Culture may refer to ‘the 
distinct customs, perspectives, or ethos of group or associations’ (Kymlicka 1995, p. 18), which 
refers to a narrower definition of culture, compared to a wider one that can be defined along 
broader civilizational terms. Both definitions, for Kymlicka (1995, p. 18), have their own 
problems. The first definition leads to the consequence that ‘the most ethnically homogenous 
state’, such as Iceland, could be considered a multicultural country since its citizens are involved 
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or participate in groups of different associations, be they in the name of religion, lifestyle, gender 
affiliation or political ideologies. Contradicting this, the second definition would emphasise the 
notion that the most multi-national and multi-ethnic countries such as Switzerland and Australia 
respectively are less culturally diverse if their citizens share and participate into the same form of 
modern industrialised life. 
These definitions, Kymlicka found, are not enough to build a more coherent theory of 
minority rights and therefore he uses a different meaning of culture, more akin to ‘a people’ or 
‘a nation’ (1995, p. 18). By ‘a people’ or ‘a nation’ he means ‘an intergenerational community, 
more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct 
language and history’ (1995, p. 18). With this definition, he notes that a state could be called 
multicultural if ‘its members either belong to different nations (a multination state), or have 
emigrated from different nations (a poly-ethnic state), and if this fact is an important aspect of 
[their] personal identity and political life’. With this definition, Kymlicka (1995, p. 19) 
differentiates between national minorities and ethnic groups. The first refers to cultural groups 
who previously occupy a certain territory and are then incorporated in the larger society. One 
example of these groups is the Quebecois in Canada who are francophone whilst the rest of the 
country are Anglophone. The second type is that of immigrant groups who have ‘a loose 
association’ to an ‘ethnic group’ within which these groups wish to be incorporated into to the 
larger society. While they might be demanding recognition, they do not attempt to separate from 
the larger group, but ask for the laws to respect their cultural differences (Kymlicka 1995, p. 15).  
The first group is eligible for special political status – the right to speak their own language 
and native land use as self-government. This is due to the fact that before joining or being 
incorporated into the larger society they may have engaged in self-governing. They also have their 
own territory, distinct culture and are entitled to call themselves ‘a distinct society’ (Kymlicka 
2001, p. 10). On the other hand, the second group do not have such rights because they do not 
qualify as a ‘nation’, as they simply do not occupy their own territory. Furthermore, they are still 
required to participate in the public sphere, adjust to the dominant culture and speak the 
common language. Their demand for recognition is not geared towards creating a parallel society 
but rather towards acknowledging their cultural particularity (Kymlicka 1995, p. 15); thus, they 
may be asking for poly-ethnic rights (Kymlicka 1995, p. 31).  
It should be noted, however, that Kymlicka qualifies which cultural groups would be 
granted minority rights. The demands for such rights, he argues, would only be fulfilled when 
they respect the basic foundation of liberal principles such as freedom, autonomy, self-reflection 
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and choice (1995, p. 37). This goes in line with his idea to differentiate what he called as ‘internal 
restriction’ and ‘external protection’ regarding the notion of cultural membership (1995, p. 35). 
Internal restriction means that cultural groups demand restrictions on basic individual civil and 
political rights. This means that the individual may not be able to reassess the cultural value they 
subscribe to, implying that there is no freedom within minority groups. The external protection 
refers to the demands by cultural groups to reduce their vulnerability in relation to 
mainstream/dominant society. The liberal view prefers external protection as long as the group 
provides equal treatment to others (Kymlicka 1995, p. 37). 
While the idea put forward by Kymlicka might solve the tension between ‘individual’ and 
‘community’ membership, some scholars such as Young (1997, p. 50) still argue that the idea of 
distinguishing between cultural groups in what Kymlicka calls ‘national minorities’ and ‘the 
immigrants’ remains somewhat problematic. This is due to the diversity of cultural groups 
reduced only to these two categories. In fact, there are some groups that could not be considered 
as national minorities or simply as voluntarily immigrants (Young 1997, p. 50). A good example 
would be African-Americans, who are the descendants of slaves transported by colonial powers 
by force. This is similar to people of Indian descent brought by the British in many parts of Asia 
and Africa. 
Furthermore, Young (1997, p. 51) argues that the distinctions between the two groups 
identified by Kymlicka could be simplified as one group who has the right to be a ‘separate and 
distinct society’, and those who wish or are expected to integrate into the larger society. Following 
this logic, therefore, separation and integration would be the only options available for cultural 
minority groups. This potentially questions the basic idea of multicultural citizenship since self-
government may lead to a separation that may endanger political unity. At the same time, the 
integration argument for ethnic groups can also lead to problems. In some cases, the cultural and 
religious groups may demand access to economic opportunity and their incorporation into the 
political decision-making process, while at the same time rejecting the notion that they integrate 
into the dominant national culture (Young 1997, p. 52).  
Young (1990; 1989) also points to the problem within the idea of liberal citizenship: the 
emphasis on universality in a way that potentially undermines the particularity and differences 
among communities. Young criticises the universality claim of citizenship on two points: 
universality as generality and universality as equal treatment (Young 1989, p. 151). As generality, 
the idea of universality concerns the activities of citizenship that produce ‘general will’ that in turn 
transcends the differences among different groups. While this idea sounds reasonable, the will 
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to seek general will tends to exclude certain groups, particularly those who are ‘not capable of 
adopting that general point of view’, for example those who still hold so-called ‘illiberal values’ 
against dominant liberal general will. In other words, the idea of universality tends to lean towards 
homogeneity and thus undermines the heterogeneity of people in terms of their tradition, culture 
or religion.  
As for universality as equal treatment, universal citizenship tends to treat different groups 
of people as equal. While this idea sounds laudable and even benevolent, the problem with this 
is that in reality, groups of people are often treated discriminately due to their different culture, 
physical appearance, tradition or religion. It might be true that in laws or regulations such cases 
do not exist, however, in everyday life there are many groups who feel they are being excluded, 
as is the case with black, Indian, or Asian people in the United States. Thus, to some extent, 
speaking of equal treatment whilst negating the fact that in real life people are treated differently, 
will only serve to sustain the existing order of privileged groups and to undermine the non-
privileged ones. As a result, Young highlights the important point of representation and thus 
proposes the idea of differentiated citizenship to accommodate these particularities and 
differences.  
Therefore, and different from a general understanding of representation as more of 
substitution of groups of people during their absence, Young (2000, p. 126-127) tends to define 
representation as ‘a process involving a mediated relation of constituents to one another and to 
a representative’. The key point here is that representation is not an identity substitution for 
constituency since the will of groups of people cannot be represented by a single person. Rather, 
representation emphasises a relationship where there is a connection between the different 
groups (represented and the representative), and thus it is a kind of differentiated relationship. 
As a consequence of this logic, representation functions as ‘speaking for’, not ‘speaking as’. 
Furthermore, and borrowing the concept of trace by Derrida, Young (2000, p. 127) highlights 
that representation always involves the history of the relationship between the constituent and 
the representative where it can be traced back in the past as it can be anticipated in the future.  
There are three modes of representation in which someone can be represented, as 
Young argues (2000): firstly, when it comes to interest. Interest here may mean something 
important to individuals or groups of people or organisations that can lead to achieve their goals. 
It may refer to material or non-material things such as cultural or religious expression. In social 
life, pursuing interests is inevitable and may lead to conflict between people, evident in the 
political arena where competing interests between political actors are a common scenario. 
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Secondly, people can be represented when it comes to opinion or, as Young (2000, p. 135) refers 
to, the ‘principles, values and priorities’ a person holds that affect they the way they pursue or 
judge something, and what kind of policies should be issued. Within social life, groups or 
associations may offer certain principles or values in their name to express opinions on certain 
issues or to affect public policies. As such, political parties offer some programs that are designed 
in accordance with certain principles that they believe express the interests of the people. Thirdly, 
representation may occur when it comes to perspective. The perspective here refers to the way 
a person or groups of people view certain issues in relation to their experience, history, or social 
understanding, which comes from the social position they occupy in relation to other groups or 
people. Differing from interest and opinion, the perspective consists of ‘a set of questions, kinds 
of experience and assumptions with which reasoning begins’ (Young 2000, p. 137). With this 
definition, people may belong to different groups but are likely to share the same perspective, 
due to their position in social space in relations to others.  
Given the importance of representation in the differentiated citizenship concept, it is 
important to sketch briefly what a social group means for Young. While Kymlicka focuses on 
cultural groups, Young (1989) tends to focus on social groups, which she defines as having a 
shared affinity either in the sense of history, perspective, or mode of reasoning. Its nature is more 
of an association rather than an aggregate that is signified by a certain attribute. A common 
objective attribute such as skin colour may set this affinity, but it is not always the case where 
people may have different colour skin but they share the affinity because of social relations. With 
this association, people join the group voluntarily, and may leave the groups whenever the affinity 
is no longer there. A social group or a group identity then needs to be understood in a relational 
term. With this in mind, the identification of social groups is always relational, meaning that there 
is no such an essence of group identity. As a social group, it may ‘come into being and fade away’.  
What needs to be emphasised here is that while some social groups earn privileges, 
others often feel oppressed. Young (1989, p. 161) identifies several forms of oppression in which 
it may refer to exploitation, where others’ work benefit to other groups but not reciprocated. 
Oppression may also occur when people feel marginalised due to being excluded from 
participating in certain social activities. Powerlessness is another form of oppression whereby 
people may live under others’ control and have little autonomy and authority over themselves. 
Another form of oppression is a kind of cultural imperialism where people are stereotyped due 
to their differences from others, and with this they have limited opportunity to express themselves 
in any social events. Lastly, oppression may take in the form of violence, either physical or non-
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physical, such as harassment or intimidation. It is at this point when citizenship needs to be 
differentiated to ensure that different social groups can be represented in any social and political 
decision-making process. 
Parekh offers a similar critique to the concept of multicultural citizenship proposed by 
Kymlicka. Since Kymlicka argues his approach to multicultural citizenship from the perspective 
of liberal theory, Parekh (1997) contends that this is only relevant to liberal Western society and 
not other types of non-Western, ‘non-liberal’ ones. In fact, so-called multicultural societies today 
incorporate both liberal and non-liberal cultures, with ongoing contestations between the two. 
The question remains as to how acceptance and toleration of liberal groups can be justified vis-
à-vis non-liberal ones, especially when the latter group is required to subscribe to the basic 
principles of liberal tradition. Otherwise, Kymlicka’s theory may well be considered as a 
framework for an internal dialogue strictly among liberal groups. Furthermore, Parekh (1997, p. 
58) argues that Kymlicka tends to over-simplify things by stating that there is a single societal or 
national culture. In fact, there is a substantial range of variations in Western societies and it would 
be a simplification to call them ‘simply liberal’. 
The argument posed by Kymlicka, whereby individuals can reflect on, revise or choose 
the values of cultures which are appropriate for them, or suit the liberal tradition, might be 
plausible. However, as Parekh (1997) notes, this is only one way among others to depict the 
relationship between the individual and group culture. Some communities, such as migrant 
religious minorities, tend to see their culture and tradition as part of a divine revelation that needs 
to be preserved, cherished and transmitted from one generation to the next. The attempt to 
revise or strongly criticise this sacred belief could be considered as a violation of basic rights and 
in some cases as an outright act of blasphemy. Moreover, this kind of culture also requires loyalty 
from members of the minority cultural-religious group. This is not to say that individuals, while 
preserving their culture or religious tradition, would fail to adapt to the new situation: they do in 
fact have the capacity to adapt to changing conditions, but in this way they may not follow what 
the liberal tradition proposes to them.  
With regard to the important point of religious practice, the difficulties of universal liberal 
citizenship in accommodating religious expression is due to the fact that citizenship has been 
seen as something inherently secular in the same way that liberalism, in general, inherently 
implies secularism. Secularisation theories predict that as modernisation progresses religion will 
decline and will be constrained to the private sphere, since as it is perceived to be incompatible 
with modern society and its secular values. While the modern is characterised as rational and 
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civilised, religion is associated with superstition and backwardness, and thus does not conform 
with modern life (Berger 1999, p. 3). It is not surprising then that religion, in this secular 
framework, is increasingly viewed as hostile toward citizenship (Turner 2002, p. 262). This 
argument is rejected by Turner (2002) who argues that religion may provide a strong foundation 
for citizenship since it offers both a social bond that goes beyond kinship and primordial ethnic 
ties.  
Hudson (2003) reflects further on how religion could be best theorised in the citizenship 
discourse. For him, religious citizenship can take different forms: firstly, a nation-state model 
where the state allows its citizens to perform religious obligations and it is acknowledged in the 
constitution, and secondly, a civil society model in which citizens could exercise their rights as 
religious person in the public domains. This model allows the citizens to develop ‘different 
religious citizenships in different domains’.  
Thirdly, religious citizenship could take into account the rights of persons that may be 
exercised within the community and when there is an obligation to perform these at the local, 
national, or international level. The fourth model refers to the specific legal documents that 
acknowledges and requires that the states oblige to these particular regulations on religious issues 
such as the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, which was introduced by the United Nations in 1981. Lastly, 
religious citizenship may refer to a person who acquires citizenship by taking a position or 
declaring themselves as part of a particular religious group so that any rights could be claimed 
and obligations required of them could be exercised. This insight on religion by Hudson (2003) 
might help to unpack the complexity of religion in the discourse of citizenship in which it can 
take different forms and pose some practical challenges.  
While Kymlicka, Young and Hudson offer a framework of citizenship to accommodate 
the expression coming from cultural and religious communities, it is also important to discuss 
the performative aspect of citizenship. This discussion offers a more nuanced approach to 
citizenship since rights, by nature, need to be exercised and claimed if they are to be accessed 
and practised. Within citizenship tradition, this performative aspect of citizenship could be traced 
back to the republicanism school of thought. Republican tradition emphasises more the notion 
of active citizens and public participation in order to pursue common interests and a public virtue 
(Honohan 2015, p. 10). This public participation defines what a citizen is. This participation or 
performative aspect goes beyond the legal-status aspect of citizenship. This suggests that looking 
at status only would be insufficient when studying citizenship in the context of culturally and 
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religiously diverse societies. In this context, citizenship needs to be understood as a set of 
practices that can be used to define a person as a member of a pluralist society.  
Turner (1993) argues that to look at citizenship as practices, one is required to shift the 
focus from the legal status to ‘the dynamic of social construction of citizenship which changes 
historically as a consequence of political struggles’ (Turner 1993, p. 1). Furthermore, White 
(2008, p. 48) suggests that citizenship is comprised of ‘a pure tendency towards stasis and a pure 
tendency towards movement and change’. This ‘stasis’ tendency refers to habitual practices and 
collective beliefs that make it possible for the society to be sustained and remain stable, while the 
‘movement and change’ refers to the dynamic of the society that might break the habitual 
practices and thus need for change. This means that citizenship may mean participation, civic 
engagement, interaction in everyday life and any acts or movements that seek social change.  
Within this ‘movement and change’, Isin and Nielsen (2008) introduced the concept of 
‘acts of citizenship’. Differentiated from practices that take the form of habitual performance and 
thus are based on ‘order’, acts of citizenship focus more on the rupture, and thus emphasise its 
dynamic aspect. This approach reflects how claims are articulated and subjectivities are formed 
(Benhabib 2004; Soysal 1994, cited in Isin 2008). Dealing with acts requires an investigation of 
the acts, actions and actors. Here, Isin (2008) differentiates between an act and an action. An act 
refers to ‘an expression of the need to be heard’, while an action is the actuality of such act, which 
could take different forms. Thus, act is more virtual and action is more actual. With this logic, 
an act precedes an action and produces an actor. Furthermore, since an act needs to be heard, it 
brings the sense of dialogical elements within it.  
Drawing from the concept of the acts of citizenship, Turner (2008) discusses acts of piety 
as the foundation of citizenship and how this is institutionalised in line with the secularist 
conceptualisation in which religion has no place. The modern nation-state has its foundation in 
the Westphalian Treaty which, in 1648, separated religion from public life, thus making the 
relationship between ‘the act of piety and the act of citizenship become problematic’. Acts of 
piety, in this context, bring back the religious arguments into the public that ruptured the norm 
of secularised public life. This ‘pietization of acts’ can take the form, for example, of requesting 
a change of office hours because of an obligation to perform religious rituals. It might also take 
into consideration the demand of ‘islamization’ of certain regulations, where religious groups 
believe that ‘the secular regulation’ is outdated and insufficient to accommodate religious 
demands.  
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These acts of piety require further investigation in relation to their challenges to 
citizenship theories since they go beyond the legal-normative framing. There are at least four 
typical ways of dealing with the challenge that arises out of cultural and religious diversity in the 
context of citizenship (Parekh 2000, p. 165-266). The first is what Parekh called universal moral 
values, where the universal human rights are the standards of evaluation. The second is the 
principle of core or common values that may represent the moral minimum of each culture, are 
neutral in nature and can be a standard of evaluation. Since most cultures have their own unique 
history, this standard of evaluation potentially violates the different values among cultures. The 
third is what Parekh called the no-harm principle, which argues that since moral values are 
culturally embedded, evaluation should be based on whether the cultural practices do no harm 
to the people. Only those principles that cause harm to the people should be disallowed. The 
fourth is the principle of dialogical consensus, whereby dialogue will be conducted to make 
concessions and achieve compromises.  
As such acts highlight the importance of dialogue, Parekh proposes the idea of dialogical 
consensus where dialogue is conducted in order to make concessions and achieve compromises. 
Nevertheless, Parekh argues, ‘it is unlikely to take us far in the abstract and context-less form 
proposed by its advocates’ (2000, p. 167). Consequently, there should be a clear starting point in 
engaging with this dialogue. Parekh proposes what he called operative public values that operate 
on three levels: (1), constitution; (2) laws; and (3) norms governing the civil relation between 
members of society (2000, p. 167-269). Constitution here refers to the ultimate source or 
regulation whereby the basic legal and moral design of the polity is formulated with reference to 
it. While constitution is general, laws are more specific, providing a legal framework that regulates 
the daily life of citizens. While the constitution constrains the laws, these laws are not necessarily 
derived from the constitutional values. The last one refers to norms or values that are agreed 
upon and regulate the daily lives of the people. Laws regulate many but not all of these kind of 
activities, for example the relationship between neighbours, the norms for using public transport, 
etc. Thus, these norms are also referred to as civic values. For Parekh (2000), these norms occupy 
‘an intermediate realm between the structured relations of organized public life and the intimate 
relations of personal and private life’.  
Drawing from the work of Gibson (2007) on the symbolic forms of knowledge in 
Southeast Asia, the first two might refer to the modern symbolic form of knowledge evidenced 
in the work of modern bureaucracy, while the latter could refer to traditional and charismatic 
symbolic form of knowledge that could take into the forms of religious and cultural values. 
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Discussing and negotiating these values in an intercultural dialogical process would help the 
different communities to create or craft a common sense of belonging and solidarity that can 
nurture democratic and inclusive citizenship.  
To summarise, the idea of constructing citizenship in relation to minority groups in the 
Western liberal tradition has been challenged on many fronts, as it places the individual at the 
core of its concern. Some liberal theorists such as Kymlicka argued for multicultural citizenship 
where it is possible for minority groups to have ‘poly-ethnic rights’ and preserve their culture and 
tradition as long as these cultures and traditions meet the liberal criteria. Young, on the other 
hand, proposes the idea of differentiated citizenship in which the vulnerable groups have 
representatives that make it possible for them to be represented in public participation, and social 
and political decision making. This framework of citizenship allows vulnerable social groups to 
be freed from any forms of oppression: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural 
imperialism and violence. Hudson goes one step further and proposes the idea of religious 
citizenship, which can take different forms and requires more interrogation on how to place 
religious issues in the discourse of citizenship. Furthermore, Turner, Isin, Nielsen, and White 
propose to focus more on the dynamic, performative aspects of citizenship found in everyday 
activities. Finally, Parekh proposes a more deliberative approach to citizenship, which could be 
situated along a dialogical process whereby people from different communities could deliberate 
democratically over common principles to reach an agreement that might facilitate a more 
dialogical approach to citizenship practices. These proposals make it possible to situate the idea 
of citizenship as an inclusive process that is open to being contested and negotiated.  
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Figure 8 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
The citizenship concept used in this project is sociological par excellence where, 
following Turner, it is understood as ‘a set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) 
which define a person a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the 
flow of resources to persons and social groups’ (Turner 1993, p. 1). The key to this definition is 
the notion of practices, which differs from the more normative juridical approach. This allows 
us to understand ‘the dynamic of social construction of citizenship which changes historically as 
a consequence of political struggles’ (Turner 1993, p. 1). As a series of practices, citizenship is 
‘essential for cultivating civic virtues and democratic values’ (Isin and Turner 2007, p. 5). 
Citizenship practices may refer to participation, interaction and civic engagement in everyday 
lives. This approach allows for a more performative interpretation of ‘religious’ citizenship, 
where acts of religious practice can engender outcomes associated with coexistence and 
conviviality rather than intercultural conflict and discrimination. 
Therefore, a citizenship approach as adopted in this study is understood as a dynamic 
process where the structure (state) and the agent (individuals/community groups within society) 
interact, negotiate, and affect each other. This is not a one-dimensional process whereby a 
minority group is expected to simply acquiesce and abandon its collective religious and cultural 
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rights. Rather, it implies a complex two-way process, where the state and the community group 
negotiate, adapt and navigate their ideals and interests in the process of performing citizenship. 
In this respect, the religious and cultural dimensions of citizenship might play significant roles in 
the way religious communities understand and practice religious citizenship. It is worth noting 
the importance of space and how public spaces are organised in order to facilitate different social 
groups’ participation in social and political decision-making process (Young 1990; 1989). 
Citizenship can be seen as a process open to being questioned, contested and negotiated by the 
different communities in response to the dynamic of political and social change in order to 
achieve common ground. Whether there is a notion of poly-ethnic rights (Kymlicka 1995) or 
differentiated citizenship (Young 1990; 1998), for example, will be examined further in this study.  
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CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Research Approach  
This research project is qualitative in nature and seeks to understand the meanings 
constructed by members of minority groups in Indonesia in relation to religious expression and 
practices; that is, how individuals make sense of the world in which they live and the kind of 
experiences in which they partake in the specific context of the study’s focus, namely religious 
citizenship (see Merriam 2009, p. 13; Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p. 3). The case study approach 
employed in this project can be defined as ‘an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 1994, p. 13). Its primary purpose is to understand ‘something 
that is unique’ and specific to the selected cases. Thus, it involves systemic strategies to gather in-
depth contextual information about the phenomenon in question: be it relation to a person, 
social settings, event, or a group of people (Berg 2001, p. 225). The nature of case study implies 
that the cases need to be selected based on their uniqueness with the sample size being generally 
smaller than the case with quantitative approaches. A qualitative approach is aimed at excavating 
the finer, in-depth specificities of the selected case studies. 
The two sites for this research are Yogyakarta and Surakarta (also known as Solo). There 
are several reasons for choosing these locations as research sites. The first reason is their 
historical connection. Both Yogyakarta and Surakarta were once centres of the great Mataram 
Kingdom, one of the biggest kingdoms in Java. Due to the internal conflict within the royal family 
and the intervention of the Dutch colonial enterprise, the kingdom was then divided into two 
regions which are now known as Yogyakarta and Surakarta. This split is recorded in the Giyanti 
Treaty of 1755. The second reason is cultural. Both cities are considered to be the capitals of 
Javanese culture and tradition and are central sites of ‘the court civilization of the Javanese’ 
(Koentjaraningrat 1989, p. 21) where ‘the heart of the Javanese tradition beats’ (Shiraishi 1990, 
p. 38).  
Another reason is demographic, with the two cities being of a similar size. The total 
population of in Yogyakarta was estimated to be around 403,000 in 2013 (Badan Pusat Statistik 
Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 2014), whilst the population of Surakarta in 2013 was 
slightly larger at around 508,000 people (BAPPEDA Kota Surakarta 2014). In terms of diversity, 
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people living in Yogyakarta and Surakarta are predominantly Javanese, along with small numbers 
of people from other ethnic backgrounds. In terms of religion, the majority of people living in 
both cities are Muslim. In the city of Yogyakarta, Muslims constitute 81% of the total population, 
followed by Catholics (19%), Protestant Christians (7.5%), Buddhists (0.5%) and Hindus (0.2%) 
with a very small number of ‘others’ (0.01%) (Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Yogyakarta 2013, p. 
57). In Surakarta, Muslims constitute 77% of the total population, followed by Protestant 
Christians (13%), Catholics (10%), Buddhists (0.01%), and very small numbers of Hindus and 
others (less than 0.01%) (BAPPEDA Kota Surakarta 2014, p. 43).  
It is worth noting, however, that although the numbers used here are important, the true 
measure of the dynamics of social, religious, and cultural issues goes well beyond mere statistics. 
It is often the case that parties involved in certain conflicts come from nearby areas but that the 
event itself happened in these two cities. The opposite can also be true with incidents occurring 
in nearby areas, with the actors involved being based in the city. Considering the fact that religious 
communities are spread throughout the cities and surrounding areas and that events in a certain 
area might socially and culturally affect the lives of others in nearby locations, the two cities and 
their surrounds represent a focal point in which to investigate citizenship practices. Socially and 
culturally Yogyakarta or Surakarta/Solo refer not only to the cities as administrative units, but 
also to their surrounding areas.  
A further reason is related to the nature of religious life in these cities. Yogyakarta has 
been known as a city with a vibrant civic culture and for being socially harmonious, although this 
does not necessarily imply a total absence of conflicts. Surakarta, on the other hand, is considered 
a city with ‘a short fuse’ (Majeed 2012). The history of Surakarta has been coloured with inter-
ethnic tension between Chinese and Javanese; and the emergence of radical Islamist groups 
further fuelled religious tensions between different communities.  
More recently, the situation has dramatically changed. A survey by Setara Institute (2015; 
2017) on cities and levels of tolerance has ranked Yogyakarta amongst the ten least tolerant cities 
in Indonesia. Surakarta, however, ranked in the top ten most tolerant. This survey has challenged 
the previous image of the cities, particularly Yogyakarta which as recently as 2006 was declared 
a city of tolerance. Despite the fact that both research sites share many similarities, sharp 
differences exist between them, particularly in terms of interaction between different religious 
communities. This is why a comparative study of these two sites will help us to account for the 
issues and challenges in cultivating a more democratic and inclusive citizenship.  
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Despite the fact that it is not be possible to generalise the research findings due to the 
selective case study approach adopted, the findings can, nevertheless, be useful in providing 
insightful perspectives through which one can comprehend the larger picture of the society in 
question and thus provide the foundations for another, more expansive project with similar 
characteristics. 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
The data collected in this project is divided into two categories: primary and secondary 
data. This secondary data is collected from national and local libraries, university libraries, and 
archival resources under the relevant ministerial department such as Internal and Religious 
Ministerial Affairs Department. Regulations, articles, news, and academic briefing papers by 
experts published in books, reports, newspapers or journals were also used. The type of data 
gathered from these resources is mainly focused on the issue of citizenship (discursively or policy-
wise) in Indonesian history, particularly from documents related to the issue of religious 
communities. Employing this document discursive analysis is very important in this research 
project since the discourse on citizenship is supposed to be part of the broader discourse on the 
nation-state itself.  
The primary data is collected by employing two methods: interviews and participant 
observations. The interviews were semi-structured with guiding thematic questions asked in a 
systemic and consistent manner, whilst still allowing the interviewer to formulate and follow up 
questions beyond the given answers for the prepared questions or topics (Berg 2001, p. 71). The 
interviews were largely conducted one-on-one and ran for around one hour for each participant. 
The interviews were conducted in Indonesian and Javanese since almost all participants in the 
research speak one or both languages. The participants for this project were chosen through 
purposive sampling techniques. As the literature suggests, this method is used to ‘study a small 
subset of a larger population in which many members of the subset are easily identified’, however 
‘the enumeration of them all would be nearly impossible’ (Babbie 2010, p. 193).  
The sample was grouped into three categories: non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
activists, religious groups leaders or activists, and government representatives. The reasons for 
selecting participants from these three categories have to do with the fact that they are the ones 
who are actively contributing and disseminating public statements related to the topic of this 
research project. The contact between the researcher and the participants was facilitated by the 
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host institutions. Once a contact has been made the following arrangements was then organised 
by the researcher and the participants.  
The total number of participants interviewed for this research project was 32, 16 each 
from each of the two sites of Yogyakarta and Surakarta.  
 
Figure 9.1 Distribution of Participants from Yogyakarta 
 
 
Figure 10.2 Distribution of Participants from Surakarta (Solo) 
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Most of the NGO activists interviewed in this research project have experienced or have 
been involved in several incidents related to the everyday practices of citizenship, which also 
involve different religious communities in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. The involvement of NGO 
activists varied, from dealing with violence, to mitigating conflict, to engaging in research and 
public campaigns on building tolerance and harmony in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Nearly all of 
the NGO activists interviewed for this project are connected through a network where they may 
work together, though they do not necessarily have the same opinion on how to characterise the 
existing problems and challenges they faced. 
In contrast to the NGO activists, the participants from religious groups or community 
leaders interviewed in this project ranged from a variety of Muslim and non-Muslim groups. 
Some are seen as moderate, some vulnerable to persecution, and others have been associated 
with extremist views. Also, some are imams in mosques or leaders in local churches. This was to 
ensure that as many different perspectives as possible were engaged in this study, so as to obtain 
a more meaningful picture on what is happening in both research sites and, furthermore, how 
these are analysed and understood. The category of extremist views used here refers to ultra 
conservative/resactionary versions of Islamism, or political Islam. The terms Islamism and 
political Islam are typically used to refer to a certain view which tends to see Islam as not just a 
religion but also a political ideology in which the creation of Islamic state and the implementation 
of sharia are part of the ultimate political goal (Hasan 2006, p. 6). Hasan (2006, p. 6) notes that 
political Islam may manifest in different ways, where some might place more emphasis on 
‘assertion of parochial identity to a fully blooded attempt’ to achieve the goals. Within this range 
of manifestations of political Islam, the term extremist or extremism used in this particular project 
refers to the view or activity in which violence in its various forms is frequently used to bring the 
ideals of political Islam into reality. The extremist activities may include intimidation, attacks or 
protests against any groups that are considered as opposing the proponents of this version of 
political Islam. On the other hand, the term moderate here is used to refer to the views or 
activities that tend to emphasize the moderate and tolerant values and are against violent actions. 
Moderate interpretations of Islam reject the obsession of extremists with establishing an Islamic 
state and calling for the full implementation of sharia.         
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Figure 11.1 Distribution of Religious Organisations in Yogyakarta 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.2 Distribution of Religious Organisations in Surakarta (Solo) 
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government, such as FKUB (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, the Interreligious Harmony 
Communication Forum) or leaders from the sub-district local level. The local leader selected for 
this research project was involved in managing tolerance and conflict-related religious issues 
occurring within his local area. This was to understand on a micro-level how interactions between 
different religious communities take place and how these are perceived and navigated in everyday 
life. 
There is an issue with the gender distribution regarding the interviewees. Most of the 
participants are heads of mass organisations, religious communities or religious-based 
organisations or are in charge of the issues related to the research project. Given that most of the 
leaders or holders of key positions within this mass organisations are male, it proved difficult to 
find female spokespeople and would be willing to be part of this project.  
 
Figure 13.1 Gender Distribution of Yogyakarta Participants  
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Figure 14.2 Gender Distribution of Surakarta (Solo) Participants 
Interviewees for this project were chosen purposively by considering the local socio-
political context. In Yogyakarta, for example, the number of non-governmental organisations 
concerned with issues of pluralism, religious freedom or interfaith dialogue is higher compared 
to that of Surakarta. On the other hand, the number of laskar (religious paramilitary groups) that 
are actively involved in religious issues in Surakarta is higher than Yogyakarta. Consideration of 
contextual factors ensures that various voices from these groups are covered in this research 
project. Another example are representatives from vulnerable minority groups. In Yogyakarta, 
religious minority groups such as Ahmadiyah and Shia do exist and are widely known for their 
activity, particularly Ahmadiyah groups. In Surakarta, however, these two groups do not exist at 
all, or at least their numbers are so insignificant that their existence has never been an issue for 
the community. Apart from these issues, the number of participants from each category does not 
differ much. It is also noteworthy here that the representatives chosen in this research project 
have, in general, been involved in and experienced either as ‘an actor’, ‘a victim’ or ‘a mediator’ 
in conflict involving religious issues within communities. 
The categorisation of interviews into these three groups aimed to reveal what gaps, if any, 
exist between what is written and what is practiced in terms of citizenship, as well as what has 
been understood by different groups from different communities regarding citizenship practices 
in the two research sites.  
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The second source for primary data will be participant observation, which was used to 
describe  
what goes on, who or what is involved, when and where things happen, how they 
occur and why – at least from the standpoint of the participants – things happen 
as they do in particular situation (Jorgensen 1989, p. 12).  
By doing participant observation, the unique attributes of the two case studies were 
accurately described and captured. Moreover, these observations helped to bridge the gap 
between what has been said and what has been done or has happened in the actual daily 
interactions between the different communities. In this participant observation exercise, the 
researcher observed and participated in some activities conducted by religious and other 
communities, such as festivals, interreligious meetings, local level forums and so forth. The 
researcher took extensive field notes during this observation process.  
 
3.3 Data Analysis  
The collected data was organised and analysed systematically using discourse analysis. 
Discourse analysis as adopted in this study is used to examine ‘the social construction of meaning’ 
produced by discourse and the ‘implication of such social practices’ in real life (Tonkiss 2004, 
p. 380). Discourse may be defined as ‘a group of statements which provide a language for talking 
about – i.e. a way of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic’ (Hall 1992, p. 
290).  
Discourse is not only about ‘language or speech’, but is ‘also the way language works to 
organise fields of knowledge and practice’ (Tonkiss 2004, p. 374). The way it organises the field 
of knowledge through discursive practices – ‘in which texts are produced (created) and consumed 
(received and interpreted)’ – need not be seen as mono-directional, where one practice 
determines the outcome of other practices (Jorgensen & Philips 2002, p. 61). Instead, it is 
dialectical in nature, within which the process of shaping and re-shaping the social world and 
cultural practices occur. Fairclough states that ‘it is partly through discursive practices in everyday 
life (processes of text production and consumption) that social and cultural reproduction and 
change take place’ (cited in Jorgensen & Philips 2002, p. 61). Discourse analysis then ‘challenges, 
interrogates taken-for-granted meanings, and disturbs easy claims to the objectivity….’ (Tonkiss 
2004, p. 380) of any social and political discourse(s) that shape the real world.  
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Following Fairclough (1992), this study employs discourse analysis to examine three 
discursive sources: text, discursive practice, and social practice. Text here may refer to speech, 
writing, images or a combination of them. Discursive practices may be defined as ‘one dimension 
or moment of every social practices in a dialectical relationship with the other moments of a 
social practice’ (Jorgensen & Philips 2002, p. 18-19). Meanwhile, social practices may refer to 
any particular activities in social space. The relationship between discursive and social practices 
is dialectical, where both are reproduced and shape each other.  
The materials analysed for this research project come from the audio-recorded interviews 
which were transcribed, corrected, and edited. Adding to this are the observation activities during 
the fieldwork that helped to contextualize the text with the actual practices in the field.  The 
transcriptions are in Indonesian and Javanese, with sections later being translated into English. 
The transcriptions were provided to the participants to check and make amends in case of factual 
errors. Data was then coded thematically with reference to the theoretical framework used in this 
project. Employing discourse analysis helped in identifying the underlying structures of power 
and knowledge (in the form of verbal and/or written statements) that produce certain versions of 
citizenship in a particular time and space, as well as the way they work and affect the way people 
experience their lived social world. Within the discourse analysis, the data gathered from three 
different methods was treated as inter-textually linked, which made it possible to connect in a 
complementary manner the data from the two case studies.  
Textual analysis was used to frame and categorise the secondary data (constitution, law, 
civic norms), to shed light on how certain interpretations and discourse affect the way the different 
communities understand the operative public values that navigate their citizenship practices. The 
thematic coding used in this research project is derived from notions of public operatives 
suggested by Parekh (2000). The aim of employing this particular method of analysis was to 
reveal the competing discourses that shape the conception of citizenship and its practices in the 
everyday lives of the communities in the research sites.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This section outlines the analysis of the data collected through the fieldwork undertaken 
in the two sites of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. The data collected for this research project is 
obtained through secondary sources such as documents and articles, and primary sources 
through individual interviews and field observation. Documents such as reports, news, articles 
appearing in journals, books and magazines were analysed in order to gain an understanding of 
local settings and also to further contextualise insights made by the participants. The in-depth 
interviews were guided by thematic questions that helped to navigate the discussion during the 
interview. The fieldwork observations and notes were used to shed further light on any claims or 
statements made during the interview. The collected data was categorised and further analysed 
based on the key themes emerging from the all interviews.  
 This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part briefly outlines the context of both 
research sites to get an initial understanding as to the kind of context that facilitates the exchange 
between different groups in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Following this is a section discussing the 
practices of citizenship in both cities. Rather than looking at citizenship as merely a legal 
construct, this research places greater emphasis on the social practices associated with citizenship. 
In doing so, it is possible to see the conflict and tensions between different communities by 
investigating their actions. The third section reveals the discursive construction that informs the 
practices of citizenship in this city. Unpacking this discursive construction helps understand the 
kind of logics or discourse that encourage different groups to commit certain actions toward other 
groups. The fourth part outlines critical observations from both cities regarding the practices of 
citizenship that might be instructive in cultivating a more inclusive and democratic citizenship. 
Following this is the conclusion of the chapter which highlights the differences and similarities 
between the two cities. 
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4.2 Research Sites: Contextual Analysis 
4.2.1 Yogyakarta: A Short Context  
In Indonesia, Yogyakarta is one among few regions (the other two are Jakarta and Aceh) 
to earn a special status of regional autonomy and is among the first regions to recognise the 
declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945. Soon after the declaration, the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta of the time sent a letter to support this independence and recognising the political 
authority of the national government of Indonesia. It was also stated in the letter that Yogyakarta 
would be part of this new modern state, despite the fact that at that time, Yogyakarta was a 
powerful monarchy. Soon after that, Yogyakarta played an important role in stabilising the newly 
born nation-state. It served as the capital of Indonesia during the turbulent early years of 
independence in which both Jakarta and Bandung, two other important cities that house the 
national movement, were defeated by the Dutch. In the later years, Yogyakarta was also known 
as a site of cultural and political movements which played important roles in the democratisation 
process in Indonesia.  
Historically, Yogyakarta was known as a place where national movements, particularly 
those focused on education, found their roots. It is in this city that one of the biggest mass 
organisations, Muhammadiyah, was established by Ahmad Dahlan in 1912. Adopting an Islamic 
Modernist approach to Islamic teaching, this organisation became known since its inception, 
particularly among young Muslims, for its educational initiatives and creating educational 
institutions in many places. Along with Muhammadiyah, another historical educational 
movement started in this city. Perguruan Tamas Siswa was initiated in 1922 by Ki Hajar 
Dewantoro, a well-known figure in Indonesian education and respected in national movements. 
Yogyakarta is currently the home of around 40 accredited universities, both private and 
government owned, earning it the label of a City of Students – Kota Pelajar.  
This city embraces and celebrates different traditions, thus serving as ‘a meeting point’ 
for a range of diverse cultures. In this city, different traditions live side by side, from Javanese 
traditional beliefs (kejawen), abangan (nominal religious groups) to militant religious ones. Art 
and cultural performances have also proliferated here, with their leading figures such as Umar 
Khayam and Emha Ainun Najib, to name just a few (Subkhan 2007). In terms of the relationship 
between different religious communities, Yogyakarta has been recognised as a place which first 
initiated interfaith dialogue, or at least planted its seeds. In 1970s, Mukti Ali, a leading figure of 
interfaith dialogue in Indonesia, organised students group discussions, Limited Groups, that 
focused on a more inclusive and liberal interpretation of religious teachings. In 1990s, several 
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new institutions that ‘inherited’ this legacy were established, with LKiS (Lembaga Kajian Islam 
dan Sosial, Institute for Social and Islamic Studies) is being among the more notable. In terms 
of interfaith dialogue, DIAN Interfidei (Institut Dialog Antariman di Indonesia, Institute for 
Interfaith Dialogue in Indonesia) was established in 1992 by Christian and Muslim activists who 
shared a vision of tolerance among different religious groups and dialogue as the key to nurture 
a peaceful relationship between different groups (Subkhan 2007).  
During the 1998 social and political movement, where many cities in Javas were 
destroyed by mobs and riots (including Surakarta, which was severely damaged, Yogyakarta 
remained unscathed despite it being one of the cities that facilitated student movements against 
the New Order regime (Aspinall 1999). Furthermore, during the rally on May 20 1998 with half 
a million participated, Yogyakarta remained under control and ‘not a single shop window was 
broken, and not a single person was injured’ (Mas’oed, Panggabean & Azca 2001). It is believed 
that part of the reason for this is the effective leadership of the Palace. Within Javanese tradition, 
the Sultan of the Palace has a mandate to maintain balance between the different groups in his 
territory. Furthermore, the foundation for a more inclusive identity was laid by the palace in the 
1940s, from Yogyakarta-based to Indonesia, one when the Palace recognised the authority of the 
modern nation of Indonesia. 
After the New Order regime collapsed, the social-cultural-political situation changed 
dramatically throughout the country. The resurgence of political identity, particularly in the name 
of religion, proliferated in many areas across the archipelago. In Yogyakarta, a number of militia 
bearing the title laskar were established such as Laskar Jihad (Jihad Paramilitary Group) and 
Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Paramilitary Group). These groups shared 
similar agendas calling for jihad in Maluku at that time (due to the conflict perceived by these 
groups as religious conflict between Muslims and Christians) to demanding a full implementation 
of sharia. With the latter demand, violent actions were committed by these groups by attacking 
places considered as facilitating sinful actions such as hotels, cafes, etc (Hasan 2006, p. 16-19). 
At the government level, the introduction of the legislation on regional autonomy, Law 
No. 22/1999, has impacted the political landscape of Yogyakarta, particularly regarding the 
election process for local leaders. It had been a normal political occurrence that the governor 
and vice governor of Yogyakarta are automatically appointed by the Sultan and Paku Alam 
respectively, and this has been perceived by the people of Yogyakarta as part of the reason as to 
why Yogyakarta is a ‘special’ (istimewa) region. Ahnaf and Salim (2017, p. 31-37) argue that this 
new policy has instigated the protest movement among the people. Some supported this new 
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policy while others, see this as threatening the special position of Yogyakarta. The latter believe 
that the relationship between different communities in Yogyakarta being characterized by the 
social harmony is partly due to this special political privilege of the political leader being 
appointed rather than elected. Furthermore, they believe that an election would only lead to 
instability.  
The debate over this political mechanism and how people view this special position has 
diverted the attention of the local leaders from the real problems faced by the people. 
Complicating this issue is the internal conflict within the palace over the succession plans, the 
rapid investment in Yogyakarta and problems related to land legal status, particularly the ones 
related to the palace. These all have contributed to what Ahnaf and Salim (2017) called the crises 
of this unique city (krisis keistimewaan).     
One of the problems arising from this crises is the several intolerant actions that occurred 
in many places in Yogyakarta, particularly related to religious blasphemy allegations associated 
with vulnerable religious groups such as Shia and Ahmadiyah, and worship places, with the issue 
of Churches and their building permits. A report by the Wahid Institute in 2014 ranks 
Yogyakarta as the second most intolerant major city in Indonesia, an alarming result that 
surprised many. Another survey by Setara Institute has confirmed this changing situation 
regarding the interaction between different communities in Yogyakarta. The Setara Institute 
conducted surveys in 2015 and 2017 and produced an index of tolerant cities (Indeks Kota 
Toleran) by using four variables to determine the level of the tolerance: favouritism (whether the 
local government treat certain groups better over others), local regulation, social regulation, and 
the proportion of the population. In its survey in 2015, Yogyakarta was ranked 62 among 94 
surveyed cities while two years later, in 2017, Yogyakarta was ranked 89, making one of the top 
ten least tolerant cities in Indonesia.  
 
 
4.2.2 Surakarta: A Short Context 
Compared to Yogyakarta, Surakarta, as noted in the previous chapter, has been 
characterised as a city with ‘a short fuse’. Though this characterisation is rejected by the people 
of Solo (Wong Solo), it has some historical justification in the history of conflict and violence 
that occurred repeatedly there. Mulyadi et al. (1999) recalled that, up until 1998, violent conflict 
was recorded eleven times in this city, seven of which related to the Chinese community. The 
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first violent conflict refers to Geger Pecinan which resulted in the relocation of the capital of the 
Mataram Kingdom from Kartasura Hadiningrat to Surakarta Hadiningrat (1745); the second one 
can be traced back to the War of Java (1825-1830) where many Chinese were killed; the third 
event occurred during the old Sarikat Islam movement (1911-1912); the fourth was during 
Sarikat Islam (1926); the fifth was during the G-30 S tragedy when President Sukarno was toppled 
by officers led by Suharto on the pretext of supressing a coup attempt; the sixth event was during 
the November riot (kerusuhan) in 1980, and in May 1998, the seventh has been one of the 
greatest acts of violence related to the Chinese community after the New Order collapsed. This 
riot damaged or burned down 330 businesses, 400 cars and 500 motorcycles (Majeed 2012 and 
Mulyadi et al. 1999).  
The repeated violence that occurred in Solo signals that the tension between different 
groups has a deep and long history. The emergence of political parties and civil society 
organisations such as Sarikat Islam (1912), for example, was initially intended as a response to 
the struggle between those who fought for economic and political interests in Solo (Mulyadi et 
al. 1999). Due to dissatisfaction with the authoritarianism exhibited by the colonial power and 
the Palace, a radical movement at the grass-roots level grew rapidly between 1918 and 1922. In 
1920, under the leadership of Misbach and Tjipto Mangunkusumo, two national leaders, this 
movement gained momentum. In the period of 1922 to 1927, this popular movement gave birth 
to a prominent communist movement in Surakarta. Furthermore, the rise of national awareness 
movement took down the colonial power and the Palace. Since then, the authority of the Palace 
has lost its place among the people and the new national modern bureaucracy laid its foundations 
after that.  
The collapse of the New Order regime and the May 1998 riots that accompanied it 
caused severe damage to the heart of the socio-cultural fabric of Solo, leading to new dynamics 
at the grass-roots level. Furthermore, the chaotic situation at the time and the weak performance 
of the state to maintain stability led to uncertainty. Violent conflict with strong religious 
dimensions occurred in many areas across Indonesia. The feeling of being victims, the solidarity 
among Muslims and the need to protect Muslim society led to the emergence of laskar 
(paramilitary groups). The laskar groups proliferated in many areas and Surakarta is no 
execption. It was during this period that many laskar groups were founded.  Joni, one of the 
laskar senior leaders from LUIS (Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta, Surakarta Islamic Paramilitary 
Group), said that a laskar functions ‘to help security... so that we would not get overwhelmed by 
circumstances (kecolongan) [such as] the riots in 1998 and 1999…’. Furthermore, Salim, a youth 
 69 
religious and laskar leader from Ngruki pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding school), noted 
that the communism and Christianity grew rapidly in Solo:  
we do not have any other choices rather that waking up the awareness of Muslim 
people... we do not want to wait until [it becomes a case like] Bosnia... like 
Myanmar…we do not do brutal things... attacking…but [we] stay alert… 
While the number of laskar groups in Surakarta reaches around 40, this does not 
necessarily mean that this is evidence of Surakarta being Islamised. The majority of Solonese are 
abangan (nominal Muslims, syncretistic) (Wildan 2013) despite the fact that the Islamic 
preaching organized by the mass organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, has been there for a 
long time. There are also a number of majlis taklim and pesantren (council of Islamic teachings) 
such as MTA (Majlis Tafsir Al-Qur’an, the Council of Quranic Exegesis), jamaah Gumuk and 
Ngruki pesantren. MTA has been growing rapidly and has numerous branch across Indonesia. 
Yet, MTA does not demand explicitly the implementation of shariah since they believe that this 
demand would slowly emerge from the bottom up once people start getting a better 
understanding of Islam (Wildan 2013, p. 204).  
Furthermore, the al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki has gained much attention due to its 
two key leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.  These two key figures who had 
been known as very critical to the New Order regime and are often associated with the resurgence 
of radical and terrorist groups in Indonesia. Founded in 1970s, The Ngruki pesantren aims to 
preach and develop Islam in Solo in a more rigorous way. Due to the dissatisfaction with the 
New Order regime, these two important figures had involved in the underground movement, 
NII (Negara Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic State). The two were arrested and jailed before 
fleeing to Malaysia in 1985. While their influence was temporarily subsiding, they managed to 
regain influence.  This was especially the case with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir after the collapse of the 
New Order regime, as Abdullah Sungkar died in 1999 (Wildan 2013, p. 195-201).  
The emergence of these laskar groups can also be seen as an anomaly. In May 1998, 
violent riots occurred in Surakarta while other large cities nearby, such as Semarang and 
Yogyakarta, were relatively under control. Regarding this laskar and anomaly, Dendi, a senior 
LPLAG (Lembaga Perdamaian Lintas Agama dan Golongan, Peace Institution Across Religion 
and Groups)   activist, said that ‘the peak of anomaly is the emergence of something like that 
[laskar]…that is difficult to understand, [it is] breaking the law, anarchic…’. The growing numbers 
of laskar groups in Solo represent different Muslim communities and different demands from 
implementation of Sharia to eradicating sinful actions (maksiat). With this phenomenon and 
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adding to it is the growing power of communism and Christian groups in Surakarta; it does not 
seem hyperbolic to say that Surakarta may be an ideological battlefield in coming years, as Salim 
perceived it. Furthermore, after the Bali bombings (2002), Surakarta has also been reported as a 
breading place for terrorism, particularly via the Ngruki network. This discourse portrays 
Surakarta as a ticking time-bomb that might explode at any time.  
The emergence of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) as city mayor of Surakarta in 2005 has been 
considered as paving a way to revitalize Solo after the 1998 incident. The new government of 
Surakarta had been challenged to deal with the basic issues such as providing basic welfare, 
housing, health, education, infrastructure, etc. Masudi (2017) notes that Jokowi has been seen 
capable in delivering the demands of public due to his style of governance that he gained popular 
support among the people. As mayor of Solo (2005-2012) Joko Widodo as the city mayor) is 
widely seen to have successfully mended the social fissures in this city.  
Notwithstanding these violent episodes in the past, Solo has remained relatively peaceful 
during the post-Suharto Reformasi Era, though this does not necessarily mean that no conflict at 
all happened after the 1998 period. Nevertheless, in general terms, no further notable violent 
conflicts on a large scale occurred after the May 1998 riots. This reality is reflected in the recent 
surveys conducted by the Setara Institute in 2015 and 2017 respectively. In its survey in 2015, 
Surakarta ranked 13 among 94 cities surveyed in Indonesia. Two years later, Surakarta was 
ranked amongst the top ten most tolerant cities in Indonesia. 
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4.3 Citizenship Practices in Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the dynamics of citizenship policies and practices in Yogyakarta 
and Surakarta as the participants of this research project perceive them. The presentation of the 
discussion on this section begins with an overview of citizenship policies and practices in both 
cities in order to get a general understanding of what is happening in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. 
As the surveys by Setara Institute suggest, Yogyakarta, which until recently was praised as a ‘city 
of tolerance’, is currently ranking toward the bottom of the tolerance index, while on the other 
hand, Surakarta, famous for its reputation as a ‘short fused’ city, is currently sitting in the top ten 
most tolerant. Whilst this survey provides a valuable information for this project, this section 
investigates sociologically the current situation regarding the interaction between different 
communities and, in the cases of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, what can be gleaned from these 
interactions. This discussion is then followed by an analysis of how citizenship practices are 
performed in these two cities outlining any signs of tension, conflict, and contestation. 
 
4.3.2 Citizenship Practices in Yogyakarta: An Overview 
A key finding from the interviews conducted with study participants relates to significant 
changes taking place in Yogyakarta in recent years regarding the relationships between religious 
communities. Reports and surveys from institutions and non-governmental organisations 
concerned with the issue of pluralism, democracy, and religious freedom have already indicated 
this trend. However, this change is perceived differently by different participants in this study. 
Those who are associated with the government still believe that Yogyakarta is conducive to 
religious life and tend to deny reports to the contrary. Jufri, a member of FKUB Yogyakarta, for 
example, said that ‘the report by Wahid Institute is inaccurate’. Indeed, ‘members of religious 
community can practice their religious teachings’, argued Fahmi, an officer of Ministry of 
Religious Affair, Yogyakarta. This is particularly the case when members of minority groups 
follow the rules of the law such as fulfilling the ‘procedural’ requirements regarding places of 
worship. Furthermore, Fahmi claimed that strict religious issues do not cause conflicts; rather, 
other factors such as social relations do.  
Yet, those from non-governmental organisations, minority religious groups and 
mainstream mass organisation such as NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah acknowledge 
that there has been a substantial increase in numbers of intolerant actions committed by certain 
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religious groups against others in this city and that this is far from encouraging. A member of a 
minority religious group, Salman, the leader of Raushan Fikr, expressed his concern: ‘I just do 
not feel comfortable...it is much harder [to believe] because this is happened in a city that is 
claimed to be tolerant’. Indeed, Yogyakarta was declared a tolerant city in 2006, but the current 
situation suggests something different. A network created by non-governmental organisations in 
Yogyakarta once declared Yogyakarta as a city with a ‘violence emergency’ (darurat kekerasan) 
in 2013 due to the increasing number of violent incidents related to religious, social, political and 
economic factors. Bagus, a youth activist from Gusdurian Network, said that in a three to four 
years period, around twenty cases of violence occurred and there is no plan from the state 
apparatus to address these problems.  
There are many factors that contribute to these continuing actions of intolerance in 
Yogyakarta. One that is emphasised by the participants is the weak performance of the state 
apparatus to enforce the law in many cases. Instead of preventing the violent actions occurring 
or taking those who break the law to the court process, for example, the police tend to stay 
passive. Mahmud, a youth activist from LKiS, recalled his friend being punched in front of the 
police office due to his comment in the media where he regretted the objection by hardliner 
groups to the plan to organise Easter celebrations in a public area. Due to this statement, he was 
being threatened and chased out by the groups. Mahmud further stated that ‘he was identified 
and chased whilst in traffic, he then run to the police office there’. Instead of obtaining protection 
he was punched. Indeed, and even when ‘he was bleeding, the police did nothing’ to protect him.  
Regarding this passive response by local security agencies, Feni, a senior activist from 
DIAN Interfidei, shared the story of when she came to the police and asked what could be done 
to progress investigations into the violence cases. The police answered that once the actors were 
clearly identified, the cases could be taken further. She then questioned the police action, citing 
a violent episode experienced by members of a certain church who were performing a religious 
ritual in one of its member’s house and were attacked by a group of people. During the incident, 
this member was injured, part of the house was destroyed and the ‘perpetrators’ and the police 
were there. She asked why the police did not take down ‘the perpetrators’, and the police 
responded that they were afraid of being accused of violating human rights: ‘This is [the response 
from] wakapolda [Wakil Kepala Kepolisian Daerah, Vice Head of Police Department at 
province level], if this is his logic, how can you imagine things are going to improve?’, Feni said 
in disbelief.  
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Passive responses by the authorities are, partly due to confusion in how to differentiate 
between exercising rights and breaking the law. Since none of the perpetrators was being 
investigated further, Bagus said that that kind of action is potentially not seen as a problem. 
Mahmud argued that ‘this weakness of law enforcement made them [the hardliner groups] feel 
arrogant (jumawa), [made them] feel that their actions are right’. The hardliner groups indeed 
exploit this absence of law enforcement. Idris, one of the leaders of the hardliner groups, said 
that it is the government who breaks the law since they do not perform their duty, for example 
to stop rituals in a place where it is not allowed. He argued further:  
If the government is not upholding the law, should we uphold it? Our position is 
the same, breaking the law... if they are informed [about a certain case] and they 
do not take any actions, we will act.  
This statement suggests how breaking the law is now normalised, and how the authority 
that should enforce the law is being undermined.  
In addition to the weak performance of the state to uphold the law, the authority of the 
palace is also diminishing and is coming into question due to its slow response in the face of 
violent actions. Unlike Surakarta where the palace has lost its place among the people, the palace 
of Yogyakarta has a strong foundation in society. This can be seen, for example, in the 2009 
massive protest organised by different groups in the city in response to the plans of the national 
government to choose the governor of Yogyakarta via election. Unlike other provinces, the 
Sultan of Yogyakarta is automatically appointed as the governor of the province. Plans for the 
election of the governor are opposed by many for fear that it will change the special status of 
Yogyakarta, as well as the position of Sultan among the people. For most Yogyakarta people, the 
special character of the city and the status of the palace is deeply rooted in history and 
consequently, they will defend it at any cost. The national government plan was abandoned, as 
did the protest.  
For Yogyakarta people, the Sultan is seen not only as a political leader but also a cultural-
spiritual leader. With this status, the Sultan possesses a powerful authority where his words will 
be listened to. However, the current situation has contributed to the authority of the Sultan being 
diminished in the eyes of the people and this leads to confusion over the extent of the authority 
of the Sultan. In response to the recurring violent actions in Yogyakarta, the Sultan issued 
statements condemning violence but no further serious actions were undertaken. Mahmud said 
that  
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[in] Jogja [a nickname of Yogyakarta] people listen more to the Sultan. That is why 
I said that this is a chance to suppress the intolerant actions in Jogja. But I do not 
know why Sultan did not seize this opportunity.  
Instead, when the violence in Yogyakarta led the NGO network in this city to declare it 
as at violence emergency level (darurat kekerasan) in 2013, it was clearly denied by the palace 
since they believed that it was not the case. The Queen of the Palace argued that emergency 
status refers to people not feeling safe when they go out: ‘[indeed] it is not safe, when we talk 
about pluralism, tolerance, etc., we do not feel safe’, Mahmud commented in response to the 
Queen’s statement. Here lies the tension of how tolerance and violence are understood and 
practiced between the NGOs activists who made the declaration and the authority (in the form 
of the palace or government).  
As a cultural-spiritual leader, the Sultan of Yogyakarta holds the title of Sayyidin 
Panatagama Khalifatullah, a title in Javanese tradition that suggests the Sultan or the King is not 
only the ‘secular’ leader, but also the ‘religious’ one. Maman, an activist from NU, said that  
sayyid means the leader...panatagama [means] maintain religious life...maintain 
Java as something balanced but dynamic...khalifatullah. This is a spiritual concept, 
the integrity concept of the Sultan...the Sultan has a role to maintain the balance.  
With this title, it is the task of the Sultan to maintain religious life in Yogyakarta but what 
happened in the last couple of years suggests that the balance has gone. This is because, as 
Maman argued further, the Sultan  
does not care about the feelings of the people…he prefers thinking about 
business…economy...investments in Jogja … [even] to stand against his own 
people…in Kulon Progo, and everywhere. There is no mercy feeling…  
With this kind of position, whether the Sultan still holds the cultural authority, and 
whether his words can be listened to and expected to reduce the violence, remains in question. 
Rahmat, one of mass organisation leaders, argued that ‘if now there were a survey, the level of 
trust in the Sultan among Jogja people would be shown to have dramatically decreased’.  
Another environmental factor that affects citizenship practices in Yogyakarta is the lack 
of formal social spaces due to rapid economic developments within the city. The current high 
level of investment in Yogyakarta has been identified by the participants as one of the factors that 
has led to the current uncomfortable situation in this city of learners. This significant investment 
can be seen, for example, in the number of hotels that are being planned and developed. Rahmat, 
an activist from Muhammadiyah, said that ‘…as of early January 2016, there will be 37 hotels with 
three to five stars in Jogja...and all have obtained permission [to be built] already’.  The number 
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of hotels in Yogyakarta indeed increased gradually reaching 401 in 2013 (Badan Pusat Statistik 
Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Yotyakarta 2013) and 580 in 2018 (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi 
Daerah Istimewa Yotyakarta 2018).  
This significant investment has several consequences. For example, these new buildings 
do require a lot of water and this has led to several protests such as the Jogja Asat (Jogja is dry) 
movement, due to water shortages experienced by local people. Furthermore, the investment 
has changed the landscape of the city. As the participants noted, while the rapid investment has 
attracted a lot of people, the social spaces where people of different backgrounds meet and 
intermingle no longer exist.  
The availability of social spaces is seen as very important and plays a significant role in 
facilitating public discussion among different groups. There used to be this kind of space in 
Yogyakarta such as public squares (alun-alun), but Rahmat argued that  
…there is alun-alun, but they do not want to go there. They tend to go to the cafe, 
but not everybody come to the cafe. The topic discussed is also limited...so, the 
issue of ethnic, religion, become serious issue in Yogyakarta… pesantren is 
attacked, the church is attacked... 
Indeed, this rapid development has opened new spaces such as malls and cafes, but few 
people come there, particularly wong Jogja (people of Yogyakarta) who are mainly poor and have 
limited education. The rapid investment has, by and large, led to the marginalisation of these 
people, a concern noted by Rizal, an activist and researcher at Gajah Mada University, who stated 
that ‘these marginalized people then are being welcome by GPK [Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah, 
Ka’bah Youth Movement, a paramilitary organization]. This new solidarity emerged in this new 
social religious group’. These kinds of groups might not be the only ones where marginalised 
groups can find their new place. Indeed, religion has become a new glue for these groups. With 
the absence of social public space, Rahmat said that ‘the one that can bind [people] together is 
religion, apart from ethnic…but in Jogja, mostly religion’. This is part of the reason the 
construction of places of worship and Christmas celebrations, for example, become a significant 
issue in Yogyakarta.  
In addition to the absence of these social spaces there is also a lack of a shared common 
agenda among different groups in Yogyakarta. This city has been known as a place where many 
different groups – be they in the name of religion, tradition, or ideology – coexist. Many forums 
and discussions are regularly held in this city. However, most of those who come to these forums 
have similar perspectives. Forums or activities where different groups with very different 
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perspectives interact with each other are very limited. Furthermore, since attendance to these 
forums or activities is voluntary, there is a question over the continuity of these practices. This 
kind of situation, by and large, has affected the way citizenship is being exercised in Yogyakarta.  
The section below discusses the citizenship practices in this city that are affected by 
conflict and tensions which sometimes lead to violent actions. 
  
4.3.2.1 Procedural Requirements vs Basic Rights 
One of the features of citizenship practices in Yogyakarta is coloured with tension 
between procedural administrative issue and exercising basic rights. This can be seen from the 
conflict over places of worship that affect the relationship between Christian and Muslim 
communities in Yogyakarta. One of the cases that received public attention is the attack on the 
Christian community of Jemaat Santo Franciscus Agung Banteng Church while they were praying 
the Rosary performing Rosario religious ritual in a member’s house in Sukoharjo, Ngaglik, 
Yogyakarta in 2014. The attackers were a group of people in long tunics [gamis], which are 
normally worn by Muslim groups. The owner of the house, Julius Felicianus, was informed about 
this attack, so he went back home from his office. Once he arrived, these groups attacked him 
too, causing him to be hospitalised. On this issue, instead of condemning this action, the head of 
the Indonesian police at that time told the people not to use the house for worship because it is 
against the regulation and might instigate a similar attack. This statement was strongly criticised 
by many groups, such as PGI (Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia, the Communion of 
Indonesian Churches). PGI believes that performing religious obligation is the right of every 
person and is guaranteed by constitution.  
Indeed, one of the main issues regarding these places of worship is the need to comply 
with procedural requirements. Since the joint regulation No. 9 2006 and No. 8 2006 on guidance 
for government at district level on managing religious harmony and functioning inter-religious 
forum and places of worship issued by the Ministry of Religious and Internal Affairs, the number 
of intolerant and violent actions increased in Yogyakarta. On this, Supono, a member of FKUB 
from Catholics group, admitted that ‘indeed, the problems have emerged due to the new 
regulations…the new regulation is being key of entrance to problematize the churches’. Supono 
said that there are many churches in Yogyakarta that have not yet received building permits. Due 
to this, he argued that ‘[these churches] are vulnerable to being questioned…the churches have 
been used as worship places, but they do not have the building permits’.  
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On this procedural issue, Fahmi, an officer from the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
Yogyakarta said that cases related to places of worship are mainly due to the procedural reasons, 
but in some cases the issues were more related to relations between the different communities 
in the area. This argument suggests that the problem related to places of worship is more than 
procedural. Supono recounted that, when he once asked his Muslim friends about the objections 
held by Muslim groups vis-à-vis other religious communities building worship places, the answer 
he received was that ‘the reason is worry. If there is a place of worship, there might be Muslims 
who will convert to other religions’. Supono did not oppose this reason, but said this is not always 
the case. He argued  
if they want to be fair, to check the places of worship that have not get the permits, 
there are many mosques that haven’t got the permits. But I do not problematize 
this. I like seeing people performing worship. Because the law guarantee for every 
person to perform religious obligation.  
This argument suggests that there is a tension between the procedural requirement and 
the more substantive issue of the right to perform religious rituals that is guaranteed by the 
constitution. Furthermore, this procedural aspect may lead to a violation and denial of basic 
rights, such as the Jemaat Santo Franciscus Agung Banteng Church attack. While this has never 
been the intention of this regulation, the tension between these two are likely to keep simmering, 
considering the number of churches in Yogyakarta that have not yet received building permits. 
This will be one of the main challenges for nurturing a more inclusive and democratic citizenship 
in Yogyakarta. 
 
4.3.2.2 Religious Teachings vs Basic Rights 
Another feature that is notable regarding the practice of citizenship in Yogyakarta is the 
unresolved tensions between performing religious obligations and respecting others’ basic rights. 
The example here is the intimidation toward Raushan Fikr, an institution associated with the 
Shia community in Yogyakarta, by certain orthodox Muslim groups. The first intimidation took 
place in 2013, and two years later the same group committed another action. Idris, one of the 
leaders of FJI (Front Jihad Islam, Islamic Jihad Front) believes that Shia community members 
practice heresy. As he believes that Raushan Fikr is part of this community, he initiated an action 
to stop their activity. Idris said that ‘two years ago, they were asked to stop their activities’. Before 
2013, some activities were organised by Raushan Fikr such as public discussions and ceremonies 
commemorating ashura. Due to the intimidation, these activities stopped, but discussions by 
students on Islamic teachings critical of such practices still continue.  
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Due to this activity, Raushan Fikr was accused of breaking the agreement in 2013 with 
the incidents of 2015 being viewed as a response to this. For Idris, the 2013 agreement was 
intended to stop all the activities of Raushan Fikr, but  
it still continues ...MUSPIKA [Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan, the 
Consultation Forum of Leaders at the lower level district under municipality] stay 
quiet… the camat [the head of lower level district under municipality], local police 
(polres) [too]…from [Raushan Fikr] breaking the agreement two years ago...that is 
their fault … in other words, I said the government is stupid.  
The small discussion activity on Islamic philosophy for Idris and his group is part of a 
brainwashing process. He further stated that ‘it is definitely …to brainwash people …with ideology 
and philosophy… we understand it clearly. One of the ways to get new followers’. Since he 
believes that Shia is heresy, he concludes that ‘if we know their wrongs, and we do not take any 
actions to save those who do not know… then we are in the wrong’.  
In response to this intimidation, Salman, the leader of Raushan Fikr, believed he had 
done nothing wrong. He argued that ‘…here is a place of for learning…those who come here are 
not only Shia, [but also] Sunni, Christians…’. He admitted that he himself is Shi’i but his 
approach to Shia is rather different. He said that ‘…my approach to Shia is philosophy and 
tasawwuf [Islamic spirituality], not in theology...not in kalam…the debate of Sunni-Shia...to me, 
it is political’. Furthermore, during his stay in this area, he never acted in an exclusive way, saying, 
‘from the start, I do not want to be exclusive…having our own mosque ... having our own 
mannerism, our own clothes…’. He and his community have been actively engaged in the societal 
activities. Furthermore, he believes that he does not practice religious blasphemy and does not 
understand the reasons that force them to stop their activities: ‘indeed, there are bad people in 
Shi’i... [but there are bad people] in other groups too’, he added.  
This case shows how practicing religious teachings as a particular group perceives it can 
undermine another group’s basic rights. In this case, Salman and his community have the right 
to organise public events and group discussions, since the constitution guarantees this. Differing 
from the case with the Ahmadiyah group, there is no regulation that prohibits Shi’a to perform 
their activities. Even so, Salman claimed that his place and activities are open to the public, not 
exclusively for Shia. He himself does not represent the Shia community in any forum since there 
are others who are better suited to representing them, such as IJABI (Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait 
Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Ahlul bait Group). He stated that he and his community 
will continue their discussion activities since it is not against the law and they do not disturb 
society. He and his community always inform the local leader whenever they organise activities. 
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Such decisions might invite intimidation in the future, particularly from groups that believe that 
they are practicing heresy and should therefore be banned. 
 
4.3.2.3 Shared Common Interests Vs Indifferent Citizenship 
An important feature of citizenship practices relates to those indifferent actions towards 
the rights of minorities. As stated earlier, the number of intolerant actions has increased in 
Yogyakarta. However, instead of getting further attention from the wider public, the concern 
remains mainly of the domain of the NGO activists or religious mass organisations such as NU 
and Muhammadiyah. The case of attacks on LKiS when they organised a discussion forum is an 
example of this. The speaker for the discussion was Irshad Manji, a controversial figure due to 
her extreme views on Islam and her sexual orientation. During the discussion, many participants 
were attacked. Mahmud, an activits from LKiS, recalled these events, saying ‘a lot of people know 
the case of Irshad Manji. It happened here, the glasses of the library cabinets were broken, there 
was a discussant that was brought to the hospital’. Despite the videos and photos available as 
evidence for prosecuting those who committed the violence, there has been no progress on that 
case. 
While being related to the issue of weak law enforcement, what is highlighted here is the 
response of people in surrounding areas who tended to remain passive. Mahmud stated that 
‘they [local people] do not take direct action against this violence because [they believe that] this 
is not their problem.’ This is different from how local people initiated a protest against the 
developers and builders of many hotels in Yogyakarta because of its impact on water services. 
Because of their concerns that the water might run out, they took initiatives to claim their rights 
as citizens. However, with the case of violence against minority groups, Mahmud said that ‘the 
issue of tolerance is not directly related to the public’. On this Rizal said that ‘…the language of 
tolerance, interfaith dialogue is segmented, not all of the people really connect to these 
languages.’ Therefore, tolerance, religious harmony or interfaith dialogue have not been a shared 
common agenda, not only for civic associations such as the sepeda onthel community (a biker 
community), but also for many other people. 
In many cases this indifference is due to the absence of common interests. As argued 
earlier, the rapid expansion has led to the absence of social spaces in which people from different 
groups can interact with each other. The topic discussed is limited too and thus a shared common 
interest is difficult to achieve. Regarding the LKiS phenomenon, Rahmat argued that many 
offices in Yogyakarta are not managed by local people. There is a limited local involvement in 
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activities organised by these offices: ‘this makes the emotional bond [between local people and 
those work in the office] not close ... there is distance’, he argued. This distance not only separates 
them in terms of social relation, but also on issues that need to be shared concerns: ‘Actually, if 
they can make a close [relationship] to the local people such as [employing them as] the security 
guy at night, the waiter (those who prepare a drink), the office boy’ – he continued – the story 
might be different, but ‘this rarely happened’. Part of the reason is that for some NGO activists, 
these kinds of jobs require them to possess some qualifications such as speaking other languages 
– qualifications that are difficult for local people to obtain.  
Cultivating an inclusive and more democratic citizenship requires a shared common 
understanding of local agendas across different groups. This common understanding could be 
achieved when the parties share common interests. Without this, cultivating citizenship will be 
only a concern for some groups, but not for others. The issue of indifference, intolerant actions 
and the languages used to overcome such problems has not reached a point in which wider public 
audiences have developed clear awareness.  
 
4.3.3 Citizenship Practices in Surakarta: An Overview 
Unlike the case in Yogyakarta, the relationship between religious communities in 
Surakarta, as the participants attest, is generally good. This does not necessarily mean that there 
is no conflict or tension between religious communities in this city, as will be elaborated upon in 
the next section, but it does not generally result in violence and widespread conflict. Surakarta 
has been recognised by the participants as a city with different ideologies of living side by side, 
from ‘red’ to ‘green’, from ‘left’ to ‘right’. As the history records show, Surakarta has been a 
central area where different ideologies can proliferate. There is no single dominant ideology, a 
fact that makes Surakarta a city where contestation over ideology occurs on a regular basis. On 
this, Muslih, a researcher and activist from Muhammadiyah, stated that whenever a strong group 
emerges, other groups will counter it. He said ‘so, there will be the ones that encounter them 
[the emerging strong group] ...if they have strong preman (thugs)...there might be strong laskar 
too’. 
This contestation is further noted by Salim as something that could potentially lead Solo 
into the arena of an ‘ideological battlefield’ in the future. He stated that ‘maybe, Solo would be 
an ideological battlefield, which is serious’. Furthermore, he mentioned: 
I see each of this ideological power has prepared [themselves]...Christian groups 
have laskar…called Kristus…they practice with soft guns...like warfare…and it 
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seems Chinese people have supported this…those involved are the youth at senior 
high school level...it seems [this is a] long term project.  
While this seems to be a matter of finding to make this ideological battlefield turn into a 
real battle, a more optimistic view of the future Solo was articulated by Lukman, a leader of NU. 
He believed that currently Solo no longer has a fuse ‘because there is no fuse, thanks God, every 
ideologies and school of thoughts exist in Solo’.  
The current interaction between different religious communities in Surakarta is relatively 
peaceful and, as the participants note, is due to several factors. The performance of the 
government and its apparatus, such as police, is one such factor. The rise of Joko Widodo first 
as mayor of Surakarta, then governor of Jakarta and then finally as president, along with the role 
of FX Rudyatmo as the mayor of Solo since late 2005, has brought more prosperity to the people 
of Solo after the social and economic turbulence following the crisis and riot in 1998. Joko 
Widodo and his vice city mayor have successfully tackled the problems and raised the living 
standards of the community, making it possible for him to change the perception of Solo. This 
legacy has been further progressed by FX Rudyatmo who replaced Joko Widodo’s position when 
he left in 2012 to run in the Jakarta governor election. 
In terms of the state apparatus such as the police force, their performance has been rated 
by the participants as generally good and responsive. Melati, a priest and a leader of Church, said 
that the police have successfully accommodated and mitigated possibilities of conflict before they 
eventuated. Lukman added that any violence and anarchic actions are not tolerated, regardless 
of their religious or socio-political affiliation. Furthermore, the head of the police in Solo does 
builds strong connections at grass-roots level and talks to the people more directly. Lukman said 
that ‘what is so clever about him is he is getting close to the society (memasyarakat), he comes to 
their centres, talks, eats, goes outside, etc. He comes to all different groups [to talk]’.  
One of the features of leadership in Solo after the New Order collapsed is what Hefner 
(2000) calls ‘pluricentrism’, whereby no single dominant authority exists, but rather, the authority 
is spread across different ‘centres’. Regarding this pluricentrism, Dendi said that ‘the centre is 
not single...but centres’. The ability of leaders of different groups to control their people have 
played an important role in keeping Solo calm. On this matter, Muslih said that ‘the leaders of 
the groups can still control [their people] ...so, whenever there is tension, it does not continue [to 
turn into a big scale] ...I think it is important’. Despite its controversial nature, and because of its 
informal relationship with some leaders of MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Council 
of Ulama) Surakarta, DSKS (Dewan Syariah Kota Surakarta, Shariah Council of the City of 
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Surakarta) is aimed partly at controlling the movement of laskar groups: ‘the point [of the DSKS 
establishment] is to discipline them’, Salim said. This is due to the fact that some laskar groups 
tend to use violence to solve the conflict. Adding to this are the formal and informal meetings 
between the leaders of different groups, be they facilitated by the government or initiated by 
themselves. These meetings play an important role in bringing the conflict to the negotiation 
table.  
Another factor that prevents Solo from ‘exploding’ is the sense of belonging among the 
people of Solo (Wong Solo) that is growing stronger. This local identity of Wong Solo brings a 
strong sense of belonging and instils a responsibility to protect Solo from destruction. The 
experience of conflict and violence, particularly the one in 1998 that led to the damage to 
hundreds of offices and public facilities, has led to a new awareness among the Solonese. This 
awareness makes Wong Sala reluctant to see their houses destroyed and has, therefore, been 
highlighted by many participants from different groups as the reason for the relative social peace. 
Melati noted this awareness has been growing stronger, saying: ‘I have been here for 10 years...I 
feel the sense of belonging to Solo has increased. And this makes people reluctant to see their 
city being destroyed by certain groups of people’. Muslih stated that it is not easy to provoke 
Wong Solo since they love Solo and will safeguard it from falling once again into violent conflict.  
As mentioned earlier, however, the strong performance of the government, the state 
apparatus and the leaders of different groups as well as the strong sense of identity of being Wong 
Sala do not mean that there is no tension and conflict between different groups in this city. 
However, these tensions do not escalate into deeper violent conflict. However, it is important to 
note here the contestation over claiming rights, performing religious obligations and upholding 
regulation which have coloured the interaction between different groups in this city, particularly 
between those who claim to be the majority and the minority groups. Examining this contestation 
is important to understand the competing dynamics of citizenship practices in this city, as can be 
seen from the section below. 
 
4.3.3.1 Procedural vs Substantive Concerns 
Like Yogyakarta, the issue of building places of worship has coloured the relationship 
between Muslim and Christian groups in Surakarta. Protests and objections over church 
construction occurred more than once since the joint regulation No. 9 2006 and No. 8 2006. 
Apart from this regulation, there is a local regulation issued by the city mayor in 2011 regarding 
the building of places of worship in Surakarta. It is possible to obtain a building permit (IMB, 
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Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan) for redeveloping or renovating places of worship that existed before 
2006. However, apart from this, all the requirements remain the same.  
The latest case, that is currently being discussed, is a church in Busukan, Mojosongo. 
The problem does not begin from when the church applied for a building permit: this church 
has obtained all the documents needed and other relevant permits have also been obtained. 
Thus, the full permission to build this church was issued. The member of FKUB Surakarta, 
Adit, recalled the discussion when checking these requirements noting that: 
 we already did the survey... all people leaving nearby were okay [with building the 
church]…they put down their signatures...even I remember the place that we used 
to check them [the documents], near... ehm that church...that is a house that 
belongs to Muslim...because of the Arabic writings so many... so at the end, 
because all were okay, we gave a recommendation ...the church gave it to the city 
government, [which then] issued the building permit, and the church was built... 
when the building was finished, the local people did not complain, but people 
from outside did (orang luar).  
The church was built and later on, a group of people, identified as ‘outsiders’ – orang 
luar, protested against this building. They claimed that procedurally it did not meet the 
requirements because one of the documents was not right. Among the national identity cards 
collected from these protesters, there were different addresses indicating these were ‘outsiders’ 
who could not represent the local people. This was admitted by Adit, who noted: 
if people look for the mistakes, they must be really meticulous …there is a copy of 
the national identity card that is not from people living there...maybe, at that time, 
we were not really thorough or...I do not know... and this is used as the basis of 
argument...this is not legitimate... [the church].  
To deal with this issue, dialogue and discussion have been organised and facilitated by 
FKUB, but the discussion was postponed at that time because of the local election in 2015.  
In a different part of the interview, Sugiono, a member of FKUB Surakarta and one of 
the leaders of a Christian community, said that ‘the reason [for objection] is that there are already 
two churches, why there is one more...there is only one mosque’. He commented that the issue 
is not whether there are already two churches being built over there, but their specific affiliations 
and denominations. Furthermore, for Christians, it does not matter where to build the church 
geographically as long as it is allowed: ‘From the start when they got permission, it is smooth…if 
it is not smooth, we, FKUB, will not issue the permission,’ he said. Regarding the national identity 
card issue, he said that ‘[they] have been living there...in fact, de facto they have been living there’. 
He recalled that many mosques have not obtained building permits but it seems this does not 
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become an issue: ‘this one [the church] has the full permit...[it] proceeded according to the law...it 
is supposed to be tolerant of others...but maybe they have different agenda, I do not know’.  
The Busukan church case shows how procedural issues become problematic when they 
are pursued in literal terms and can be used as the basis for highlighting problems that go beyond 
the procedural aspect. Sugiono’s statement points to a rather substantive concern being that 
church building permits is sometimes not only related to procedural concerns but also other 
factors, including the number of existing mosques and churches in the area. Moreover, these 
building permits are often problematised when it comes to churches but not mosques. This kind 
of tension between procedural and substantive concerns has the potential to undermine the 
socio-political process of inclusive citizenship. 
 
4.3.3.2 Religious vs Social Practices  
Another point of contestation in Solo that is worth noting is the activities of a program 
supplying cheap and affordable food for breaking the fasting during Ramadhan, which is 
organised by a Church at Manahan. The initial idea of this activity began after the financial crisis 
in 1997/1998 by providing basic food for take away (nasi bungkus) for pedicab drivers (becak), 
since the members of the church, particularly old women, come to the church by riding pedicab. 
The idea was then developed into a regular activity since the pedicab drivers need this food 
during the month of fasting which in that year coincided with Easter. Since there was a request 
to provide food regularly, this basic food program organised during the month of Ramadhan 
lasted for a few years until 2005. 
The new priest, Melati, came in 2005 and saw this as a big opportunity for developing 
dialogue between Muslims and Christians. She said:  
I came here in 2005, I saw that this is good as a learning process...for the church 
to learn to respect other religious traditions. I think this is a bridge than can be 
built for dialogue…so, dialogue not to [be something] too big (muluk-muluk) ...but, 
let’s package it into a tool for dialogue between interfaith [members].  
With this consideration, the take-away food activities were then changed to dining-in, with 
more menus added and dessert served during the weekend. The place was set up in the front 
yard of the church, not inside. Because it was Ramadhan, every Monday the organiser invited 
religious leaders, kyai or ustadz to deliver religious sermons before breaking the fasting. Some 
performances such as keroncong (traditional Javanese music) were also organised. In 2009, this 
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activity was reported in many media outlets as one of the successful stories of dialogues. ‘We 
were glad but at the same time worried’, Melati recalled.  
This worry turned into reality when after the report, a group of people questioned and 
objected to this activity. The objection was mainly due to the fear of Christianisation. Although 
they did not have any data for this Christianisation, Joni, a senior leader of a laskar group, argued 
that  
they do not respect the holy month of Ramadhan. Clearly it is crossing the borders 
[melanggar]...and it is painful (menyakitkan)...if they [Christians people] want to 
eat just eat. Those who go through the street are Muslims...then the church gives 
[them food] ...if we use the logic, it is not reasonable.  
While she considered it fine to give food to the people on the street, Joni argued that the 
time is not right because it is the holy month of Ramadhan. Furthermore, it is likely to get 
sympathy from Muslims, ‘so that Muslims will sympathize with Christians. So that in the 
future…[they may] convert... like that.…and influencing [to convert] those who [already] have a 
religion is not allowed,’ Joni further added. 
The leader of the church rejected this accusation, saying that she had the data for all the 
members. Also, she would not invite kyai or ustadz to give religious sermons before breaking the 
fasting. Furthermore, she said that ‘[indeed] the contribution is mostly from the church, but many 
Muslims contribute too. Because they see this has other values’. However, this argument does 
not refute the accusation, with warnings that some people would come to the church with swords 
if they continued the cheap food program. While some people urge the continuation of this 
program because they believe that there is nothing wrong with it, the priest considered the fact 
that too many people were involved in this program. A discussion with several community leaders 
was organised and then she decided to stop this program. Melati recalled: 
 when we conducted the program, we did not have any intentions…means, we only 
want to share, develop dialogue...develop the form of life when the church is 
learning to respect others even though we do not ask other to respect us...this is 
not our business...but this has turned out into something counter-productive, and 
there are people who play behind this… then I said enough. If we continue, it will 
be too risky.  
Indeed, though the action took place during the holy month of Ramadhan, the intention 
of the church activity was more social by helping others to break the fasting and opening up space 
for people to learn and respect other traditions. This is of critical importance in order to forge a 
more inclusive society and a democratic citizenship framework. 
 
 86 
4.3.3.3 Religious Teachings vs Basic Rights 
While the anti-Shi’a sentiments have proliferated in Surakarta, the most notable 
sentiment observed during the fieldwork of this research project is the rejection of what is seen 
as a non-Muslim leader: the city mayor. This sentiment was communicated and campaigned for 
via banners in public areas and newsletters that were placed in some mosques as well as during 
public religious gatherings. For the last couple of years, Surakarta has been led by a Christian city 
mayor, who succeeded Joko Widodo (the current Indonesian president) when he ran for the 
gubernatorial election in Jakarta in 2012. His vice mayor, FX Rudyatmo at that time, was 
automatically nominated mayor to replace Joko Widodo. While a non-Christian leader in Solo 
should not pose any problems, particularly for the moderate Muslim groups such as NU, this 
has alerted other religious groups, particularly the Islamist ones. 
Part of the response was the establishment of DSKS. Arman, the leader of DSKS, 
explained the reasons for creating DSKS, saying that ‘firstly is the political change where Jokowi 
(Joko Widodo) went to Jakarta...then replacing him is a Christian...and we do not want that there 
will be oppression (kedholiman) for the Muslims ...also, we do not want there [to] be conflict… 
[between Muslims and Christians]’. From this, it could be evinced that the emergence of a non-
Muslim leader, at some points, is associated with kedholiman (oppression) and a new 
organisation to deal with the conflict that might potentially occur between non-Muslim and 
Muslim groups is urgently needed. This DSKS later on became the place where laskar groups 
gathered and organised campaigns and protest actions. 
Among Islamist groups, the emergence of this non-Muslim leadership has led to new 
awareness, particularly related to the movement of non-Muslim groups. Salim said: ‘We clearly 
felt, when Jokowi and Rudi [nickname for FX Rudyatmo] emerged, the Christians people rose 
too...raised their heads…their spirits, positions…we also saw the arrival of Chinese people’. He 
added: ‘what I see from him in the last two years or more, is more to strengthen his position and 
his people...those who support him, Christians, or those who do not support him...the Muslim 
groups have been eliminated’.  
FX Rudyatmo ran for the city mayor in 2015 and won the election. With another 5 years 
of leadership to come, Salim said that ‘we do not have any other choices rather that raising the 
awareness of Muslim people...we do not wait until [it becomes a case like] Bosnia...like 
Myanmar…we do not do brutal things...attacking…but [we] stay alert’. 
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Not all Muslim groups are against Rudyatmo. Indeed, some Muslim groups have 
supported him, despite the fact that he is not a Muslim. These groups believe that he performed 
well during his first period of leadership as the city mayor. As Salim noted,  
Muslim people here [can be grouped into] is at several levels in terms of their 
extremist understanding…there are those believe that Shariah should be enforced 
whatever the means...if not the totality [of it] at least its values are free to be 
exercised...and need to be [included] in the regulation...there are some, those who 
believe that as long as one can do sholawatan or hadrohan [reciting some praises 
for the prophet Muhammad]...that is Islam...and it is enough...there are also those 
who do not care at all.  
The first group of Muslims, he claimed, are those who stand for the people 
(keberpihakan) because for him the local government does not function well.  
Prior to the local election, the campaign against Rudyatmo’s election among Muslim 
groups was widespread. Salim believed that it is the obligation of ulama to enlighten people over 
this issue: ‘yes, it is part if the duty of ulama to enlighten the people…because according to the 
religion, it is not allowed to elect a non-Muslim as the leader’. However, more moderate groups 
believe that this is only a matter of interpretation of Islamic texts and the prohibition is not the 
only interpretation available for Muslims. After consulting with respected ulama, Lukman said 
that ‘it is not an obligation [to not choose a non-Muslim as a leader], so it is up to you.’ 
Furthermore, Indonesia is not an Islamic state and the law used here is an Indonesian law, so ‘as 
long as it is complying with the constitution, everyone has the right to be chosen for candidacy’, 
he added. 
The tension here pertains to the issue of performing religious obligations, as the Islamist 
groups believe, and respecting others’ freedom to exercise their rights as guaranteed by 
Constitution. The Constitution does not prohibit a non-Muslim from being the political leader 
and thus he or she has the same rights and obligations as a Muslim. However, religious principles 
might be used to stand against this constitutional right due to a narrow interpretation of religious 
texts. This kind of interpretation remains one of the main challenges in nurturing inclusive 
citizenship practices in this city. 
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4.4 Discourse of Citizenship in Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The section below discusses the discourse of citizenship that circulates in the two cities. 
The interviews with the participants highlighted several discourses that have played important 
roles in navigating the practices of citizenship in Yogyakarta. These discourses do not necessarily 
come from one single analytical unit such as politics or religion, because in many cases these also 
relate to other factors such as culture and economics. The no non-Muslim leader discourse, for 
example, is not necessarily driven solely by religious perspective, but also political and economic 
ones. Thus, to understand the meaning and impact of certain discourse on the citizenship 
practice in the two research sites, the analysis employed here contextualized by interrogating the 
political, social, cultural and legal context.  
 
4.4.2 Discourse of Citizenship in Yogyakarta 
  
4.4.2.1 Discourse Leading to Inter-religious Tensions 
One particular discursive construction that emerges in navigating citizenship practices in 
Yogyakarta is the sentiment toward religious minority groups which emerges prior or during 
political events. The example here refers to the use of anti-Shia and Ahmadiyah slogans that 
could be found in many places during or prior to the local elections in Yogyakarta. While 
expressions of anti-Shia sentiment are relatively recent, anti-Ahmadiyah sentiments have been 
present throughout the two decades following the collapse of the New Order regime in May 
1998. Of particular significance is the attack on the Ahmadiyah Centre in Bogor in 2005 during 
the annual meeting. The attack resulted not only in extensive damage, but many Ahmadiyah 
people also suffered severe injuries, according to reports. Since then, the anti-Ahmadiyah issue 
has spread across Indonesia, and Yogyakarta is no exemption. Since the fatwa (religious edict) 
by MUI and the joint regulation between the Ministry of Internal and Religious Affairs, the 
Ahmadiyah community has suffered significant discriminatory treatment including having their 
mosques shut down and their activities stopped because they were seen as potentially spreading 
Ahmadiyah teaching, and thus they were forbidden from practicing in accordance with the local 
laws and regulations.  
Following the many anti-Ahmadiyah attacks over the past two decades, virulent anti-Shi’a 
sentiment has emerged. Despite the fact that there is as yet no fatwa and regulation issued by the 
government regarding the prohibition of Shia’s teaching, the discussion on Shia as a deviant sect 
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in Islam has been widespread. With the case of Yogyakarta, anti-Shia sentiment has been made 
public, particularly prior or during the election. As Mahmud stated: ‘anti-Shia banner (spanduk) 
is quite unique. The advice (seruan) of anti-Shia, sometimes, it gets the public attention (ramai), 
sometimes it does not (sepi) or it just disappears (hilang)…it might appear again, for example 
prior to local election.’ This statement highlights how the election event, as an instrument of 
political practice, intertwines and plays an important role in constructing certain religious 
narratives. Apparently, political leaders encourage this sentiment in public discourse believing 
that it might lead to them securing more votes from Muslim groups, particularly those who 
oppose Shia. And for religious groups, bringing up this issue prior to elections is seen as a way 
of getting more attention, particularly from those who are running for office.  
Indeed, protest and intimidation toward a community associated with Shia did occur 
prior local election in Yogyakarta, and the anti-Shia sentiment has gone further. One active and 
vocal Islamic group even declared not only Shia, but also those who protected them as the enemy 
of Muslims (Panjimas.com, 31 December 2016). Prior to this, several protests against Shia 
community or those who are considered as part of it occurred more than once in Yogyakarta. 
There has been an effort from some extremist religious groups to seek fatwa from the MUI 
leaders on the prohibition of Shia teaching, but this request was rejected. The first was in 2013 
when the extremists demanded the closing of the activity of Raushan Fikr, an organisation that is 
seen as having a close relationship with Shi’a. The second protest occurred in late 2015. The 
plan of protests spread via WhatsApp groups and gained a lot of attention on the day of the 
protests. As discussed earlier, their objection on Shia community is due to them believing that 
the Shia community practices heresy. 
Although there were no violent actions committed, due to the involvement of local 
citizens and police in mitigating this protest, this anti-Shia sentiment has gained significant public 
attention. This happened prior to local election in three municipalities in Yogyakarta: Bantul, 
Sleman, and Gunung Kidul. In this context, the local election has served as a way to open up a 
political opportunity structure, defined as ‘specific configurations of resources, institutional 
arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development 
of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others’ (Kitschelt 1986, p. 58). 
While the connection between this protest and the local election needs to be examined further, 
in this case, the anti-Shia sentiment that can be found in many public areas prior to the local 
election does show how this particular political event facilitates the opening of a political 
opportunity structure. 
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Apart from, anti-Shia and anti-Ahmadiyah discursive construction, the citizenship 
practices in Yogyakarta by and large have been driven by the logics of legal discourse related to 
worship places (worship places discourse). This can be seen in the number of conflicts related to 
places of worship in Yogyakarta that arose since the joint regulations No. 9 2006 and No. 8 2006 
that provide guidance for government at district level for managing religious and inter-religious 
affairs, including permits for building places of worship. This new regulation replaces the old one 
issued in 1969. In many cases, this new regulation has been used by Islamist groups to justify 
their actions to against new building permits for places of worship, particularly by minority groups 
such as Christians. Not restricted to building permits, this new regulation is used to justify actions 
against older places of worship that have been used for a long time but are yet to receive building 
permits (IMB).  
The number of these kind of churches in Yogyakarta, as Supono pointed out, is large. 
Indeed, obtaining a full permit is rather difficult due to the increasing number of 
members/adherents required by the new regulation. Furthermore, another requirement that is 
difficult to meet is for the places of worship not to disturb social orders. Supono said that ‘if 
people want to build a church [for example], it should not to disturb the order and interest of 
the society’. This point, he argued, tends to be interpreted differently and politicised by other 
vested interest groups. Fahmi admitted that this point is rather subjective, meaning that different 
groups might interpret it differently, but ‘for the state apparatus [police], this level of disturbing 
social orders [keresahan] has a standard… the state apparatus has known about this’. Idris, one 
of the leaders of Muslim groups that raised concerns with the issue of churches, stated that what 
has happened in these cases is that the Christian community ‘cheats’ by building churches without 
having full permits, and this is the reason for his and his groups’ objection to these churches.  
The problem related to ‘disturbing social order’ tends to be politicised even further, 
meaning that meeting the procedural requirements to obtain full permits will be even more 
challenging. Considering the weak performance of the state apparatus, as discussed earlier, 
referring to the standard of the state apparatus might not solve the problem, particularly when 
there is confusion as to how to determine which action is breaking the law and which action 
facilitates performing basic rights: ‘the procedural things will we achieved when there is a good 
relationship with local people’, Fahmi argued further. He did make a point, however, that the 
problem related to the churches sometimes goes beyond this. Apart from the building permits, 
Idris and his groups tend to see that many churches have not obtained full permits because they 
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are only a sect, not part of the mainstream group. Therefore, they need to be disciplined, 
otherwise their activities may potentially undermine the process of nurturing inclusive citizenship. 
Related to this is the anti-Christianisation discourse with the example of the rejection over 
the Easter celebration for the elderly in public areas in Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta by the Islamist 
groups. This celebration invites around thousand elderly people from Yogyakarta and 
surrounding cities to celebrate Easter in a public area. Considering the number, it was to be 
organised in an open public area. It was also to include a traditional culinary festival by having 
‘Tiwul’, a traditional food from Java. However, this plan was challenged because of a perceived 
Christianisation agenda. As a result, the organisers of this event had difficulties securing an open 
public space for this celebration. Many NGO activists tried to resolve this issue and organised a 
meeting with the Sultan of Yogyakarta. However, in the end, nothing could be done by the Sultan 
despite the authority he possesses as the king of Yogyakarta. The celebration was not conducted 
in an open public area, but was then organised in eight to nine different churches.  
Having a socio-religious ceremony in a public area is common in Indonesia. Muslim 
communities across Indonesia have organised this kind of event many times, such as public 
religious sermons while collecting donations for social-cultural needs. However, when it comes 
to non-Muslim groups, this practice becomes almost impossible to implement. In this particular 
case, feeling threatened by Christianisation has served as a major reason to protest this socio-
religious event. Furthermore, this kind of argument has been used in many other cases too. As 
mentioned earlier, part of the objection regarding church building is due to Christianisation. 
Mujiburrahman (2006) notes that this particular feeling has coloured the relationship between 
Muslims and Christians in Indonesia due to the history of conflict between them 
(Mujiburrahman 2006). This feeling, combined with such narrow interpretation of religious 
teachings, remains a serious challenge to achieving more equality and inclusion in Yogyakarta.  
Hefner (2001) notes that the policy of the New Oder regime to acknowledge and 
institutionalize only five official religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism) may implicate the creation of what could be termed ‘religiously differentiated 
citizenship’ (something that was avoided during state formation) where people might be treated 
differently due to religious membership. Those who are not part of these five official religions, 
such as those who hold traditional beliefs, might have some difficulties in claiming their rights 
since declaration of religious membership has been part of the national identity card. Whether 
the column of religion should be part of national identity card is being debated. However, what 
is currently happening in Yogyakarta has shown that different treatment is not only experienced 
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by those who are not part of official religions, but also those who are part of it due to perceived 
socio-religious agendas – most notably a fear of a Christianisation program. 
Adding to the anti-Christianisation discourse is the marginalisation discourse linked to 
the rapid investment in Yogyakarta. This rapidly increasing investment has been highlighted by 
the participants in this project as contributing to the current situation of conflict. This investment 
drive has changed how people give meaning to local place and space in this city. Of particular 
note is the absence of social place where people from different groups can intermingle. There 
are new spaces open, however these are limited to the few people who can access them. On this, 
Bagus noted that ‘the different between now [and the past] is the increase in new spaces where 
Wong Jogja are not present’. This is because the newcomers have all the resources, access and 
assets to the newly created places and spaces while at the same time local people, Wong Jogja, 
have been pushed away. This indicates that the investment has at some point led to exclusion 
and marginalisation that further widened the social distance between Wong Jogja and 
newcomers.  
This situation, in some cases, leads to discriminatory practices as can be seen from the 
issue of intolerance towards minority groups which has remained a concern for NGO activists 
and mainstream organisations. Furthermore, whenever violence is committed, such as the case 
of LKiS, the people living in surrounding areas tend to be passive. At other points, this 
marginalisation might lead people to find a new bond in this changing space. One of these 
important new bonds is religion, and religious militant organisations find their base and 
supporters in marginalised areas. As some participants from NGOs argued, most Wong Jogja 
live in villages. The vigilante groups such as GPK operate in the villages, and these groups are 
often accepting and welcoming these marginalised people. Thus, as Rizal mentioned, a form of 
new solidarity emerged in this new social religious interplay.  
GPK, as well as other extremist religious groups, are well known as vocal groups that 
actively play important roles in closing churches or protesting against religious minority groups. 
However, the reason such actions is not always religious. Rizal said that  
the action of these groups to close the churches could also be seen as the internal 
dynamics of this organisation, not solely resistance against the churches or the 
ritual itself...the loyalty is then measured by whether you are brave enough to close 
the church. Even if the church has obtained the permit, they will still try to close 
it.  
A strong point was made by Mahmud when he said that the  
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religious issue is only a mask. What is clear is that there is a strong power in 
Yogyakarta that need to show their force. So, if you would like to feel safe, there 
is the way. From this, it can be seen that this group is ideological, but also 
opportunistic. 
 
4.4.2.2 Alternative Discourse 
Some efforts have been undertaken by NGO activists to counter social-religious issues 
by advocating religious pluralism discourse. This can be seen from their constructive engagement 
with different groups at different level such as having regular meetings between the leaders of 
religious communities to engage in some form of interfaith dialogue. This kind of activity is 
organised by DIAN Interfidei, for example. They also regularly have discussions and invite many 
people from surrounding areas and from across Yogyakarta; and not only those with similar 
perspectives but also those with extremist views, although they do not necessarily come. The aim 
of this activity is to exchange perspectives and gain a better understanding about how living in 
harmony in spite of the diversity of backgrounds. Feni, a senior activist from DIAN Interfidei, 
recalled when her institution once organised a discussion about Jewish people: ‘MMI (Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia, Mujahidin Council of Indonesia) and FUI (Front Umat Islam, Muslim 
Ummah Front) came. There is Ahmadiyah, Jews… MMI, FUI…it is complete. They [MMI, FUI] 
asked a lot about Jews’. For her, this was a social capital to further formulate the inter-faith 
dialogue activities.  
Inviting those who strongly oppose the idea of pluralism and religious freedom to 
participate in these types of activities is part of a strategy to nurture a more democratic citizenship. 
This is because many NGOs in Yogyakarta have been dealing with extremist groups in a different 
way: rather than including them in the process of dialogue, they tend to exclude them. Feni said: 
we campaign for peace, but at the same time we spread the hatred. We criticize 
the groups who spread hatred, [but] we at the same time build hatred …we cannot 
build a wall with anybody, with the government and even the militia groups. We 
need to build a bridge. we are institutions that concern with dialogue…if we can 
smash the wall to fall down, it will be wonderful. This is what we need to strive for. 
Feni foresaw a place in Yogyakarta where people from different groups can come, 
interact and participate in inter-faith activities. She said:  
so there is tourism, education, cultural elements of Jogja [are] included there...the 
visitors, domestics or overseas can come there…people can participate. Like Dian 
Interfidei have a workshop…IRE, CRCS, UGM…in that place there is dance... 
and people can watch a movie. 
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 For her, what makes Yogyakarta special should not be limited only to how people shall 
learn about “kejogjaan”, the culture of wong Jogja. More than that, she added that ‘the uniqueness 
of Jogja is that there are people from different ethnic backgrounds [who] can live together…and 
when we talk about miniature of Indonesia, it is Jogja’. Organising this kind of discussion with 
people from different backgrounds and perspectives is a start to pursuing this ideal. 
Indeed, bringing this ideal into reality is really challenging. One of the key points affecting 
the practices of citizenship that is highlighted in the previous section is the lack of shared 
common interests across different groups in Yogyakarta. The language used by the activists tends 
to be segmented and inaccessible to public audiences. Supardi, the local leader of the area where 
Raushan Fikr is located, stated he was not really involved in the mediation process related to the 
Raushan Fikr case: ‘I do not get involved in anything...because this issue is their [MUI and other 
groups] problem’, he explained. A casual conversation between the researcher and ojeg driver 
(motorcycle taxi) regarding the conflict related to religious communities revealed a similar 
response. The ojeg driver said that religion is not his business; rather, it is a matter for religious 
community leaders.  
Organising a discussion and inviting different groups may serve as the start of an interf-
faith dialogue to identify common interests. However, many of these discussions tend to be held 
in large hotels or universities, where few local or grass-roots people are involved. Furthermore, 
the topics discussed are often unrelated to the daily interests of the local people. NGOs started 
thinking about making the issue much more grounded, as stated by Bagus who thought that 
NGOs need to organise activities in which local people will be actively involved. On this point, 
he stated that  
for tolerance day for example, we campaign tolerance by donating the blood and 
say that donating blood is not [just that] but there is a tolerant message there, such 
as your blood can be used by people from a different religion, different group.  
This is part of the initiatives that he and his network organise to campaign for peace and 
tolerance in Yogyakarta. Such grounded initiatives are still small in scale, though he was optimistic 
that most NGO activists are making progress towards this objective. 
Another counter-discourse is inspired more by digging and introducing human rights 
values to Muslim groups. This can be seen from the activities associated with organising public 
discussions or training related to religion and human rights issues. One such an example is a 
workshop on human rights education for pesantren leaders organised by LKiS, Yogyakarta to 
highlight role that the religious leaders could play in dealing with violence. Mahmud stated that 
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‘the furthest they could go is issuing advice to the people [to not commit violence] ... the religious 
leaders can do nothing to them [the wrongdoers] because it is not their authority.’ He further 
argued that ‘they might think that as long as they [the hardliner groups] did not attack their 
pesantren… [it would be fine, but] once they attacked, they might retaliate…’, something that he 
and his institution did not anticipate.  
Feni noted that the role of pesantren in Yogyakarta in dealing with violence is quite 
strategic. She had high expectations of the pesantren leaders to deal with current acts of 
intolerance in Yogyakarta. Part of the reason for this are the internal issues in the palace after 
Sabda Raja. Furthermore, the Palace has been seen as losing its spiritual and cultural authority 
because of its involvement in the rapid development and investment in Yogyakarta, which in turn 
led to a number of problems in society. Consequently, as Feni stated, ‘the strong institutions that 
can back up the palace is kyai-kyai [the pesantren leaders]’. She did hope that the pesantren 
leaders will be able to deal with the emerging actions in Yogyakarta and start building a strong 
network with other groups that have similar concerns.  
With the weakness shown by law enforcement, there is concern here that there will be 
conflict at the horizontal level between religious groups. Mahmud recalled a time when he 
organised an event, but was threatened by some hardliner groups: ‘I was called by Banser 
(Bantuan Ansor Serba Guna, Multipurpose Ansor Front) [paramilitary organisation under NU], 
they offered me protection, I said no, because this is not their obligation’, so he refused that 
offer. Against this context, LKiS has taken the lead to organise human rights education training 
in pesantren. Introducing this topic to the pesantren would not only help them to understand the 
principle of human rights but also to counter the extremist groups’ arguments in public. Mahmud 
stated that ‘[it is hoped that] with human rights education training, there will appear religious 
leaders with the perspective of tolerance and human rights’. This is important because at the time 
in Yogyakarta, the public discourse on religion was filled with sentiments of intolerance in 
particular against religious minorities, and in particular being explicitly anti-Shia and anti-
Ahmadiyah. 
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4.4.3 Discourse of Citizenship in Surakarta 
  
4.4.3.1 Discourse Leading to Tensions 
While the anti-Shia discourse in Yogyakarta has led to incidents intended to force those 
associated with Shi’a community to stop their activities, the banning of non-Muslims from 
leadership positions has served as a discursive framework (no non-Muslim leader discourse) that 
navigate people’s actions, particularly during the local election in Surakarta. For those who 
campaign for this idea, it is an obligation for Muslims not to choose a non-Muslim as their leader. 
Arman, the leader of DSKS, said that  
If we are Muslims, profess Islam, it is imperative [that we want] to be led by 
Muslim. All leaders must want their people to be what they want...as Muslims, 
[they] must want to be led by Muslim the Islamic way.  
Furthermore, he argued that ‘as a Muslim, one’s loyalty is to Islam… how can we consider 
as Muslim if our loyalty is not for Islamic ideology…this is what we are directed to’.  
These groups do realise that groups of Muslims supported and voted for Rudyatmo 
during the election. Joni said in a satirical way: 
Muslims support Rudi...is it not great? This is an extraordinary [form of] 
tolerance…firstly, they do not really understand religion... what a leader is... its 
character... and how to crown a leader... [it is] regulated by shari’ah …so, it is like 
they do know but do not want to know. Secondly, perhaps there are something to 
be given [to them] ...position, facility, food [sembako].  
Salim further commented that those who support Rudyatmo are ‘level 2’ (those who 
believe that it is enough as long as they can do sholawatan or hadrohan (reciting praises for the 
prophet Muhammad) and ‘level 3’ Muslims, those who do not care at all.  
Apart from this obligation, they do believe that a leadership under a non-Muslim leader 
would be unorganised and chaotic. Even they tend to call them kafir rather than non-Muslim: ‘in 
Quran, there is no non-Muslim...so, it is definite, it is kafir...there are only two groups in this 
world [Muslim and kafir]’, Joni said. Furthermore, kafir leaders will not be just leaders: ‘it is 
impossible, until the end of the day’, simply because it is not according to the Shariah as he 
believed. Joni believed that governance under a kafir leader would be negative at every level, ‘the 
government, economic power, cultural power,’ and furthermore, ‘there [would be] no tolerance’. 
Salim claimed that the number of ‘level 1’ Muslims is less than 30% of the total Muslim 
population in Solo, and ‘because [of that] we have to [be vocal] ... if we just keep silent, we will 
be finished.’ 
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Adding to the no non-Muslim leader discourse is the places of worship discourse. As is 
the case in Yogyakarta, the issue of building places of worship has also coloured the relationship 
between Muslim and non-Muslim groups in Solo. The church at Busukan, Mojosongo, is an 
example of how tensions can easily emerge due to the regulation of building of worship. While 
there might be other motives behind this protest, such as local election, the legality of the 
documents has been the basis for the arguments. This protest and its argument could be seen as 
a way that legal regulation has instigated other actions, or simply justified them. Furthermore, this 
legality argument has put the emphasis on ‘procedural’ rather than ‘substantive’ matters: for 
example, the case of the national identity card which omits the fact that the people who owned 
this card have been living there, despite the fact that the address on their identity card, 
administratively, suggests a different place. 
The use of regulation to justify any protests or actions, or simply open up a space for 
problematising the existence of places of worship would be challenging in Surakarta, considering 
that hundreds of these places have not yet obtained their building permit. Adit said that  
we have the database, the current places of worship be they churches, mosques, 
viharas (temple for Buddhism), all for these 6 religions [Islam, Christianity, 
Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism], the total is more than 870 
worship places, but almost 500 of them have not yet received their building 
permits.  
With this in mind, the problems faced by FKUB regarding these building permits, due 
to the new legal regulation, will continue to be significant. 
In relation to the Busukan church, Joni said that information from his informants about 
the church in Busukan shows that it was built illegally. He said that  
…we have informants. In one RT [Rukun Tetangga, lowest district level] ...there 
are two churches established that are illegal….it is so big… and that is enforced to 
be established by Rudi…and it becomes a problem…a big problem. And a lot of 
churches [like that].  
Furthermore, for him and his groups, the issue is no longer getting permission or not, 
but whether these churches will cause more damage to the local people. This ‘negative effects’ 
argument is interpreted differently according to different parties, and tends to be politicised to 
serve the socio-cultural-political interests of a certain group. 
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Due to this, the issue of Christianisation is important in navigating actions taken by 
Islamist groups in particular. The case of the Manahan church that organised the basic food 
program clearly demonstrated how the fear of Christianisation led to the opposition of a program 
that had run for several years. Despite the fact that this program had been organised by a church, 
Muslims and people living nearby the church did participate. Furthermore, kyai and ustadz were 
involved, but the fear of Christianisation took precedence over this fact. For this accusation, the 
priestess of the church argued that Christianisation is clearly not on the agenda. Melati said that  
there is no data that people come to this church is due to the cheap rice [program] 
... I have data for those who are baptised here and what for [reason]...if I want to 
Christianise, I will not ask for haji [a call for those who did pilgrimage to Mecca] 
or ustadz [to deliver religious speech] ...there is never been this agenda.  
Indeed, the groups who objected to this program had no proof of this Christianisation, 
since they did not find Muslims being converted through it; rather, they argued that it would be 
a hidden Christianisation: ‘It means that there is a long process...such as the blur of the values 
and principles [between Islam and Christianity]’, Arman said. Furthermore, he claimed that it 
offended Muslims because fasting is part of worship. Joni questioned why they did not start this 
program earlier. Indeed, the program has run for a few years, but, he argued, ‘why not in the 
other months?’. For Joni, this program only added fuel to the situation of inter-religious strife in 
Solo: ‘We only asked them to stop doing it,’ Arman said, since ‘we do not want to deal with this 
issue with violence’.  
It is worth noting here that those groups who objected to this program have no experience 
in working together with groups from different religious backgrounds, particularly Christian ones. 
Joni said that ‘we do not work together with them...never…but we do understand them…but 
please they have to understand us [too]’. He believed that ‘mutual understanding’ is the key for 
tolerance. However, what this ‘mutual understanding’ actually means is not clear, though he did 
indicate that being tolerant does not always mean to work together, ‘so, we do not need to work 
together... [for example] let’s make a joint team’. The program for breaking fasting during 
Ramadhan did continue for several years in the place across from the church but there was no 
involvement of the church itself in this program, despite the fact that they did initially start it and 
most people had become familiar with them. 
While the changing landscape of the city and the huge investment in Yogyakarta have 
been key issues that inform citizenship practices, the participants do not clearly highlight this 
issue. However, they did note that the circulation of the money and the flow of people from 
Surakarta did affect the citizenship practices in this city. Dendi noted that Surakarta is small but 
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rich in resources and opportunities. For Sugiono, Solo is an urban destination for those who do 
not have land or occupation. Dendi further said that  
the money circulated every day is more than 20 billion...only in the city of 
Surakarta …so, owners of a national identity card in Surakarta are only 500,000… 
574,0000, but during the day, it is occupied by more than 2 million people... to 
look for money, to learn.  
This, it is implied, will impact on the flow of people, information, ideas, value, and 
interests.  
The phenomenon of laskar groups and their activities can be seen from this perspective. 
Indeed, many laskar groups do their activities, such as sweeping some places for money, as 
admitted by Salim and Joni, respected figures in laskar groups. Parades of laskar groups have 
been organised more than once in Surakarta. While these parades are intended to apply pressure 
on other parties such as the government and those who they perceive as organising sinful actions 
(prostitution and so on), their exhibitions of physical power, such as performing body skills or 
martial arts, have made them synonymous with violence. As a symbol of violence, laskar is 
potentially used by other parties. It is at this point where the show of force of the laskar groups 
meets economic interests: in fact, Joni admitted that some laskar groups committed certain 
actions for the sake of money.  
Furthermore, Dendi reported that he once heard a report on how an entrepreneur used 
laskar to make drunkards move away from his place: ‘[He told me] ...I invited laskar...thus they 
are gone… what did you give to them? Something for buying tea and coffee...like that...the laskar 
is glad...both [of us] are glad’. Laskar with a reputation of violence are used by those who own 
the capital to destabilise a strategic area, so that the price of land will become cheaper: ‘so that 
they can buy this [land] cheaply’. With this kind of socio-economic interest, Yasmin, an interfaith 
dialogue activist, mentioned that some churches have no problem with laskar traveling around, 
‘because [they] received the money. This is an interest that clearly can be seen, and is money 
oriented’, she said. 
 
4.4.3.2 Alternative Discourse 
From a different perspective, many groups make efforts to keep Surakarta peaceful. For 
example, a regular meeting between religious groups is organised by FLAG (Forum Lintas 
Agama dan Golongan, Cross Religion and Social Group Forum). It is a forum where ‘every 
religious leader meets and communicates’, Lukman said. Created in 2011, FLAG is more of an 
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informal forum rather than a formal institution and pioneered in bringing the pluralism discourse 
into the public domain. Many religious leaders are involved in this forum and leaders of 
traditional beliefs are no exception. The meeting is organised once every two months with many 
issues related to diversity in Solo being discussed. Lukman, the local NU leader, stated that ‘we 
are not trying to be hypocrites...at the elite level, between religious leaders...they can hug each 
other, say something good, but at the grass-roots level, there is indeed a tension’. Thus, this forum 
becomes important in bringing this kind of issue up for further discussion by various 
stakeholders. 
These meetings discuss important local issues that have serious implications for inter-
faith relations, such as the negative sentiments towards non-Muslims during the local election, in 
particular when Rudyatmo ran for office in 2012. The negative sentiments towards non-Muslims 
was exaggerated by Islamist groups since they believe that it is forbidden to choose a non-Muslim 
as a leader within Islam. During this meeting, they worried that there would be a clash between 
the supporters of the different candidates, due to manipulation by other religious interest groups; 
but those who attended the meeting made a commitment to not let this happen and to keep Solo 
peaceful.  
Lukman, the coordinator of this forum, believes that abiding by the law and regulation 
will be the key to keeping Solo safe:  
As Indonesians and Wong Solo, the unity in diversity spirit (ke-bhinneka tunggal 
ika-an) has coloured [our] daily life…and the regulation has been there. When 
people live in a place, first [they] will be bound by religion and then [they] will 
bound by the local government regulation.  
Thus, by following the rules, they hope to live a serene and peaceful life. He warned that 
‘Once there is someone [that] breaks the rules and believe that they are more superior [than the 
others], this will lead to restlessness’. Indeed, different groups share their concerns, listen, and 
learn from each other, and together keep their commitment, as Indonesians and Wong Solo, to 
follow the rules. 
Further efforts to lower the tensions among different groups in Solo are made by 
institutions such as LPLAG by organising training seminars and public discussions related to the 
issue of peace and humanity. This institution was established in 2002 by leaders of different 
groups in Solo, partly in response to the Bali bombings, where the perpetrator is an alumnus 
from one of leading religious institutions in Solo. Its main focus is to eliminate conflict related to 
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economic, social, cultural, and religious issues and promote a spirit of peace and plurality so that 
the people can resolve conflict in more just and respectful ways.  
Empowering people at the grass-roots level is part of the key to promoting peace. Dendi, 
one of the leaders of this institution, realised that at an elite level, some issues might have been 
resolved as different leaders discuss and talk to each other. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that problems at the grass-roots level are already solved. Dendi said that ‘The question [is], 
people at the grass-roots level, can it [the resolved issue] reach them...are they represented [by 
the elites]?’. Several efforts have, indeed, been organised to reach out to people at the grass-roots 
level. Apart from organising training seminars and public discussions, members of LPLAG have 
organised more concrete programs, such as engaging families that are vulnerable to terrorism 
and helping the members of laskar groups whose houses need repairing; but, instead of asking 
someone else to do this, they have to do it themselves. Dendi stated that ‘peace is concrete... and 
reflective, real and gives advantages [to the people]’. 
One of the more successful stories of activities led by one of the LPLAG members is 
their engagement with one of the prominent leaders of a laskar group which is against Christians 
(Suyanto & Hartono 2015). Although several invitations to talk were rejected by the leader of this 
laskar, due to the LPLAG member’s identity being both Chinese and Christian, the LPLAG 
member never gave up on this ideal as he believed that an engagement via intensive 
communication would be the key to reducing the tension between this laskar and Christian 
groups. It took time but in the end this LPLAG member successfully engaged with the laskar 
leader, who was invited to several discussions conducted by LPLAG and sent for peace and 
conflict resolution training. During the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh, this leader cooperated 
with the Christian community to do humanitarian work to help the people of Aceh at that time. 
Constructive engagement is arguably one of the keys to reducing tension and establishing more 
peaceful citizenship practices. 
An initiative to transform the tension into a more constructive engagement was also 
initiated by several young activists in Solo. Solo has been known as a city where every ideology 
from nationalism, communism, and Islamic militancy can develop. Furthermore, different 
religions and beliefs are able to grow and live side by side in this ‘Spirit of Java’ city. Conflict and 
tensions among the members of these ideologies and religions are unavoidable, as history 
records. The idea to introduce this diversity from an early stage was championed by youth 
activists in Solo, who created Sobat Anak Surakarta (SAS, the Friends of Surakarta Kids) in 2010: 
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‘We do need [to find a way for] kids to be able to play with other kids from different religions’, 
Yasmin, one of its founders, said.  
There are also activities which bring children from different religions to play and visit 
different places of worship: ‘We rode on a two-level bus together. We stopped at a Protestant 
church, a Catholic church, a mosque, a vihara [Buddhist temple] and then we went home’, 
Yasmin said. During this visit, an interesting encounter between these children, the places of 
worship and their imams or priests occurred. The children asked the imams or priests many 
questions regarding the places of worship. A Muslim child asked the priests about ornaments in 
the church, the statue of Christ and why there was no Allah there; meanwhile a non-Muslim one 
asked the imam about the absence of ornaments in the mosque. ‘This is why this is an 
extraordinary activity and my son is happy’, Yasmin pointed out. 
Involved in this activity are many ordinary mothers who actually partially fund this activity: 
‘The money comes from our donations. So, those who agree on the activity, donate [towards it]’, 
Yasmin said. After the successful first activity where children from different faiths become 
friends, a number of plans were made for children to become more engaged with each other, 
such as camping together. The feature of this activity is that the initiatives come from the grass-
roots level, involving many ordinary parents and children. This kind of normalising initiative that 
involves young generations is one of the key points aimed at cultivating a more inclusive 
citizenship, that in turn can help reduce tensions between different religious communities. 
 
4.5 Comparative Summary of Key Findings 
4.5.1 Key Findings from Yogyakarta 
As discussed earlier, there are different factors emphasised by the participants that 
contribute to the current citizenship practices in Yogyakarta. The weakness of law enforcement 
has provided a loophole to be exploited by some hard-line religious groups, who often use violent 
methods. Confusion over what is exercising rights and what is acting to break the law has slowed 
down the law enforcement process against violent actions. Furthermore, the authority of the 
Sultan has diminished among the people. His involvement in some investment projects have 
created problems for him with the local people. As rapid investments continue, social spaces for 
different social and religious groups no longer exist. This has led to situations where these groups 
have no physical space where they can interact and exchange ideas, which is conducive to creating 
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shared common interests across different groups. The section elaborates more on specific 
common issues that impact the practice of religious citizenship in Yogyakarta. 
The first issue is the lack of social forums to facilitate exchanges between different groups. 
When there are such forums, those who are involved are mainly those who already have the 
same vision. While this is important, it can limit the scope and impacts of such activities to the 
wider public. Indeed, an initiative to include hardliner groups in a discussion such as the 
experimentation by Feni and her institution (DIAN Interfidei) was organised. However, this was 
still limited in scale. Such an effort does need commitment and perseverance, since having 
discussion with those who have different ideas is always challenging. During a rare meeting with 
the hardliner groups, Bagus said that ‘we can’t talk too much because they will say “it has to be 
like this” (pokoknya begini)’. This limits the chances of further discussion. 
There is an initiative from the government, either via FKUB or other meetings organized 
by the Department of Religious Affairs. However, this kind of forum is, at some points, rather 
formal and bureaucratic and thus somewhat slow to respond. Idris claimed that his group informs 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs regarding the churches that, for them, are problematic. He said: 
‘We go to the Kemenag [Kementrian Agama, Ministry of Religious Affairs] ... they 
should ask [about this church issue] to Christian Bimas [Bimbingan Masyarakat, 
a guidance council within the Ministry of Religious Affairs] ...why they have never 
been asked for discussion...this becomes our question’.  
He argued that after the reports he did not know what to do:  
but we are not directed to where...what is the progress of the discussion...what 
should be done...While we are waiting and there is no response from them [the 
government, the police] ...we take the action...the people take action…in our word, 
we hit the drum first so it will make the sound [and be heard by the government].  
The challenge is not only with this particular group in the forum, but also with non-
governmental organisations. Feni recalled a time when she asked her colleagues to have a 
discussion with MUI but she was questioned instead. She said, ‘Our friends still hold old 
paradigms...because MUI often issued a fatwa, instigates “problems” related to religious 
freedom’. This kind of paradigm will not solve the intolerance issues in Yogyakarta because, for 
her, it is like building a wall that separates them from the others. She argued further that  
if we do this, we could not get angry with them…thus we [have to] try to intervene 
as much as possible...glad if we can be involved in the internal process... [related 
to issuing fatwa].  
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With the issue of religion now becoming a glue for new solidarity, building the wall will 
make efforts to reduce intolerant actions more challenging. Rather, ‘we need the new languages 
that resonate with the interests of the different social group in Jogja’, Rizal pointed out.  
Another feature that is worth noting from Yogyakarta is the diminishing authority of the 
Sultan as a cultural-spiritual leader. Yogyakarta is one of a few areas in Indonesia where the 
Sultan has had strong authority and where he is automatically appointed to the governorship. As 
mentioned earlier, the position taken by the Sultan in dealing with intolerant actions is questioned 
because he has power but does not use it. Mahmud describes the actions taken by the Sultan, 
who expressed regret without taking serious action, as adh’aful iman (the weakest forms of faith). 
This is a religious language to describe the passivity of someone to deal with the problems 
because he is powerless. This term is also understood as a satire; to say that the Sultan does have 
the power but decides not to exercise it.  
Indeed, as a cultural-spiritual leader, the Sultan’s authority had shown its power in the 
past. Mawar, a member of Ahmadiyah, remembered a statement from the Sultan in the past: 
‘He said, everyone can live in Jogja, no matter their background or affiliation, you are welcome 
to stay in Jogja as long as you do not cause chaos (rusuh)’. Regarding the Ahmadiyah issue, she 
said further that  
there was a demand to ban Ahmadiyah in Jogja…Sultan said that Ahmadiyah can 
live in Jogja...the one that has the authority to ban is the national government...I 
have no authority.  
While in many places Ahmadiyah are subject to attack, they feel safe in Yogyakarta. Feni 
said that  
Ahmadiyah everywhere is likely to be attacked…in Jogja they were safe because of 
the Sultan... [who said that] “if you want to protest, you can, from your headquarter 
until alun-alun (public square)...no more than that,” and they followed it. 
However, this powerful authority seems to have faded away as the issue of intolerant 
actions have become more frequent. Rahmat said that despite the Sultan describing Yogyakarta 
as a house for everyone, what he is actually doing suggests something different. His involvement 
in the large investments in Yogyakarta that potentially causes social problems, such as pushing 
local people to the periphery and creating difficulties in accessing water, has indicated that 
Yogyakarta is not a house for everyone. Therefore, Rahmat claimed that if there were a survey 
to measure the level of trust of the Sultan among the people, the result would have shown a 
drastic decrease. This indicates that the Sultan is out of touch with the people. Maman said that  
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the Sultan does not keep the mandate of their ancestors (amanah leluhur) ...to 
maintain the inner feeling relationship between the Sultan and the people’; 
instead, ‘he prefers thinking business...economy...investment in Jogja.  
The Sultan’s cultural-spiritual authority has previously balanced the power in Yogyakarta, 
as indicated by the cultural title of the Sultan as Sayyidin Panatagama Kalifatullah. With such 
authority slowly fading away, borrowing the category on charismatic, traditional and modern 
power by Gibson (2007), the power is rather pluri-centralised among the leaders of different 
groups as well as the modern bureaucracy. The weak performance of the state apparatus suggests 
that the ball now is in the hands of traditional, religious leaders. However, the latter also face 
challenges, since there is no shared perspectives among them. Idris and his group are an example 
of how they tend to act their own way, rather than exchanging ideas with the other religious 
leaders. He said that ‘We are part of Islam, but only the left hand...for cleaning the dirty [bad 
things] ...the other will be acting as the right hand [the good things]’. Re-awakening the 
charismatic power of the Sultan and restoring the function of the bureaucratic machine are 
important factors for cultivating inclusive citizenship.  
One last notable feature regarding the practice of citizenship in Yogyakarta is the growing 
awareness of local people to maintain social peace, which requires locals to be active citizens. As 
mentioned earlier, there were specific factors that ensured the protest on Raushan Fikr, an 
institution associated with Shia community, did not turn to violence. Part of the reason was the 
involvement of the community there to ensure their area remained peaceful. Supardi said that  
the involvement of people here is to protect the area...we do not have any intention 
to defend them [Raushan Fikr] ...our principle is...please...if it is not good, please 
[finish it] outside...not in our area.  
He mentions that people living in that area are actively engaged in social activities: ‘Our 
members here are in solidarity. If something [happened], we like to gather here [his house] 
...discuss...to protect our area’.  
Regarding the Raushan Fikr community, Supardi said that they have been good members 
of society and the relationship between them and other people in that area was positive. He said 
that  
there is no problem [with the relationship] ... [they participated in] working 
together for community (kerja bakti) and every activity in this area...they do 
participate...there is no problem [with them].  
Salman said that his community has never had any intention to be an exclusionary one. 
He and his students have always come whenever invited: ‘I do not personally come [for every 
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meeting] …but my students... they know that they are from Raushan Fikr’. As a member of this 
community, he always does what is supposed to be done: ‘we inform that we have [regular] 
discussion…every new student comes, we inform RT and RW...we are not a closed community’.  
Practicing active citizenship has been the key here that makes the bond between different 
members of community grow stronger. Apart from the Raushan Fikr case, this strong bond 
between the members in this area is exemplified in the theme they chose for the village 
anniversary:  
Our theme is for the unity of religious communities...we asked them to perform… 
the five religious leaders and all of them came...and participated in kirab budaya 
[cultural event] in the village.  
For Supardi as the leader of this village, to keep this strong bond between members, it is 
necessary to be a good and active member of the community: ‘For beliefs, it is their own 
business...we are not allowed to mind (mengurus) their business...we also do not know... [about 
their personal beliefs].’ 
 
4.5.2 Key Findings from Surakarta 
As discussed earlier, many initiatives have been taken by different groups in Solo to 
reduce tensions and maintain peace between different parties. The government and its state 
apparatus have facilitated several meetings either via FKUB or other institutions. The police have 
also played an active role in maintaining close interaction with the community and enforce the 
law regardless of the perpetrators’ backgrounds. The performance of the leaders of different 
groups to control their members has been important too. The emerging awareness of Wong 
Solo among different groups have served as a glue to keep Solo together. This section highlights 
some common features that are important in cultivating more democratic and peaceful practices 
of citizenship.   
The first feature is the existence of different forums arranged by the government, 
community leaders or people at the grass-roots level. While these forums have served to share 
common concerns and issues, those who attend these forums already share a tolerant 
perspective. Thus, the forum has created a space for ‘tolerant people’ to talk about some issues 
with ‘tolerant perspectives’. This does not mean that this kind of forum is not necessary, since as 
an initial stage it may pave a way for a broader collective citizenship movement. However, dealing 
with issues which arise from a diverse society such as Surakarta requires more engagement with 
different parties, particularly those with different perspectives. This is because what comes out 
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from that kind of forum will only be likely considered as ‘their concern’, not a common concern. 
Excluding those with different perspectives will only turn this kind of forum into a closed and 
exclusive one.   
Sugiono, a member of this informal forum FLAG, said that no representative from laskar 
attends regular meetings, despite the fact that there are more than 40 laskar groups in Solo. He 
believed this is an issue of concern, although he realised that inviting those who have different 
ideas might affect the mood of the forum. He said that ‘if we have a meeting, we do not meet 
them...[and] that is the problem’. Bringing together different groups, particularly those who have 
different perspectives, is something that needs further work in the case of Surakarta since the 
issue is more than a meeting, but also a question of representation. Surakarta belongs to all 
groups, not only those who have ‘tolerant perspectives’. Some of the leaders of Islamist groups 
were involved in several formal discussions, but they admitted that they rarely engage in more 
constructive debates with different groups in the city. In those formal discussions they mainly tell 
audiences about what they believe, yet this is not followed up with a more engaged conversation. 
Arman said that  
With non-Muslim [groups], in principle we tell [them] our ideas...our 
perspectives... if we work together... it’s not [that we] do not want to... so we have 
the Shariah principle... so, we are ready to work together... even with demons... as 
long as [it is] something good [takwa, doing something good and avoid something 
bad according to religion]. 
This argument shows that there is a willingness from Islamist groups to be involved in a 
more engaged conversation – even to work together with the ‘demons’ (a word used by the 
Islamist groups to refer to really bad groups of people). While Arman did not clearly explain to 
which groups this word refers to, he did state that as long as the process of engagement is 
conducted in a Shariah way, based on his interpretation, he would be willing to work together. 
This Shariah principle is indeed contested, even among Muslim groups in Solo, for example 
when it comes to the interpretation relating to voting for a non-Muslim leader. However, 
cultivating citizenship requires a space for it to be questioned, contested, and negotiated by the 
different communities in response to the dynamic of political and social change to achieve a 
common ground. As Young (1990; 1998) points out, an open space is needed to facilitate 
different social groups’ participation in social and political decision-making process. This would 
make it possible to transform ‘their concern’ into ‘our concern’. The experimentation of LPLAG 
member in engaging the leader of a hard-core laskar group is an example of success, but it is 
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limited in scale and needs to be translated into a more collective process that involves more 
diverse groups in Solo. 
A rather more formal forum such as FKUB also faces similar issues, as currently there is 
no representative from Islamist groups. Furthermore, FKUB tends to be limited in its focus on 
more procedural issues, meaning that as long as all parties meet the ‘procedural requirement’, 
the case will be resolved. There is a limitation here, however, as more substantial issues tend to 
be neglected. As mentioned earlier, for example, the issue of places of worship is more than 
about procedural documents. Joni, a laskar leader, protested the Busukan church, saying that 
‘[the issue of] building a church is not [whether they are] getting permission or not...but [if] in 
the surrounding area, there are negative effects...so don’t [build the church]’. This line of 
argument is rather more controversial, and thus requires a more careful engagement that goes 
beyond procedural contestations.  
Another lesson to be learnt from Surakarta is the emergence of a more natural bottom-
up engagement between different religious communities at the grass-roots level in this city. This 
is not to say that many top-down initiatives organised by the leaders of the elites are not important. 
Rather a more inclusive and democratic citizenship needs to be cultivated at multiple levels and 
requires the co-operation and commitment of people across different groups. As stated earlier, 
the role of leaders of different groups in Solo in controlling their members has been positively 
highlighted by participants in keeping Solo under control. However, as Lukman noted, while 
effective communication and commitment toward peace and harmony are easily forged at the 
leadership level, the clash between the member of different groups at the grass-roots level does 
occur. Furthermore, Dendi said that the elites do not necessarily represent the grass-roots people 
and thus the problems solved by the elites do not always mean the same to the people. Thus, it 
is not surprising that elitist forums are often questioned as to whether they represent the interests 
of the people or are simply serving the elites’ own interests.  
Yasmin critically commented on such forums as potentially hiding the danger, which is 
only serving the so-called leaders who often use these opportunities to pursue their own self-
betterment agendas. She said, ‘When engaging in interfaith forum...indeed there is someone who 
wants to improve his/her social class, want to get a status, want to get opportunity.’ She highlighted 
that it is partly because of these interests that the current situation in Solo is the way it is. As noted 
by Dendi, Solo is a small city with numerous opportunities for the flow of people, interests and 
ideas to meet. Yasmin did not mind this as long as pursuing one’s interests is conducted in a 
transparent way, although she lamented if in the end, ‘it is all about the money’. This is because 
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this greed can potentially undermine efforts to cultivate a more robust citizenship. A strong 
critique directed by the Islamist groups to this kind of elitist-initiated forum is that they are aimed 
only at gaining favours from the government.  
Initiatives at the elite level need to be translated into a more concrete and natural way 
that can be reflected in every day interaction between different groups. The story of 
Joyodiningratan GKJ church (Gereja Kristen Jawa, Christian Church of Java) and the Al-Hikmah 
mosque shows a natural interaction between the Muslim and Christian communities in this area. 
This church and mosque share the same address; both buildings are separated by a slim wall so 
that whenever there is adzan (signal for praying) the people at the church will clearly hear it. The 
same goes for Muslims in the mosque whenever the church is organising religious ceremonies. 
Instead of feeling disturbed, they see this as part of normal process. One of the leaders of the 
church said that ‘maybe if it [adzan] is not heard, we even feel guilty...or strange’. Similarly, 
whenever the church is having a ceremony, on Christmas Eve for example (kebaktian natal), 
Muslims do not feel distracted during the praying, even though it is considered important for a 
Muslim prayer to be very focused (khusyu’). Sajad, the leader of the mosque, said  
Imagine during the Christmas celebration [while] we are praying...Muslims who 
are very focussed during the praying need to listen, it is so beautiful...the ear of 
Muslims, during praying, does not mean cannot be used to listen, but [that they 
have to] listen... but the praying is still very focussed. 
 Since they share the same address, they have the same front yard, and they both use it 
together when they need it. During Christmas, for example, the members of the church park 
their vehicles in front of the mosque while on Eid Adha, the Muslim community put all the 
animals for slaughtering in front of the church. This process has been organised in a natural way, 
by informing the church or mosque whenever they have certain activities that require using the 
yard. Sajad described this relationship ‘just like a friendship’. To symbolise this harmony, a 
candle with an inscription (prasasti lilin) was made and placed at the front yard located between 
the mosque and the church. ‘This candle inscription symbolizes that being different is beautiful’, 
said Sajad. This kind of friendship highlights an intimate relationship akin to brotherhood: 
‘[indeed] we are brothers, of the same nation and motherland, even though with different beliefs,’ 
he continued.  
The key point of this friendship is that it is based on a bottom-up natural process where 
the interaction between these two communities occurs based on their everyday needs. Whenever 
there is something to discuss they will communicate with each other: ‘if not, then not... by doing 
that it [the communication] will flow naturally’, Sajad argued. There is no meeting regularly 
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scheduled between the leaders of these communities, but they do meet in many societal activities 
such as when the church has an event and the people of the mosque are invited. The priestess 
of this church is also involved in PKK (Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, 
Empowerment and Family Prosperity), an organisation to support mothers and their family, 
regardless of their backgrounds. Communication also takes place when the priestess plays with 
children in the neighbourhoods. Thus, the communication between the church, the mosque and 
the society occurs in a more subtle and natural way and therefore has lasted from generation to 
generation.  
A concern emerges regarding the future of this peaceful interaction between these two 
communities as a result of the increasing number of militant groups, particularly those who always 
‘monitor’ the churches. Leaders of these two communities acknowledge the importance of 
understanding the history of these two buildings. New religious and political leaders are also 
required to understand the history and peaceful relationship between them. The church has its 
own system whereby every leader needs to understand the history of the church to which she or 
he is going to be appointed. Meanwhile, for Muslims, Sajad said that ‘If [someone] does not 
understand this detail [of the history], he cannot be the leader of this mosque, [because it will be] 
so dangerous’. This statement shows that the active involvement of community leaders and local 
people can be a strong base to cultivate an active-inclusive citizenship.  
The last feature of the dynamic of citizenship practices in Surakarta is the emergence of 
Wong Solo identity. The 1998 riots that resulted in the economic crises that impacted the social 
and cultural life of the people led to new awareness among people in Solo regarding their identity. 
At the same time, they served as a glue that brought the people of Solo together. Dendi used 
these events to construct a narrative that is then communicated to different people, regardless of 
their backgrounds. When he was appointed to lead a discussion, he used these words to address 
those who attended the forum: ‘I tell them, we are Wong Solo… [who are] glad to discuss 
important things in our area to be a lesson learnt’. In this language, the emphasis is on bringing 
all people from different groups together and constructing them as being part of a more collective 
identity, regardless of their differences. 
Melati emphasised that the sense of belonging amongst the people living in Solo keeps 
increasing. Melati has been living in Solo for 10 years and she felt that her love of Solo has 
increased. Part of the reason is because people start to see Surakarta as a comfortable city, a 
place to invest in, one that requires collective commitment to protect:  
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Solo people have awareness to love Solo, to keep Solo. I have been here for 10 
years. I feel the sense of belongings of Solo has increased...and this means they do 
not want their city to be destroyed by certain people.  
She acknowledged the history of violence of Solo and the growing number of militant 
groups that, for her, might spoil the current peaceful situation: ‘If not for these local people [wong 
Solo], who else [can] protect Solo?’, she added.  
As a Wong Solo and an Indonesian, she sees living with people from different 
backgrounds like living in a family. Although there are many rooms that separate the various 
members, they are connected to each other as members of the same family: ‘There is a space 
for meeting, where every member of family can share and live together’, she said. Despite the 
different characteristics of the members of the family, she hoped that every member of the family 
could learn from each other and accept their differences. She believed that differences are ‘not 
only to be respected but to be celebrated as a gift’. For her, differences do not threaten but offer 
opportunities for learning.  
The idea of Wong Solo also resonates within Islamist groups. While depicting the future 
situation of Solo as an ideological battlefield, these groups still considers Wong Solo as a factor 
to consider: ‘[regarding the ideological battlefield] ...whether it will be subdued by the kind-
heartedness of Wong Solo, I do not know’, Salim laughingly said. He himself feels the 
responsibility to protect Solo, since Solo is his home too. He said, ‘I personally see that this is 
our house. Do not destroy it’. He was concerned about some issues in Solo, such as the youths’ 
high exposure to alcohol. Thus, he said this needed to be resolved and ‘if we cannot do it our 
way...let’s make a local regulation. If it is a local regulation, they will follow’. Arman, another 
figure within Islamist groups, also shared the dream to build Solo as a peaceful and prosperous 
city, although emphasising a ‘Solo that progresses in the name of Islam, because I believe that 
Islam will take us there’. 
These different narratives of Wong Solo show how people from different groups have 
concerns about Solo and how to make it a better city. However, what Wong Solo means and 
what kind of responsibility it brings is perceived differently. Melati’s concept of Wong Solo, for 
example, derives from an inclusive perspective, where differences need to be acknowledged and 
respected. People, regardless of their backgrounds, need to be treated equally since they are the 
same members of the one ‘family’. On the other hand, the dream of Islamist groups comes from 
their religious understanding, where they believe that focusing more on religious values (i.e. 
Islam) will lead Solo to become a peaceful and prosperous city. While this kind of religious 
perspective will be highly contested when it comes to interpretation and application, the inclusive 
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perspective also faces challenges from a more sectarian one, be it in the name of religion, culture, 
or ideology.  
Therefore, there is a need to bring these different perspectives into a more synthesised 
discussion. The awareness of Wong Solo has paved the way for bringing all parties together since 
they share the similar concerns and hold same responsibilities. However, they seem to work 
differently. A more constructive engagement is likely to bring them closer together. The aim is 
not to find a one single solution for all the local problems, since the ‘pluricentrism’ of Solo opens 
up a space for different logics and narratives; it is to find shared common grounds for different 
groups to come and work together. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the practices of citizenship in two cities, namely Yogyakarta and 
Surakarta. These two cities have a shared history being previously part of the same political entity: 
The Kingdom of Mataram, the biggest Islamic kingdom in the 17th century in the archipelago.  
Recent incidents bearing on relationships between the faith communities in both cities, 
however, suggest important developments in social dynamics affecting religious minorities. 
Looking at the dynamic of citizenship practices, this research has highlighted some key factors 
that contribute to the problematisation of citizenship practices in both cities. The allegedly weak 
performance of the state apparatus in Yogyakarta, the steadily diminishing authority of the Palace, 
the paucity of physical social spaces conducive to positive interactions, and the absence of shared 
common interests between different groups have all contributed to significant changes in patterns 
of interaction between different communities. On the other hand, the strong performance of 
government and state apparatus in Surakarta, the active participation from leaders of different 
groups, their role in controlling their members, as well as the increasing dedication among Wong 
Solo to protect their city have contributed to the relatively peaceful interaction between different 
groups in Surakarta.  
These differences notwithstanding, both cities share similar challenges. Most notably, 
procedural requirements for new places of worship have led to renewed tensions between the 
Muslim and Christian communities. There are many places of worship that still do not have 
buildings suitable for performing religious rituals and ceremonies. The objections to building 
churches due to fears of Christianisation have persisted in both cities. The main difference is that 
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the tension in Yogyakarta has sometimes resulted in outright violence, while in Surakarta, it has 
not. The active role of government in Surakarta to mitigate the tension has prevented the 
eruption of violence. Furthermore, the role of traditional leaders has lessened the levels of 
tension in the city. As mentioned earlier, many laskar miitia groups exist in this city and remain 
quite active in problematising many issues they perceive as being against religion or regulation, 
in particular building places of worship. However, many of these groups have been coordinated 
in one organisation that functions to control the actions of these different groups. In Yogyakarta, 
the existence of similar groups is also a challenge for maintaining peaceful interactions between 
different groups. Unlike in Surakarta, however, there is no organisational function to control the 
movement of these groups, which tend to act independently.  
The active citizenship evident in the everyday practices across the two cities gives some 
grounds for optimism regarding the future of religious minorities and inter-faith dialogue. But 
these practices need to be ‘scaled up’ and normalised so that they can become an enduring 
feature of mainstream interaction between different communities in both cities.  
One last feature that sheds light on the differences between the two cities is the increasing 
awareness of collective identity in Surakarta, which is largely missing in Yogyakarta. The identity 
of Wong Solo has acted as a glue that made different parties feel responsible for protecting 
Surakarta and keeping it peaceful. They have a shared history of inter-group violence and thus 
do not want this to happen again. Their collective identity encourages them to think about their 
daily practices and their implications for the social peace in their city. In Yogyakarta, this kind of 
collective identity has not emerged, partly due to the lack of social spaces that facilitate encounters 
and exchanges between different groups. Rather than serving as a collective identity, the 
discussion over Wong Jogja seems to be referring only to local people while at the same time 
differentiating them from newcomers. The uniqueness of Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Istimewa) also 
seems to be interpreted rather narrowly and is often defined as a unique entity in term of cultural 
backgrounds.  
  
 114 
CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction  
The study’s key findings suggest that citizenship is practiced in distinctly diverse ways in 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Indeed, the discursive constructions that navigate these practices take 
different forms that cannot be simplified into the single categories of either politics or religion. 
The conceptual framework adopted in this project suggests that the practices of citizenship are 
dynamic and are bound up with contestation over the meaning-making process. This involves 
not only the state, community, or individuals as the actors, but also the justifications for these 
actions, be they in the name of religion, culture, constitution, or the intersection of these three.  
The first section of this chapter reflects on the role of religion in the practices of 
citizenship at the two research sites. As the findings suggest, religion has played an important role 
in navigating the practices performed by different actors in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. The 
concept of religious citizenship introduced by Hudson (2003) sheds light on the dynamics of 
religion and citizenship in Yogyakarta and Surakarta, exploring how and to what extent it is used 
and how this is reflected in performative acts of citizenship. 
The second section discusses the issue of culture and citizenship practices. As the 
theoretical framework suggests, looking at the role of culture provides insights into understanding 
how certain citizenship practices are developed, conceptualised and how they are practiced in 
two research sites. As both research sites are predominantly Javanese, key cultural symbols, terms 
and practices of Javanese culture will be examined to reflect on how they are being used to 
conceptualise citizenship.  
The third section discusses the practices of citizenship in the form of everyday life 
activities. As citizenship literature suggests, citizenship is about much more than simply voting 
during the elections, paying taxes, and working for public services; it also shapes numerous 
everyday activities that are deeply rooted in a society. Many of these practices function as glue to 
cements the disparate elements of society together, maintaining harmony and cohesion. This 
section further examines this issue. It also discusses what Isin (2008) referred to as ‘the act of 
citizenship.’ One can understand citizenship as being something ‘static’, such as in the form of 
long-performed practices that stabilise the society and help it function. However, citizenship also 
has a dynamic element. As a citizen an individual has rights which are available for them to claim 
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through day to day practices and this is what the act of citizenship investigates. The findings from 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Solo) suggest that these dynamic practices of citizenship deserve 
further investigation. This requires looking not only at the order and the habitus, but also the 
rupture that facilitates the acts of citizenship. 
The fourth section discusses the issues surrounding the virtues of citizenship. As the 
literature suggests, citizenship is not only about rights but also duty and responsibility. The 
findings show that the different actors act out citizenship practices differently in the two cities. 
This makes cultivating a more democratic and peaceful citizenship in both cities challenging, as 
common agendas have not yet been established. This tends to result in the segmentation of 
efforts to forge democratic citizenship, diminishing their capacity to resonate among the broader 
population. The extent of this lack of common agendas in cultivating citizenship and how this 
issue is placed within in citizenship theory is discussed in this section. 
The fifth section reflects the findings of this research regarding the regulation over 
citizenship practices under Pancasila, the Five Principles, the statement that constitutes the 
ideological foundations of the Indonesian state. The section briefly sketches the history of 
Pancasila and the attempts of different regimes, from the Old Order Regime to the Regime in 
the Reform Era, to interpret Pancasila in a more practical way.  
 
5.2 Religion and Citizenship: Competing Religious Citizenship in Practices 
In the 21st century there are indications that the level of interest in understanding religion 
at the local, national, and global contexts has increased sharply, particularly after the 9/11 al-
Qaeda attacks in America in 2001, which shocked many into thinking about issues relating to 
religion and violence. These attacks caught people off-guard, particularly those living far from 
conflict zones in the West, leaving them struggling to understand what was happening to 
international affairs and intercultural relations. After being overlooked for many decades within 
international relations discourse, particularly during the Cold War where the issue of religion 
had been subsumed under history, economics, ideologies, or politics category, religion has 
become a major topic of discussion once more.  
Western liberalism, being self-consciously secular in nature, has not placed religion as an 
important factor in public life. Indeed, religion has been seen as an enemy of this modern 
progress as it is often associated with a chauvinistic and barbaric nature that can lead to violent 
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conflict, thereby making it incompatible with the modern, rational and civilised new world. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, religion, together with the idea of nationalism, has come to 
surface and become a vital part of the new language of freedom, particularly in developing 
nations. Once predicted to become irrelevant, even extinct, religion is now being perceived as 
back at the centre of many current events and the contribution of religious to regulating public 
life is once again a serious matter for public discussion (see for example Casanova 1994). 
Consequently, the role of religion in causing, prolonging, or transforming conflicts, as well as the 
ways in which it contributes to the modern world, has gained renewed attention by many scholars.  
The findings of this study in Yogyakarta and Surakarta suggest that religion continues to 
play a key role in public life. Though it functions and is used differently by the participants, the 
findings show that instead of religion declining and retreating into the private sphere, as 
modernisation theory had predicted, it is once again gaining popularity. Previously, religion had 
been associated with backwardness and superstition (Berger 1999) and was also seen as 
incompatible with democracy, transparency, human rights, and so forth. However, this is no 
longer automatically assumed. While some religious institutions and communities may have 
lessened their influence, religion is by no means fading away.  
To explain this phenomenon, Berger (1999, p. 3) argues that in responding to 
modernisation, religious communities or institutions react in two main ways: rejection and 
adaptation. With rejection, certain religious groups see modernisation as an enemy to be resisted, 
much like the ways in which proponents of modernization see religion. Those pushing the 
rejection stance advocate either a ‘religious revolution’, which requires the whole modern system 
be substituted by the religious ones, or that ‘religious subcultures’ need to protect religious 
communities from the harms of (Western) modernisation.  
Those advocating adaptation argue that religious institutions and communities should 
change and evolve to meet the needs of modern society. Scholars like Berger (1999) note this 
adaptation has the potential to help religion not only survive but also to flourish. Although not 
without points of controversy, as will be discussed later, this can be observed generally in public 
life in Indonesia.  
The role of religion, with respect to the issue of citizenship, has long been marginalised. 
Indeed, religion has been seen as the ‘archenemy of citizenship.’ As Turner (2002) notes, religion 
has been considered as being hostile towards citizenship, due to the latter being a secular notion. 
The religious and the secular, while they offer ‘separate but parallel form of membership’, 
potentially conflict to each other, particularly when it comes to their members claiming rights, 
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performing duties and acting on behalf of obligation (Turner 2017, p. 3). It is argued that 
democratic citizenship can only rise when religion wanes or citizenship requires the liberation of 
society from religious hegemony’ (Turner 2002). However, Turner (2002) suggests something 
rather different. Drawing upon the work of the Weberian tradition, he argues that the 
relationship between religion and democratic citizenship can be conceptualised along the 
relationship between religion and capitalism. Therefore, ‘if the unintended consequence of 
religious asceticism was the spirit of capitalism, then the unintended consequence of the rejection 
of the world was the spirit of liberal democracy’ (Turner 2002, p. 260). 
This argument suggests that while religion is often seen as an obstacle toward cultivating 
secularised modern values, at the same time, it is advocating for social bonds that go well beyond 
mere primordial ones. In fact, faith-based communities have at times undermined primordial 
associations, such as those of ethnicity and kinship, and have made it possible for the people to 
have more transcendent associations (Turner 2002, p. 261), increasing the likelihood of more 
democratic citizenship. Therefore, and following Turner’s framing, it can be argued here that 
the more religious a society is the greater the chance of constructing a more democratic 
citizenship. However, this does not necessarily mean that every religious aspiration will always go 
hand in hand with the democratic citizenship principles, nor does it mean that religious demands 
will always obstruct the process of creating a more democratic and inclusive citizenship. In fact, 
the relationship between religion, democracy and citizenship is anything but simple.   
As the findings from this study suggest, most participants, with the significant exemption 
of the extremist Islamist groups, believe that religion, democracy, and nation-state are not 
mutually exclusive, but rather can enhance each other. Being religious does not prohibit them 
from being good citizens; and nor does being a good citizen require them to give up their religious 
convictions. Instead, the values of religion as they interpret them, by and large, have shaped their 
understanding of citizenship. Furthermore, when translated into the regulations, the principles 
of religion and democratic values do not violate to each other. They regulate their own domain 
but are not necessarily in opposition. Thus, being a good citizen means to obey the rules without 
making claims of superiority. This is because democratic principles do not prohibit them from 
exercising their faith. Instead, as the Indonesian constitution guarantees, every person has the 
right to perform their religious obligations; it is the interpretation of religious teachings that can 
give a more solid foundation to cultivating democratic citizenship.  
Nevertheless, the findings of this study point to ways in which democracy and nation-state 
might not always be compatible with religious values such as those associated with certain Islamic 
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interpretations. Islamist groups, to greater or lesser degrees, reject democratic values, saying they 
are created by human beings and therefore stand in stark contrast with religious tenets created 
by God. For them, democracy and nation-states represent something new and create difficulties 
for Muslims when practicing their religion. For them, the current political model in Indonesia 
does not facilitate Muslim aspirations. Due to this, instead of conceptualising the governance 
based on democracy and nation-state, they assert that Islamic-based governance in the form of 
Islamic state or khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic caliphate) is the only answer, whilst claiming that this 
enlightened religious governance will not discriminate against non-Muslim groups. The history 
of the first Islamic caliphate, they assert, is an example of this enlightened governance. In short, 
they reject modern democratic values and propose religious ones because they believe that the 
former is inferior to the latter. 
These two opposing views are well-known within the Indonesian context and have been 
the subject of considerable debate. As history shows, the foundations of the Indonesian state 
have been the subject of much discussion among the founding fathers since its beginnings. 
Among conservative Muslim groups, the argument over the philosophical foundation of the state 
has long been a crucial point. More progressive Muslim groups, however, believe that Indonesian 
political architecture can and should be inclusive, making it possible for people from different 
communities to live equally, side by side. Nevertheless, a vocal minority of Muslims believe that 
Indonesia should be designed as Islamic state or at least shariah Islam should be incorporated 
into the state. The latter proposal was rejected and Indonesia was designed as a modern 
democratic state – neither secular nor religious. 
With this in mind, the findings of this research project show that the aim of reactionary 
Islamist groups to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia continues to find considerable support. 
As Bertrand (2005) argues, Indonesia has experienced at least three critical junctures in which 
its Pancasila’s secularity faced intense criticism as well as concerted efforts to overturn it. The 
first critical juncture, which occurred during the establishment of the nation-state, was briefly 
discussed above. The second happened during the transition from the Old Order regime to the 
New Order. The third critical juncture occurred during the collapse of the New Order regime 
and at the beginning of the Reform Era. Within these junctures, religion and the national political 
philosophy of state were central issues of contention. 
Throughout the history of the republic, Islam has been an important part of the 
nationalist movement. This is one of the most important ways in which Indonesian nationalism 
different from European nationalism. Anderson suggests that nationalism as an expression of an 
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‘imagined community’ emerges, in part, due to the decline of religion (the other main reason 
being the decline of the existing political order such as the political-based dynasty). Anderson 
(2006, p. 16) notes that part of the reason for the decline of religion is ‘the demotion of the sacred 
language’ (Anderson 2006, p. 18). Anderson points to experience of medieval Western Europe, 
whose foremost language of scholarship and intellectual exchange was Latin. The arrival of the 
printing press and the expansion of print-capitalism quickly ended this hegemony as vernacular 
languages began to dominate the print market. With this trend, he argues, ‘the fall of Latin 
exemplified a larger process in which the sacred communities integrated by old sacred languages 
were gradually fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized’ (2006, p. 19).  
This is not to say that nationalism automatically emerges because of the decline of religion 
and the accompanying decline of dynastic realms. Anderson (2006, p. 22) states that their decline 
facilitates the possibility of apprehending the world in dramatically new ways, and thus ‘made it 
possible to ‘think’ the nation’. Chatterjee (2004, p. 5-7) argues that nationalism as an imagined 
community as proposed by Anderson is conceptualised as something emerging in the ‘empty 
homogeneous time-space of modernity’ that makes it possible to think of the world as ‘one’, and 
the activities referred to as politics occur ‘everywhere’. Chatterjee argues that this conception of 
time-space, however, is a decidedly utopian one, (2006, p. 7). For him, instead of being 
homogeneous, time-space is heterogeneous, in that people may live in the same place but have 
different conception of their shared time-space. In short, political concepts such as nationalism, 
or citizenship in particular, may mean very different things to different people. In line with this 
argument and within the Indonesian context, Hefner (2000, p. 14) points to the plurality of 
nationalism conceptions in Indonesia, arguing that it is more plural and multi-ethnic than that of 
Europe, where the tendency is towards ‘a single ethnic prototype’. This plurality, I argue, includes 
the different religious imaginations within Indonesian nationalism.  
Bringing this theoretical discussion over to nationalism and religion in the Indonesian 
context is important. As the idea of nationalism closely relates to the citizenship project, the 
different conceptions of nationalism tend to result in different conceptions of citizenship. When 
considering the European experience, it can be argued that nationalism, at least as Anderson 
imagines it, tends to be secularised amid the decomposition of sacred language and thus of 
religion. The citizenship project is then conceptualised in a more secular way in which religion 
is viewed as hostile toward citizenship. And, as Turner (2002) argues, instead of further affirming 
this idea, religion provides a foundation to build a more inclusive citizenship since it transcends 
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the primordial bonds of kinship and ethnic solidarity. It is at this point that the discussion of 
religious citizenship within the Indonesian context finds its significance.       
Hudson (2003) introduced the concept of religious citizenship as taking on different 
forms: firstly, the nation-state model where the state allows (and disallows) its citizens to perform 
religious obligations. Secondly, the civil society model, in which people can exercise their rights 
in public as religious people. Thirdly, it can take the form of a person’s right to exercise their 
religious obligations freely within local, national, and international contexts. Also, it may refer to 
the specific legal documents that makes the state oblige to this. Lastly, it may refer to the 
declaration of a person of a certain religion who, with this declaration, can claim their rights. The 
ways in which these different forms of religious citizenship shed light on the citizenship practices 
in the two research sites of Yogyakarta and Surakarta will be discussed in this chapter.  
The nation-state model of religious citizenship has been practiced since the establishment 
of the Republic of Indonesia. The 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945) guarantees that every person 
is free to perform their religious obligations. However, during the Old Order regime, the state 
acknowledged only six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Confucianism. This meant followers of other faith traditions, including indigenous spiritualities 
as well as agnostics and atheists, did not enjoy the same freedoms and so experienced a less 
privileged form of citizenship as, effectively, ‘second-class’ citizens. When the Blasphemy Law 
was introduced in the 1965, the situation deteriorated even further. This law, at that time, was 
aimed at controlling the rapid rise in popularity of indigenous spiritual beliefs (Kholiludin 2009, 
p. 184-186). However, this regulation has been used to judge what religious expression is allowed 
and what is not. 
When the Old Order collapsed in 1965 and the New Order was established in 1966, the 
practice of religiously differentiated citizenship did not fade away, but became even stronger. The 
acknowledgement of official religions was institutionalised (but with the elimination of 
distinctively Chinese Confucianism) when, in 1978 the government obliged people to declare 
their religious identity on their national identity card. These national identity cards featured a 
column nominating which of the five official religions the holder belonged to. The obligation to 
declare religious affiliation presented challenges for many, particularly for those who did not feel 
that they belonged to any of the five official religions. In addition, in the 1980s the regime 
declared the Pancasila to be the ‘sole foundation’ (asas tunggal) of every mass-based civil society 
organisation and political party (Ismail 1995). This policy was met with heated reactions, 
particularly from those who maintained the dream of The Jakarta Charter being reinstated. In 
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short, at that time, religious life was heavily regulated by the state. Religion was seen as a potential 
threat to the state, and thus represented something to be tightly controlled. 
The collapse of the New Order regime in 1998 marked a new hope towards reconfiguring 
matters of identity, particularly with respect to religious identity and associated political 
aspirations. Some progressive reforms were quickly instituted, such as the official recognition of 
Confucianism as a religion, making it possible for its followers to celebrate their religious rituals 
in public after many years of prohibition by the New Order regime (BBC, 7 April 2011). More 
recently, the obligation to indicate religious affiliation to one of six officially recognised religions 
on the identity card has been annulled, meaning that the followers of traditional beliefs can now 
nominate their beliefs on the card. Previously, they left the religious column blank and 
consequently were discriminated against when exercising their rights to access public services 
(Erdianto 2017). Nevertheless, key instruments that ‘maintain’ religiously differentiated 
citizenship remained in place. And, apart from institutionalised religions, some new regulations 
relating to religious life have since been issued. The regulation on adherence to Ahmadiyah offers 
an insight as to how the state continues to be involved in disciplining the practices of religious 
communities. Apart from that, some policies at the local level that regulate religious lives illustrate 
how the state’s desire for control over this area has never really faded away. 
Religious citizenship at the state level continues to pose significant challenges even though 
the constitution guarantees freedom with respect to the practice of religion in daily lives. This 
results in challenges for some, particularly when performing acts or exercising roles that invoke 
citizenship rights. As Hudson (2003) argues, defining citizenship at civil society level makes it 
possible for each citizen to exercise religious citizenship in different domains by practicing what 
is not directly controlled by the state. The findings from this project suggest that religious 
citizenship at the state and civil society level, or within civil society domains, are sometimes 
diametrically opposed.  
The competition between different approaches to religious citizenship can be seen in the 
campaign to prohibit a non-Muslim from becoming a political leader in Surakarta. Advocates of 
this argument indicate that it is their religious and nationalist obligation to disseminate such 
information to the public, since they believe that this represents a central element of Islamic 
teaching. Furthermore, this group believes that a non-Muslim leader could not be made to act 
justly towards Muslims, especially under a non-Islamic system such as democracy. They refer to 
Western countries where they believe Muslims suffer discrimination from secular governments. 
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Choosing a Muslim leader, they argue, is required by sharia and that complying with this is 
essential to establishing an Islamic system, to achieve a just and prosperous society. 
This argument of prohibiting non-Muslim leaders does not, in fact, represent the views 
of Muslims in general. Indeed, the argument was rejected by many Muslims in Surakarta who 
believe that this ‘Islamic’ view of prohibition represents only one interpretation amongst many 
and is not superior to the others. Furthermore, the Indonesian constitution does not prohibit 
non-Muslim leaders from competing for political positions at any level. For many, being a non-
Muslim in Indonesia should not mean being a second-class citizen with less rights. However, the 
populist campaign for prohibiting non-Muslims from becoming political candidates puts non-
Muslims in a very different position from Muslims, and effectively makes them second-class 
citizens. Furthermore, vigorously advocating for this in public might be expected to impact on 
non-Muslim candidates’ chances of being elected, to the point of making it practically impossible. 
Although this does not appear to be the case in Surakarta (where non-Muslim candidates have 
won elections), putting this kind of action in a larger picture could be seen as acting against the 
spirit of equality as it is promoted by the constitution. 
The contestation around religious citizenship does not only occur at the state and civil 
society level, but also at the individual level, referring to the third form of religious practice. This 
is demonstrated in the case of intimidation towards a Shia-associated group in Yogyakarta, the 
Raushan Fikr. As discussed above, Raushan Fikr is an organisation officially registered and based 
in Yogyakarta. The leader of this group is a Shia follower but the organisation itself officially has 
nothing formally to do with the Shia community. Its main activities include class-based teaching 
and learning and public discussion, particularly on the topic of Islamic philosophy. The attendees 
do not all identify as Shia. This organisation has become the focus of certain extremist Islamist 
groups who demand that they cease such activities. Some classes and public lectures were called 
off, but the teaching and learning activities continued until the same group intensified their 
intimidation and forced them to stop all the activities.  
The group was encouraged to stop the activities because they were accused of 
disseminating Shia teachings. Teaching and learning about Islamic philosophy, its accusers argue, 
is only a veneer. For such extremist Islamist groups, Shia teachings and practices are not 
considered to be part of Islam, even though other institutions such as MUI (from which the 
government frequently asks for religious edicts), does not say anything against Shia in Indonesia 
(with the exception of the more extremist branch of the MUI East Java, which states that they are 
practicing Islam the wrong way and thus need discipline). MUI Yogyakarta has been asked to 
 123 
intervene by the groups who are against Shia teachings, but it has refused to issue any anti-Shia 
fatwa. Despite this, the Islamist groups believe that actions should be taken since, in their view, 
opposing Shia heresy represents an obligation for every Muslim. In the words of the leader of 
this extremist Islamist organisation, ‘if we know their wrongs, and we do not take any actions to 
save those who do not know…, then we are in the wrong’, which means that as a religious person, 
a Muslim, they need to exercise such action, otherwise they would be part of the ‘wrong’ groups, 
something that they act against.  
The findings from this research project also suggest that the competition around religious 
citizenship may lead to competition between the domains of the state, civil society and the 
personal, where certain rights are acquired when someone declares themselves as part of religious 
community – the fifth form of religious citizenship. This can be seen in cases regarding 
Ahmadiyah communities across Indonesia, and Yogyakarta is no exception. Ahmadiyah groups 
represent one religious minority group that has suffered hardships in the past ten years as they 
are considered to practice blasphemy. Beginning with the attack on Ahmadiyah headquarters in 
Bogor in 2005, the attacks on Ahmadiyah communities across Indonesia have led to many 
casualties and numerous buildings related to Ahmadiyah have been destroyed. 
In response to the attack on Ahmadiyah, the government issued the joint regulation of 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the General Attorney on 
Warning and Order to Ahmadiyah Believers, Members, and/or the Members of Board of 
Ahmadiyah Community of Indonesia and the Members of Community (Peringatan dan Perintah 
kepada Penganut, Anggota, dan/atau Anggota Pengurus Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) dan 
Warga Masyarakat). This regulation warns the Ahmadiyah community, especially, the JAI group, 
to stop spreading Ahmadiyah teachings publicly. In particular, they are instructed to stop 
disseminating any teachings regarding the emergence of Prophet (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad) after 
the Prophet Muhammad. People are also warned to maintain religious harmony and that those 
who do not will be sanctioned according to the law. With this regulation, the Ahmadiyah 
community are restricted in the public dissemination of key elements of their religious teachings, 
since they are considered as deviating from the main tenets of Islam. 
Based on the Indonesian Constitution, it is guaranteed that every person has the right to 
assemble, organise and express their ideas in oral and written forms. Bringing this to the 
discussion of religious citizenship, this regulation has limited the rights of Ahmadiyah people. 
While Yogyakarta is more tolerant than elsewhere in the case of Ahmadiyah, the limitations on 
their rights, as stated in the joint regulation, remain in place. Furthermore, their mosques also 
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have been sealed and access closed. Menchik (2016, p. 85) notes that the Ahmadiyah case 
indicates that the government practices ‘a limited form of pluralism without extending religious 
freedom to heterodox faiths’. The position of the government is shared among the two biggest 
mass organisations in Indonesia, NU and Muhammadiyah, both of which support the practice 
of pluralism and freedom of religion but not without any limits (Menchik 2016, p. 85-86).   
However, in practice, it is not only the state apparatus but also some Islamist groups 
frequently monitor the activities of Ahmadiyah groups so that any activities that are deemed to 
be preaching their teachings would be dismissed. There have been many cases of certain Islamist 
groups acting to persecute Ahmadiyah groups. As Ahmadiyah teachings are considered to deviate 
from Islamic tenets, the rights of Ahmadiyah people to express their ideas on religion in public 
would only be retained if they decide ‘to come back to the true Islam,’ otherwise they would be 
unable to re-acquire these rights. It is at this point that the practice of religious citizenship at the 
state definition, civil society definition and the individual or groups domain do not only intersect, 
but serve to suppress other forms of religious citizenship. 
*** 
Viewed within the broader context, the findings pose another puzzle about the relationship 
between religion and democracy. While the findings suggest that there are at least two different 
views of how religion and democracy are related, in practice, things are not quite as simple as 
that. The contestation over religious citizenship practices have shown the complexity of this 
relation by which different actors from state, (un)civil society and individuals navigate their 
everyday practices. The question is to what extent can majoritarian religion be facilitated in 
political and civil life without diminishing the rights of minority religious groups rights.  Religion 
should, in fact, play an important role in nurturing democratic citizenship.  
 The relationship between religion and democracy, particularly Islam, has been a subject 
of considerable debate between scholars. Some believe that Islam is not compatible with 
democracy due deep differences between the two. Scholars such as Huntington (1993) and Lewis 
(2002) argued that instead of nurturing democracy, Islam would be one of the major threats that 
lead to the clash of civilizations, or instead of reflecting more on ‘what went wrong’ with Islam, 
the Muslims would always blame the west for their inability to adapt to the modern life, and thus 
of democracy. Both scholars referred to the historical conflict between Muslims and Christians 
(as representing the West) that has been lasted for long time and see this as a pattern of antagonist 
relationship between them. 
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 These views have been rejected by many as essentialising Islam and portraying it as 
something monolithic and static. Roy (2004) for example strongly criticizes this kind of view that 
tend to see Islam as ‘a discrete entity, a coherent and closed set of beliefs’ that allow the western 
scholars such as Huntington or Lewis as ‘an explanatory concept for almost everything involving 
Muslims’ (Roy 2004, p. 9). This notion is shared by Esposito (1986) who notes that Islam, like 
other world religions, is in practice, represented by different voices and groups, meaning that 
there is no singular ‘true representation’ of Islam. In line to this argument, Stepan (2001) believes 
that Islam is multi-vocal and with that in nature it may provide resources for nurturing democracy.  
 Among Muslim scholars, Hilmy (2010) notes that there are different voices too as some 
of them believe in the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Scholars such as Abdolkarim and 
Abou el-Fadl are among the key proponents of this idea as they tend to see that Islam is not only 
compatible with democracy but in fact that democratic values are embedded within it (Hilmy 
2010, p. 35). Among those who reject the idea of this compatibility are seminal Islamist writers 
such as Sayyid Quthb and Abd al-Qadim Zallum (one of the key leading figure in Hizbut Tahrir). 
These radical Islamists not only reject democracy, saying that it does not come from Islamic 
sources, but also that there is no place for it in Islam.  
 The different voices among scholars, in particular within Muslims, on the relationship 
between Islam and democracy points to the reality that there is no single and simplistic agreement 
about between the relationship of the two. Rather, it is multi-vocal, as Stepan (2001) asserts, and 
consequently the way in which the relationship is expressed depends on which groups and voices 
are considered as representing Islam. The more inclusive Islam is seen to be, the more 
compatible it is to the democratic values and vice versa. In Indonesian context, the two biggest 
mass organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, have long been considered as performing such 
inclusive and tolerant Islam, yet the ‘vocal minority’ Islamist groups have been competing their 
voices in response to public issues. The competition of the two, as the findings suggest, would be 
colouring the public life in the contemporary Indonesia with no indication of getting decline 
soon. 
The question remains of how to facilitate these different voices so that democratic system 
may work without supressing other views that are considered against democracy. Stepan (2000) 
argues that democracy should facilitates the articulation of religious individuals or groups’ 
interests in the political arena. They may create a political party or sponsor any organisations as 
long as they do not violate the democratic principles. At the same time, the religious institutions 
should not be privileged with any mandate of public policy that might dent critical freedom of 
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individuals. With this minimal boundary, religion, intellectually and institutionally, may play 
important role in nurturing democracy.  
Casanova’s works (1994) on public religion, based on studying five cases of religious 
transformation in Spain, Poland, Brazil and the United States, not only informs the de-
privatisation of religion in public life, but also the public functions of religion in calling upon the 
modern system to reflect more on their normative structures and values in regulating public life 
(228). It might, nevertheless, be contended that the state and market assumptions of what can be 
considered the ‘common good’ tend to be reduced in a more individual sense. Allowing religion 
to enter public life would facilitate the different rationalisation of ‘the traditional’ and ‘the 
modern’ that might result in checking and balances roles between the two, or facilitates what 
Stepan (2000) calls as ‘twin tolerations’.     
Within this context, it is worth returning to the thesis proposed by Turner (2002) on the 
role of religion in cultivating democratic citizenship. Departing from the perspective of religious 
hostility toward citizenship and referring to the work of Weber, he argues that religion is to 
citizenship is what the spirit of the Protestant work ethic is to capitalism. He says, ‘If the 
unintended consequence of religious asceticism was the spirit of capitalism, then the unintended 
consequence of the rejection of the world was the spirit of liberal democracy’ (Turner 2002, p. 
260) This is due to the fact that religion provides an inclusive foundation and a social bond that 
goes beyond the traditional one, be in the name of kinship or tribal-ethnic, which is a faith-based 
association. This kind of association may serve as a common civic culture, an idea nurtured by 
the liberal norm, that in turn would serve as solid foundation for democratic citizenship. 
Considering the dynamics of practicing religious citizenship in Indonesia, it can be argued 
here that the thesis proposed by Turner (2002) would stand as long as religion is conceptualised 
in a more tolerant and inclusive way, or is positioned as a social ethics to function as checks and 
balances partner with the state to assert their public role that safeguards the practice of healthy 
democracy. Otherwise, it can constitute a hindrance to cultivating a more democratic citizenship 
in emerging democracies like Indonesia.   
 
5.3 Culture and Citizenship Practices: Re-cultivating Values and Tradition  
Apart from religion, the issue of culture has been widely addressed within the discourse 
of citizenship, particularly in immigrant countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, 
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and some European states. One of the issues is whether these different cultures and traditions 
should be recognised and treated accordingly or whether they need to be treated equally based 
on the current civic norms, and adjusted to the rules and norms that the majority of people 
embrace. One of the proposals to deal with the challenges that come from these subjects, 
cultures, and traditions is the idea of multicultural citizenship. In fact, as Kymlicka proposes, 
these cultures and traditions need to be recognised and granted special rights or minority rights 
as long as they can conform to the basic tenets of liberalism such as freedom, tolerance, and 
autonomy. While this idea is criticised by many in terms of its conception of culture and how it 
places liberal values above ‘illiberal’ ones, he acknowledges that culture or tradition play 
important roles for the community that affect the way they think and act in their public life. 
Unlike the countries mentioned above, Indonesia is not a country formed substantially 
by migration, thus its experiences are different from those of deeply plural Western countries 
like Britain and France, and especially New World nations formed through migration like the 
US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, the weltanschauung or the basic 
philosophical foundation of Indonesia, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity), has 
acknowledged diverse cultures and traditions, since it is these differences that have defined 
Indonesia since its inception. If there is a challenge for recognition, this comes from the 
indigenous people, whom national regulation has yet to provide protection for and who are often 
in conflict with large corporations. Due to this, the demand for recognition of their culture and 
tradition from the state is strongly voiced. The research sites of this project, namely the cities of 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta, experience no issues with indigenous people and their demands for 
recognition. Rather, this section discusses to what extent the issue of culture plays a role in 
navigating citizenship in the two research sites.        
As discussed above, both research sites are predominantly Javanese. While the Javanese 
are dominant in these two cities, they co-exist with other groups of people, most of whom came 
as migrants. People of Chinese and Arabic heritage, for example, have been living for many 
generations in Surakarta. In Yogyakarta, diverse groups of people from all over Indonesia have 
been living side-by-side with the Javanese people. Open conflict between these groups in the 
name of culture or traditional values rarely occurs, even though conflict over political and 
economic interests between Chinese and Javanese people has occurred many times throughout 
the history of Surakarta. If there are tensions in terms of cultural values, they are between 
religious values such as Islam and Javanese values. This is because while some Islamist groups 
advocate their ‘purification,’ others seek to incorporate Javanese values or rituals into religious 
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performance. Consequently, the tension lies on whether Javanese rituals need to be 
accommodated by religious ones or clearly separated, so that the religion will remain pure.      
Differing from the religion that is expressed demonstratively by the participants in 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta, the values of Javanese culture are not clearly articulated. With religion, 
basic tenets and sacred texts can generally be identified. At least, ontologically speaking, to 
paraphrase the words of one participant from Surakarta regarding democracy and religion, 
‘culture is man-made, while religion is God-made.’ Nevertheless, in practice, religious elements 
and cultural elements interact and are intertwined with each other since religions do not exist in 
an empty space but in one which is occupied by cultural values and performances. On the other 
hand, culture is difficult to define. There are many disagreements among social or cultural 
theorists regarding how to define culture: whether it is merely about rituals, something tangible 
or intangible, a tradition that has been inherited through generations, or a combination of these. 
Due to this, instead of defining what Javanese culture is, since Java is not a single entity and thus 
of its culture, the discussion over culture and citizenship in this section focus more on cultural 
symbolic forms, terms and practices, and how these are used to navigate citizenship practices. 
One of the important cultural symbols within Javanese culture is a kingdom or a palace. 
Not only does it symbolise the centre of polity, it also symbolises statecraft and governance. The 
ruler or the king is seen as someone with great power, with which he is believed to bring 
prosperity to the people. The king is always depicted as wise, pure-hearted and concerned with 
the welfare of the people. With this conceptualisation, it is not surprising that the terms used 
between people and the king are kawula (servant) for the people and gusti (lord) for the ruler. 
With this kind of relationship, it can be seen how Javanese people place the rulers among 
themselves and how important it is for them to listen to the king, as a gusti. It is with this kind of 
relationship that Javanese people have the concept of narima (acceptance), whereby they will act 
according to what they have been appointed to do or accept what they have been given, and to 
do so with gratitude.   
The two research sites used to be part of the same, greater kingdom in the past, the 
Mataram Kingdom. Due to colonisation and political intrigues within the Kingdom, however, 
this last great kingdom in Java was split into two palaces, namely Yogyakarta and Surakarta. As 
history unfolded, the palaces came to function differently. In Yogyakarta, the palace has been 
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central to the Yogyakarta people, whereas in Surakarta, due to the ‘unholy alliance’5 between the 
royal palace and the colonial regime at that time, the palace no longer plays a significant role in 
the lives of the people there. Consequently, in the current political system, whilst the Sultan (king) 
of Yogyakarta is automatically appointed as the governor of Yogyakarta, the Sultan of Surakarta 
does not enjoy this privilege. Instead, the modern bureaucracy long ago took over the 
administrative function within local government. In other words, in Yogyakarta, the Sultan acts 
as cultural and political leader while the Sultan of Surakarta does not. 
Recent developments regarding the interaction between different communities in 
Yogyakarta, however, have undermined the position of the Sultan as a charismatic cultural leader. 
The incidences of violence, particularly related to religious issues, occur repeatedly in the city. 
Even though the Sultan has issued some statements to condemn these actions, no major changes 
have occurred and thus the violent trend has continued. It is at this point that the cultural position 
of the Sultan starts to be questioned. For some non-governmental organisations, the Sultan has 
not acted appropriately to stop intolerant actions, despite the fact the cultural leader has the 
power to act beyond simply issuing a statement. Furthermore, when a network of non-
governmental organisations in the city declared the violence a state of emergency in Yogyakarta, 
the Palace denied this emergency status. This status would not only undermine the position of 
the Sultan as the cultural, charismatic and political leader of Yogyakarta, but also the assertion 
that Yogyakarta is a city of tolerance. 
Indeed, the increasing number of violent attacks in Yogyakarta could not solely be 
explained from this cultural perspective. As Ahnaf and Salim (2017) note the increase in attacks 
relates to structural changes at the social, economic and political levels that in turn affect the 
cultural life of people in Yogyakarta. The introduction of regional autonomy after the collapse 
of the New Order Regime brought about some political consequences such as choosing the local 
leader via election process. Complicating these changes is the internal conflict within the palace 
that has impacted how the government could control the city and thus led to the crises of the 
special (krisis keistimewaan).             
Therefore, the power of Sultan as a cultural charismatic leader is questioned whenever 
he does not act decisively in solving inter-communal tensions and conflicts. In the Javanese 
kingdom, the Sultan is given weighty titles such as Senapati ing Ngalaga Sayyidin Panatagama 
                                                     
5 Masaaki (2008) uses this term to describe the political co-operation between political thug and political Islam to 
win the election in Banten. See Masaaki, Okamoto. 2008. An Unholy Alliance. Inside Indonesia, 93: Aug-Oct 
2008.  
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Kalifatullah (Supreme Commander of War and the Organizing Head of Religious Affairs, the 
Apostle of the Prophet) (Mudjanto 1986, p. 105). This title suggests that the Sultan is also a leader 
of the religious community and is expected to keep the balance between different religious groups 
within the city. Yogyakarta has been a home for different religious communities and cultural 
beliefs, from the radical to the syncretic. Consequently, maintaining harmony, as the Javanese 
culture desires, and achieving a balance among these diverse groups is important. For some 
representatives of mass organisations, the current situation in Yogyakarta has become untenable 
because the Sultan no longer maintains balance and harmony. This is, as one of the participants 
suggests, because the connection between Yogyakarta people and the Sultan has been broken 
down. 
This disconnect between the Sultan and the people is partly due to the distancing of the 
Sultan from the people. Traditionally, the Sultan had to present himself regularly among the 
people, for example, by attending Friday prayer in different mosques. Not only did this show 
that the Sultan is physically present among the people, but it was also a way to communicate 
more directly with them. After the Friday prayer, informal conversations were held so that the 
Sultan could hear directly the issues faced by the people. This tradition, however, is no longer 
maintained by the Sultan. Instead, with the rapid influx of investment in Yogyakarta, the Sultan 
is increasingly situated in opposition to the people. This is exacerbated by the number of 
infrastructure projects that have been permitted, leading to difficulties for the people. This has 
led to protest movements such as the Jogja Asad (Jogja is dry) movement, who criticises the 
neglect of Yogyakarta’s water crisis stemming from the rapid development of infrastructure. 
Similar protests have arisen around plans to build an airport and iron sand mining. While these 
cases do not directly relate to the discussion of religious life, this shows how this disconnection 
no longer leaves the Sultan in a position to understand what is felt and experienced by the people. 
In the case of the outbreaks of violence, the denial of the emergency status could also be seen as 
part of this disconnect.  
Furthermore, recent developments in Yogyakarta after the Sultan issued a sabda raja (the 
King’s decree) have led to internal conflicts within the palace, particularly between the Sultan and 
his brothers. It is believed that this decree makes it possible for the Sultan’s daughter to inherit 
the crown since the Sultan has no male children. Such an action is seen as a deviation from palace 
custom, since according to tradition, the Crown King is always male (Ahnaf & Salim 2017, p. 40). 
This conflict was widely known by the public and gained different responses. While this may be 
an internal affair within the family of the Sultan, this Sabda Raja has sparked suspicion among 
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the inner circle, as some of the participants from religious groups argue. It is widely known that 
the Sultan maintains a good relationship with some religious groups, both Muslim and non-
Muslim. Once the Sabda Raja was issued, some Muslim groups suspected that non-Muslim 
groups were behind the decree. Therefore, this sabda raja and the internal conflict within the 
royal family have led to questioning the role of the Sultan as a cultural and political leader, with 
many wondering whether he has the capacity to resolve the conflict among the people while 
enduring the internal conflict within the family. 
While in Surakarta the position of the Sultan differs to that of Yogyakarta, and thus plays 
a limited role in navigating citizenship practices among the people of the city, a more vernacular 
cultural term has emerged which plays an important role in maintaining the current social 
relations among different groups in Surakarta. The term Wong Solo, meaning people of Solo, 
is used to describe the collective identity of the people of Surakarta. Solo is the name of a village 
in the area and is informally used to refer to Surakarta as an administrative city. The term Wong 
Solo has been used by different participants in this research projects, who come from diverse 
groups, from Muslim to non-Muslim and from moderate to extreme ones. Wong Solo has also 
been used as an inclusive term, as it incorporates people who have been living there for 
generations as well as those who have come more recently. Within the discourse of citizenship, 
Wong Solo can be seen as an identity that brings to sense of collectivity, where individuals ‘act 
and conceive’ themselves as part of it (Joppke 2007, p. 38). Wong Solo is to Surakarta what 
citizen is to a nation-state.  
As a collective identity, Wong Solo are characterised by qualities such as kind-
heartedness. As one of the participants argues, Surakarta has long been expected to become a 
battleground for different ideologies. Surakarta is home to diverse groups, from ideologically 
moderate to radical, and from religious to abangan (nominal Muslims). One participant argued 
that these different ideological groups have been preparing for battle by creating their own laskar 
(paramilitary groups). It is worth noting here that within Muslim groups, there are more than 40 
laskar groups in this city. While the ‘future ideological battleground’ argument needs to be 
validated further, this imagination is ingrained in the mind of this participant, who was one of the 
laskar youth leaders in pesantren in Surakarta. 
 Nevertheless, he also said that while he could not predict the outcome of this ideological 
battle, he doubted whether this situation would be conquered by the kind-heartedness of Wong 
Solo. In other words, as the history of violent conflicts has repeatedly occurred in the past, this 
 132 
ideological contestation between different groups might again result in violence unless it is 
pacified by the kind-heartedness of Wong Solo. 
Wong Solo are also associated with harmony. Antlov and Hellman (2005) note that 
harmonious social relations characterise Javanese society; not only among themselves, but also 
when interacting with other groups. This harmonious characteristic poses a question as to the 
conflict that occurred many times throughout its history, as well as the more recent tensions. 
While these tensions do not escalate into large-scale conflicts, they do occur frequently. In this 
regard, some participants suggested that those who instigate the conflict are invariably orang luar 
(people not from that place, the outsiders). These may be people who do not come from villages 
or other low district regions within Surakarta – as in the case of the protests against Busukan and 
Manahan churches, where protesters were not locals – or it may refer to people from outside 
Solo, such as in the case of 1998 riots. Therefore, orang luar is used to strengthen the image of 
Wong Solo as people who love harmony, while at the same time it may serve to mask the violence 
committed by Wong Solo.   
Another cultural term that is used by the people of Solo is the concept of ‘Solo as our 
home.’ A participant of this research project imagined Solo as a home where different 
communities are considered the children. In this house, there are many rooms. These rooms 
symbolise different communities with their different traditions, cultures and religions. The rooms 
are separated by walls, but despite these the members of the house acknowledge and recognise 
the existence of the other children there. In other words, rooms are a space where different 
communities develop and maintain their private issues. However, when these children come to 
dining rooms, living rooms or other shared spaces, they need to be respectful toward each other, 
since they all have the same rights and obligations. Conceptualising Solo as house requires each 
member to be tolerant towards each other. Mutual understanding is therefore the key to 
sustaining the positive relationship between the members of the house.  
Imagining Solo as a home also implies a responsibility to protect it. As history records, 
Solo has experienced violent conflict many times. Consequently, Solo earned a label as a city 
with a short fuse. As Solo is considered a house, it requires the members to develop a sense of 
responsibility to protect it. Just like mutual understanding, the responsibility is shared among its 
members. It functions to protect the house from internal conflict or destruction by orang luar, 
and also to develop and nurture it into a space in which each member can have a good life. It 
strengthens the in-group identity. In short, Solo as represented in terms such as Wong Solo and 
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‘Solo as a home’ cultivate a notion of mutual understanding and respect toward the members as 
well as responsibility – values that characterise a democratic citizenship.         
Similar to the idea of Wong Solo, the cultural term Wong Jogja (people of Yogyakarta) 
is also used repeatedly by the participants. However, differing from the inclusive Wong Solo, the 
term Wong Jogja is used somewhat exclusively, referring mainly to the people who are originally 
from Yogyakarta. This term emerged when discussing the newcomers to the city. The number 
of the newcomers increases yearly, which is understandable considering Yogyakarta is a centre 
of education. Furthermore, the new investments in hotels, shopping centres, and so on are 
designed to attract more people to Yogyakarta. New spaces are created but Wong Jogja do not 
occupy them. At this point, as some participants noted, the social distance between Wong Jogja 
and the newcomers becomes greater. Due to this, there is a social and cultural segregation 
between Wong Jogja and non-Wong Jogja. While the intention of citizenship is to weaken social 
class division, the practice of using the term Wong Jogja here has the opposite effect, by 
strengthening these divisions. 
This social and cultural segregation between Wong Jogja and newcomers has, to some 
extent, led to indifferent practices of citizenship. The incidents of violence in LKiS are an 
example of this. During and after the attack, there is little evidence of local people preventing the 
attack or helping victims during the aftermath. This is different from the case of Raushan Fikr, 
when a group of people who came to intimidate were prevented by the local people from causing 
any violence. The locals helped to mitigate the tension by having a dialogue with the conflicting 
parties. On this difference, one of the participants noted that many offices in Yogyakarta do not 
hire local people to work there. There may be issues regarding education levels here, as most 
Wong Jogja have not attained higher education qualifications. Despite this, the practice of hiring 
outsiders has led to another social distinction, as one of the participant argued, between orang 
lokal (local people) and orang kantor (people at the office). 
Another cultural term that is central in navigating citizenship practices is the conception 
of Jogja Istimewa (‘Yogyakarta is special’). Yogyakarta earned this title partly because while 
Yogyakarta was a significant independent power during the 1940s, the Sultan of Yogyakarta 
decided to ‘give up’ its sovereignty and become part of the new, modern nation of Indonesia 
when the national government declared its independence on 17th of August 1945. Consequently, 
the national government decided to give special administrative architecture to this city, different 
to other regions in Indonesia. The arrangement whereby the Sultan is automatically made the 
governor of Yogyakarta is part of this special administration. Looking from a cultural perspective, 
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this integration also means giving the new and more inclusive identity of ‘Indonesians’ to the 
people of Yogyakarta.  
This new inclusive identity does not necessarily mean that the people of Yogyakarta have 
to give up their identity as Wong Jogja. Rather, what has been an issue is the meaning of Jogja 
Istimewa, which fostered the birth of politics of identity. One of the participants who has been 
living in Yogyakarta for many years felt that this title tends to be interpreted in narrow ways by 
referring only to the culture of Yogyakarta, ke-jogja-an (‘things about Yogyakarta’), the palace and 
so on. The case of Florence Sihombing, who was prosecuted after expressing her feelings at being 
refused service at a Petrol Station in Yogyakarta, exemplifies this. After not being served due to 
her refusing the queue line, she insulted the people of Yogyakarta calling them ‘poor, stupid, and 
uncivilized’ and posted on her social media, Path. Suddenly, this post spread and she received 
many negative responses. One of these came from the mayor of Yogyakarta, who said,  
Yogyakarta adalah kota yang menerima siapa pun yang datang. Namun demikian, 
masyarakat yang datang pun harus menjaga dan menghormati kota dan 
masyarakatnya. Ikut menjunjung budaya yang ada…jangan mengusik (‘Yogyakarta 
is a city that welcomes everyone. But, they must maintain and respect this city and 
its people. Participating and upholding the culture… don’t disturb’) (Okezone 
2014) 
This case shows how cultural identity (‘ke-jogja-an’) has been used to exclude people 
considered to be acting against what ‘ke-jogja-an’ is believed to be. Reflecting on this case, the 
participant argued for a broader interpretation of the Jogja Istimewa slogan, whereby everybody 
is welcome and any cultural expression is acknowledged. In short, what makes Jogja Istimewa for 
her is when Yogyakarta becomes a model of tolerant pluralism. 
Despite the differences between the two, Yogyakarta and Surakarta shared cultural 
activities of selamatan and tahlilan. Selamatan (sometimes called kenduren), as Geertz notes, 
(1976, p. 11) refers to ‘a communal feast’ where people from various places, be they friends, 
neighbours, coworkers or relatives, come together to ‘celebrate, ameliorate, or sanctify’. In 
Javanese tradition, selamatan is held on special occasions such as a marriage, the birth of a baby, 
circumcision, the communal prayer for a deceased loved one, to celebrate a village anniversary 
or other such public occasion. Despite these distinct functions, Geertz (1976, p. 11) argues that 
in all cases, whether explicitly religious or not, it symbolises the social unity among people 
participating in this communal feast. The feast also signifies mutual support and co-operation as 
virtues within Javanese tradition. Similar to selamatan is tahlilan. Tahlilan is a more specifically 
religious occasion and it most often held when meeting to pray for a recently deceased relative. 
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It is typically associated with Traditionalist Muslims (such as members of Nahdlatul Ulama) who, 
unlike Modernist Muslims (such as Muhammadiyah), reject these kinds of activities because are 
considered un-Islamic.   
What is interesting about selamatan and tahlilan events is that they serve as a space for 
social interaction and communication. Both before and after a selamatan or tahlilan, people talk 
with each other about their activities or discuss the topical issues in their area. The people invited 
to these events are not limited to specific groups. Even in the case of a tahlilan, which is explicitly 
Islamic, people from different religious communities happily attend. In the words of the 
participants of this research project, the selamatan functions to ‘pacify any grudge’ or different 
political or ideological affiliation. At a selamatan, all people, whether they are rich or poor, 
whether they are highly educated or not, whether they are community leaders or just ordinary 
members, sit side-by -side as equals. Consequently, a selamatan denotes an idea of equality and 
egalitarianism in their vernacular form.    
Many efforts taken by the non-governmental activists tend to focus on seminar, dialogue 
or workshops held in a university or hotels. While these kinds of activities have their own strength 
in disseminating ideas, it is very rare for ordinary people to participate, thus the forums tend to 
be elitist in nature. This is of particular note in Yogyakarta where there is a gap in terms of interest 
and issue between the activists and the people at the grassroots levels. At a time when a 
connection between actors is an important matter, looking at the vernacular practices of cultural 
performance such as selamatan and tahlilan might offer insights in forging a shared, common 
ground between people, which may create a more democratic and inclusive citizenship.  
*** 
The findings of this project suggest that cultural symbolic forms and expressions may 
serve as a useful navigation tools in citizenship practices. Not only do they inform us by which 
people conceptualise the nature of relationship, but also how, to some degree, they function to 
regulate the interaction between different group. This particular topic seems to be largely 
overlooked in citizenship studies since most of the works on the culture focus mostly on how the 
challenges arising from cultural expressions may be resolved and shall they be recognised (see 
for example Kymlicka 1995; Barry (2001); Benhabib 2002; Carens 2000).  This does not 
necessarily mean that the issue of recognition, for example, is not important, but focusing more 
on this has come at the cost of overlooking the role of culture in crafting citizenship. The 
multicultural citizenship framework, for example, strongly highlights the point whether the 
cultural or religious tradition conform with liberal tenets in order to be recognised and granted 
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special rights (Kymlicka 1995). The function of culture or religion for their community is 
contained with liberal values in so much that their role in public life is meaningful as long as 
liberal principle confirm it. 
In fact, the significant role of culture in public life such as maintaining peace, order and 
resolving conflict has been highlighted by many scholars, particularly peace studies and conflict 
resolution tradition. The works of Lederach (1997) and Avruch (1998) are among the first few 
that acknowledge and recognise the role of culture in building peace and resolving conflict. 
Furthermore, Abu-Nimer (2003), among others, also highlights how Islamic or Arabic tradition, 
its allegedly different conception of peace and conflict, such as sulh and other tribal mechanism 
have proved to be resourceful to mitigate conflict. The acknowledgement of non-western 
traditions of conflict resolution has instigated discussion about formulating a non-western 
approach of conflict resolution (see for example Brigg & Bleiker 2011).  
Within citizenship studies, approaches other than the traditional liberal approach have 
tended to be labelled as ‘illiberal’ and held suspect as to whether its conception of membership, 
for example, limits individual freedom and autonomy (Kymlicka 1995). Whenever a more 
collective nature is found, it needs to be checked as to whether it undermines individual liberty. 
This kind of perspective in looking at non-western conceptions of citizenship needs to be re-
examined as the findings suggest that other cultures, that is not necessarily ‘liberal cultures’, could, 
in fact, play and important role in nurturing citizenship. It is worth noting here that the called 
universal liberal tradition is also culturally specific as it is underpinned by certain conceptions of 
human beings, behaviour, social system, etc. In short, it could be argued that liberal tradition 
represents certain elements of White-Anglo culture. As a consequence of this, evaluating 
different cultures based on ‘the liberal tradition’ serves to privilege Western culture over non-
Western culture. Some element of culture, whether liberal or non-liberal may pose challenges 
in forging a more inclusive and democratic citizenship. So, if there is to be a common benchmark 
in which cultural expressions need to be ‘re-examined’, this should be the subject of discussion 
among different groups and the benchmark does not have to be based solely on the ‘universal 
liberal tradition’.                               
It is clear then, that looking at the role of culture in their symbolic forms and expression 
may enrich the discussion in citizenship studies.  As the findings suggest, cultural practices in the 
form of selametan or tahlilan in the two cities provide opportunities for people to meet and talk 
as equals. Such vernacular practices and other cultural symbols that create a sense of collectivity 
and responsibility between different actors serve to contribute to a strong foundation and nurture 
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a more matured citizenship in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. If maintained and exercised, these 
cultural practices can foster a common ground and the civic virtues of citizenship.  
 
5.4 Citizenship Practices: Habitus and the Act of Citizenship 
The previous two sections discussed the role of religion and culture in citizenship 
practices in the two research sites. When they are interpreted openly and used contextually, both 
religion and culture offer potential constructive qualities regarding the cultivation of a democratic 
and inclusive citizenship. Conversely, they may also pose serious challenges to nurturing 
citizenship when they are defined exclusively and narrowly, since they are likely to contribute to 
a religious or culturally based political identity, and hence could be a hindrance to notions of 
democratic citizenship. Borrowing the terms used by Kymlicka, it needs to be determined 
whether religious or cultural values are used as an ‘external protection’ or an ‘internal restriction’ 
in order to best situate the two and how they function in the citizenship-forging process. This 
section discusses citizenship in its performative aspects as well as how certain cultural or religious 
values are used to justify certain actions and claim certain rights, and questions their meaning to 
the effort of crafting citizenship in a diverse society. 
The findings of this study suggest that acts of religious practice in both research sites could 
be classified into the categories of habitus and the performative acts of citizenship that can be 
seen from everyday life and public activities of the people in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. These 
everyday activities have been practiced by people for a long time and have become normalised. 
On the other hand, there are some practices that challenge and question the current structure 
and are aimed at achieving change. Investigating citizenship in these two forms requires moving 
beyond classical understandings of citizenship that merely focus on its legal-formal status. This is 
because legal recognition as a citizen does not necessarily mean that the rights of every person 
will be automatically upheld. In reality, these rights need to be exercised or claimed, as will be 
discussed below. 
White (2008) argues that citizenship can be understood as a ‘composite’: something 
which is constituted by ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ aspects. By static aspects, he refers to the 
understanding of citizenship as practices that have been performed for a long time and are 
unquestioned, becoming a requirement to maintaining the society, or as something necessary 
that makes it possible for the society to function. These practices serve to preserve order. On the 
other hand, the dynamic aspects of citizenship refer to any actions or practices that are needed 
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to break from an ‘order.’ As an ‘order’ does not necessarily satisfy all groups within society, 
certain actions then need to be done. It is at this point where an ‘order’ is questioned and 
challenged. These actions could take different forms, from public protests to civil disobedience. 
Thus, while the static is associated with ‘order,’ the dynamic aspect of citizenship is associated 
with ‘rupture.’ In the following discussion, the static aspect of citizenship is referred to as the 
concept of habitus, while its dynamic aspect is framed into the concept of an act of citizenship.  
     
5.4.1 Citizenship as a Habitus 
The static dimension of citizenship focuses on everyday activities as being routine, 
normal, or natural that need not be questioned. For example, the relationship between the 
church community and mosque community in Surakarta. As mentioned previously, these 
communities have been living side by side for more than 60 years. Both buildings share the same 
postal address, separated only by a thin wall. Consequently, whenever there is adzan (a call for 
praying) the church community will hear it, and whenever the church community organises 
praying rituals, they are heard by the mosque community. Quite often, during adzan, the 
loudspeaker interrupts the prayer or rituals of the church community. The Muslim community 
frequently experiences similar interruptions during sholat (the prayer performed five times a 
day): the voices from the church will disrupt their silence and focus (khusu’).  
For both community leaders, these ‘interruptions’ and ‘disruptions’ are normal, part of 
their everyday lives. For the church community leaders, it would be unusual not to hear adzan; 
and the mosque community leader considers it beautiful to pray while listening to others from 
the church community. It is a challenge to maintain silence and focus not only in the rituals, but 
also in other activities as they share the use of the front yard. Both the church and mosque do 
not have a large front yard, so whenever celebrating Eid Fitri (the Muslim celebration at the end 
of Ramadhan, the fasting month), the church’s front yard will be used by the Muslim community 
for parking. The same happens for the church community when they celebrate Christmas, as the 
yard is used by their congregation members. Apart from these religious activities, both 
communities are involved in social activities, such as regular meetings at the RT or RW level (a 
local administrative area, below village level). These practices have been part of the everyday life 
of both communities and as such, both leaders agree that this maintains order and the 
harmonious relationship between the two groups.      
Similar activities to maintain order may be observed in Dukuh Manggung, Yogyakarta. 
Dukuh Manggung is located not far from Gajah Mada University, one of the oldest and largest 
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universities in Indonesia. Similar to other places near the university, the people living in this area 
come from different regions, particularly the students. What needs to be emphasised in the 
everyday lives of the people in this dukuh is the active participation of the community members. 
This active participation can be observed through their regular attendance at meetings at dukuh 
level, involvement in community-based activities as well as their attendance at religious or cultural 
celebrations, and so on. For them, this participation has become a part of normal life and is vital 
to a sense of belonging; a lack of participation would be unusual for them. This is part of their 
habits and is one of the keys to maintaining order and harmonious relationships between 
different members of the community. Religious, cultural, or ideological background has never 
been an issue in this community. 
The citizenship practices shown by the church and mosque community as well as those 
of Dukuh Manggung take the form of habitual processes – they are unquestioned and have been 
accepted and celebrated for a long time. This is reminiscent of habitus, a concept introduced by 
Pierre Bourdieu. For Bourdieu, habitus is: 
the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces 
practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective 
conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the 
demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation (Bourdieu 2013, p. 
78)  
In other words, habitus consists of practices that have been exercised for an extended 
period and, thus, are ‘durable.’ Furthermore, this durability produces a ‘generative principle’ 
whereas this principle ‘produces practices.’ These practices will ‘reproduce’ that principle and 
the structure, however, this does not necessarily mean that no agency is being performed, as per 
Bourdieu’s ‘improvisations’. In other words, within habitus, a practice is generated by certain 
principles or structures while at the same time, when they are exercised, the practice will impact 
to the reproduction of the structure itself. It is at this point that habitus brings experience of 
personal subjective and social objective altogether (Maton 2008, p. 53). Put differently, habitus 
is a process that involves the ‘dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization 
of internality’ (Bourdieu 2013, p. 72). 
Yet and as a concept, habitus does not stand alone, but needs to be understood through 
auxiliary concepts, namely field and capital. Field here can be defined as ‘a structured system of 
social positions – occupied either by individuals or institutions – the nature of which defines the 
situation for their occupants’ (Jenkins 2006, p. 53).  
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The positions and roles within field relate to notion of capital, which for Bourdieu does 
not simply refer to economics and monetary exchange. Rather, he situated capital in ‘a wider 
system of exchanges whereby assets of different kinds are transformed and exchanged within 
complex networks or circuits within and across different fields’ (Moore 2008, p. 102). With this 
definition, Bourdieu introduces four forms of capital, namely: economic, such as money and 
assets; cultural, which can be seen from taste, literature, and sport preferences; social, which 
refers to networks, and symbolic, such as credentials. 
With this understanding, the everyday practices of citizenship performed by the church 
and mosque community or people of Dukuh Manggung actively represent the idea of habitus, 
as these practices have been performed for a long time and thus are durable. They occur in a 
particular field, for example, a socio-religious field for the Church and Mosque community and 
a socio-cultural field for people in Dukuh Mangung. This field has its own structure, norm or 
system that require the members to maintain cohesive and harmonious relationships between 
the members. This norm, system, or rule ‘is taken for granted,’ as a doxa (Bourdieu 2000, cited 
in Deer 2008, p. 120). Due to this, members’ actions are structured, although this does not 
necessarily mean that they cannot improvise. Every action taken by the individuals in this 
particular field affect the structure itself, either strengthening or weakening it. In this example, 
individuals decided to act according to the structure, thus maintaining the order.  
The decisions of individuals or the roles they play in this context relate to their capital, 
either economic, cultural, symbolic and social. An individual acts as a referee because a structure 
makes it so; they possess the capital to make them the referee, and thus the football game 
progresses. Within social life, each individual plays their own role, as an ordinary member, a 
leader, etc. For example, an ordinary member would not act as a leader because they do not 
possess the same capital, whether symbolic or cultural. In short, the different roles taken by 
different members make it possible for the society, ‘the game,’ to function. Therefore, habitus, 
field, and capital are not separated from each other and should be considered together to 
understand the reasons for an order being sustained for a long time.  
As the individuals gain experience, it affects the ways in which they internalise and 
externalise the structure, thus habitus might transform. This new experience, a result of 
‘accumulation of symbolic capital and economic capital’ (Hardy 2008, p. 132), may result in a 
change of capital. With this, the structure or the field will change too since the structure itself is 
partly conditioned by the habitus. Changes may take place gradually so that the habitus and the 
field will remain ‘synced’ to each other. However, there are times changes are sudden and the 
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structure changes, but the habitus cannot change at the same rhythm as the field. It is at this point 
where the crisis occurs. This crisis is hysteresis, a moment to signify that the habitus and the field 
no longer correspond. Hysteresis might occur due to the intervention of the state that changes 
the field structure, for example when the state introduces new building regulations for places of 
worship. This may potentially dislocate the habitus and the field, and thus a crisis that can affect 
the interaction between different groups may emerge.  
This hysteresis is not something unanticipated by the Church and Mosque community 
as well as for the people of Dukuh Manggung. It is at this point that some efforts to maintain 
order are organised, to ensure that the habitus and field always synchronise. For example, on 
one occasion a poster or newsletter related to religion and politics was on the information wall 
of the mosque, but the leader of the mosque prohibited this action, preventing disruption. At 
another time, some activists from a political party used the mosque to discuss political issues, but 
they were asked to stop when the leader of the mosque found out. It is part of the requirement 
for the new leader of the mosque community to understand the history and ‘norm’ that structures 
the relations between the Mosque and the Church communities. Without this knowledge 
(capital), a person would not qualify as leader. In Dukuh Manggung, the order and harmonious 
relationship between the different communities was interrupted by an Islamist group who 
accused a group of practicing heresy and demanded they stop their activities. The members of 
Dukuh Manggung, however, actively intervened to stop any further trouble and suggested 
dialogue to address the issues.  
Within the discourse of citizenship, habitus is seen as vital to maintaining order, although 
it may be argued that it is insufficient to understand the dynamic aspects of citizenship. The 
findings, however, suggest that while habitus itself might not be sufficient to fully capture the 
complexity of the dynamic performance of citizenship, it may nevertheless help in identifying 
why particular acts of citizenship occur, and would do so by drawing upon the concept of 
hysteresis, a moment when habitus and field no longer synchronise, as will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
 
5.4.2 Citizenship as an Act of Citizenship 
While some citizenship practices in Yogyakarta and Surakarta might usefully be observed 
through the lens of habitus, there are some actions that are performed deliberately to change or 
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break the order. White (2008) refers to this as the dynamic aspect of citizenship, which resembles 
the idea of the act of citizenship (Isin, p. 2008). Different forms of habitus tend to emphasise 
order; the act of citizenship is interrogating more on rupture. For Isin (2008, p. 21), an act is 
different from action, but is not separable from it, for ‘act’ is defined as ‘to put [something] in 
motion’. With this in mind, an act refers to something before the action, something that precedes 
it. An act can be in the form of expression which, when actualised, will result in an action. An act 
of citizenship, as Isin (2008) argues, produces an actor and an action. These ‘three musketeers’ 
cannot be separated since this constitutes the very basic concept of an act of citizenship.  
Acts of citizenship can be observed in a series of actions perpetrated in the name of 
(Islamic) morality performed by Islamist groups in Surakarta. These actions include organising 
a public parade for the laskar groups, monitoring places they suspected to be overrun by sinful 
actions (maksiat), such as prostitution, demanding the prohibition of alcohol, actively protesting 
church activities (particularly relating to building permits) and, as previously mentioned, the 
public campaign to prohibit non-Muslims from being elected as political leaders. This is the 
subject of campaigns by religious groups and gatherings (pengajian), circulated through 
newsletters and posters, but also publicly via large banners stretched across streets and in other 
public spaces. While these series of actions are an expression of rights, they can mean more than 
that. Thus, an investigation of the actors is needed here to capture the logics of these acts of 
citizenship.  
The actions mentioned above were performed mostly by laskar groups in Solo. While a 
clear number of laskar groups in this city is difficult to estimate, it is thought to be more than 
forty groups. These groups have their own management and structure, but do intersect with each 
other. An initiative to establish an umbrella organisation called DSKS, to facilitate meetings 
between laskar groups, was initiated with the support of some members of MUI Surakarta. Apart 
from facilitating the meeting, this organisation served as an educational space in which the ustadz 
(religious teacher) could deliver religious advice for the members of laskar groups. The leaders 
of DSKS say that they realise that some actions taken by the laskar groups in expressing their 
demands were not always right or Islamic, particularly when they apply the amar ma’ruf nahi 
munkar (‘promoting good deeds and preventing bad ones’) principle, in which some of them 
used violence. Furthermore, not all actions were purely religious, but rather were economic-
oriented. This organisation claims that it functions to discipline these particular behaviours. 
While some behaviours might be corrected, actions in the name of Islam or Islamic 
morality are supported. One prominent leader of the groups said that, while their behaviour 
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might be wrong, their intentions are good and need to be supported since Islamic teachings are 
against anything that impacts negatively on society, such as the circulation of alcohol. According 
to this leader, alcohol has led to the degeneration of Muslim youth in Surakarta, and thus they 
demand specific regulation to prevent its sale in the city. Their campaign to prohibit non-Muslims 
from being elected to public office has been seen as an obligation for every Muslim, because, as 
he said, this is what Islamic teaching demands. Furthermore, as he saw it, the rise of non-Muslim 
leaders (such as Christian leaders) in Surakarta could only see harm come to Muslim groups.  
What lies behind this action is the demand for the implementation of a narrow 
interpretation of Islamic law (Shariah) and ultimately the attainment of an Islamic caliphate. 
While he and his group do not deny that Muslim groups are currently allowed to perform their 
religious obligations, they face significant limits in doing so. In his opinion, Muslims do not have 
full freedom – not only in Surakarta, but across Indonesia. The issue of excessive drinking among 
young Muslims is an example of how a Muslim leader could not do much to prevent this because 
of national laws and regulations. While they propose their own ‘legal reforms’ on this issue, they 
have yet to be processed, despite the lengthy timeframe since their proposal, and he recognised 
that implementing Islamic law is difficult in the current Indonesian political system.  
 In a similar case, initiatives were taken by non-governmental organisations in Yogyakarta 
to run a workshop on human rights education for the pesantren community in Yogyakarta. These 
kinds of activities, which introduce modern discourse to religious communities, are not new and 
have analysed by many such as Hefner (2000) in Civil Islam, but this particular case is analysed 
here using the acts of citizenship framework. The initiators of this workshop were graduates from 
pesantren. With regards to the recent violent cases that involved the religious community, this 
workshop was aimed at introducing the concept of human rights to this so-called traditional 
religious community so that they would have a better understanding of religious violence and 
how best to respond to these incidents – such as giving an alternative pro-human rights 
perspective rather than the so-called religious but anti-human rights view.  
The question is: what makes these two cases ‘acts’ of citizenship? As mentioned earlier, 
the act of citizenship involves practices that lead to rupture rather than maintaining order. As 
described earlier, a series of actions performed by Islamist groups were aimed at breaking up 
secular domains. The act here intends to reject the current secular system and to build a new 
religious one. By proposing the implementation of Sharia or the establishment of a caliphate 
they aim to break the secular world. They consider the current laws in Indonesia as not being 
fully in accord with Islamic principles. One of the leaders of these groups explained this, saying 
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that Indonesian laws were adopted from the Dutch system. Furthermore, the current system of 
democratic politics is un-Islamic as democracy, he argued, is man-made while Islam is God-
made, and that democracy, capitalism and liberalism have led to the destruction to Muslim 
society.  
The ideal political system that they are striving for is the Islamic caliphate, referring to 
the leadership of early Muslim community after the passing of the Prophet Muhamad. The first 
four caliphates lasted for centuries until the last recognised caliphate system, the Ottoman 
empire, fell in 1924. Ignoring the fact that there are multiple interpretations, and multiple 
historical versions of the caliphate, the leader of this Islamist groups believes that fighting for an 
Islamic caliphate is obligatory for every Muslim since, he argued, this is the only political system 
that is recognised by the Qur’an. He rejects the concept of the modern nation-state (born after 
the Westphalia Treaty in 1468) because this is something new. With this rejection, he does not 
recognise the Republic of Indonesia as a valid Islamic nation-state. For him, the Islamic caliphate 
will come, as predicted by a hadith (Prophet Muhammad’s statement and actions). This hadith 
has been the subject of the debate among Muslim scholars. 
The actions of Islamic groups in Solo could also regarded as breaking from the traditional 
religious world since their demands are a modern phenomenon. Demanding the 
implementation of Islamic law and establishing an Islamic state or Islamic caliphate are among 
the many features of the fundamentalist movement. An-Naim notes that these features are 
innovations developed by the fundamentalist groups in the twentieth century (1999, p. 117). In 
line with this argument, Bassam Tibi (1998, p. 14) argues that fundamentalism is a new, modern 
phenomenon, because it selectively picks certain elements from religious tradition to construct 
their new political order. This reinterpretation of selective tradition and how the Islamist groups 
situate it in a binary opposition to the secular world is indeed new, since Islamic tradition does 
not necessarily oppose secularism. For some Muslims, the idea of the modern nation-state is not 
against Islam since Islam does not specifically introduce any one political system. The concept 
of ummah does not necessarily differ from that of nation, since it could be interpreted in terms 
of race or groups of people, as Khaldun argues (cited in Ayubi 1991, p. 14).  
In ways that are similar to the Islamist groups, the workshop initiative organised by the 
non-governmental activists was intended to break two domains: the secular domain and the 
religious domain. The act here is an expression to combine secular discourse into traditional 
religious education. It is widely known that the concept of human rights was first developed in 
the West. Islam does not recognise the concept of human rights as it is associated with the secular 
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world, however this is not to say that there are not similar concepts within Islam. The workshop 
broke down this conception and taught traditionalist Muslim communities that the concept is, in 
fact, compatible with their religious understanding. Similarly, the workshop initiative dismantled 
notions that the traditional system of religious education in pesantren must rely exclusively rely 
on classical Islamic texts (kitab kuning). In fact, new discourses, particularly those from the West 
such as democracy, gender, and human rights are not typically learnt in pesantren communities.  
*** 
This section discussed the performative aspect of citizenship by looking at citizenship 
practices in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. As a habitus, citizenship performances refer to the 
everyday practices of the Christian and Muslim communities in Surakarta and Dukuh Manggung, 
Yogyakarta. Both daily practices have been performed by the communities for so long, so they 
are durable, and have been produced and being reproduced by the field or the social structure 
in this community. As habitus recognises change, because of the individual accumulation of 
symbolic, social, cultural, and economic capital, the field might change. The introduction of new 
regulations on worship building by the government, for example, might affect to the change of 
the field and thus of habitus. To ensure that the changes do not disrupt the harmonious 
relationship between two communities and cause a crisis (hysteresis), the community leaders take 
initiatives so that the habitus can always correspond to the field. 
This hysteresis facilitates the emergence of the act of citizenship when the habitus and 
the field no longer synchronize. These acts of citizenship are aimed at breaking the order of the 
religious and secular world since the actors of the actions believe that the current system needs 
to change. The acts of citizenship as performed by the Islamist groups in Surakarta bear a 
resemblance to the idea of the ‘act of piety’ by Turner (2008). This refers to actions motivated 
by religious teachings that demand change in a secular system, such as demanding times for 
praying during office hours, or promoting the new Islamic fashion. While piety within Islam is 
concerned with reverence and obedience to God, the series of actions performed by the Islamist 
groups are not only demands for changes in regulation but also in the design of the state. This 
might be an unintended consequence of the act of piety, or a religious act of citizenship; an act 
that might affect the practices of citizenship in two cities.  
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5.5 Contesting the (Civic) Virtue(s) within Citizenship 
Rights, duties, and responsibilities have been central to the discussion of citizenship and 
have been the subject of debate among theorists. Two large clusters of theory can be mentioned 
here: liberalism and republicanism or communitarianism. Liberalism puts more emphasis on 
rights and individual autonomy, in the sense that obligations for the community or state, such as 
paying tax or voting, tend to be minimal. In contrast with this, republicanism places greater 
emphasis on community responsibility but without disregarding individual rights. For 
republicanism, greater engagement with the community for the common good is emphasised. 
This community obligation or responsibility is at the centre of the civic virtue debate. Despite 
the differences between liberalism and republicanism, some efforts have been taken to reconcile 
the two, such as Dagger (1997), who proposed the idea of republican liberalism. However, the 
spread of liberalism with its machinery apparatus of market, democracy, privatisation, and 
autonomy, makes the discussion of civic virtue come under the shadow of rights-claiming activity. 
As such, the discussion over citizenship as rights (but not duty or responsibility) has dominated 
public discourse.  
This discussion has implications, as Dagger notes (1997, p. 3). Firstly, when someone 
seeks to claim and defend their rights, it generally leaves no room for further discussion, thus it 
is difficult to reach an agreement, particularly when the other party also similarly demands their 
rights. Secondly, claiming certain rights that are associated with a person as an individual suggests 
that the claimants are attempting to separate themselves from society, particularly when it comes 
to the issue of cultural or religious arguments. Indeed, the idea of rights has been associated with 
individuals, particularly within liberal tradition. It is only recently that a group rights approach 
based on culture or religious attachment has been more fully formulated. This can be observed 
in the works of cultural liberalists such as Will Kymlicka, who proposed the idea of minority 
groups rights. Thirdly, the more rights are claimed, the more claiming rights becomes common, 
and as a result appeals for certain rights are no longer special. With these implications, it can be 
argued here that the more people emphasise rights, the more community responsibility is 
undermined.  
The findings of this research suggest that while the arguments for rights are articulated in 
many cases, the sense of community responsibility is proposed at the same time and some actions 
have been performed in the name of civic virtue. However, in both research sites, civic virtues 
are articulated differently based on the way these virtues are cultivated. As a result, civic virtue 
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has never been single, but rather plural, thus virtues. This does not necessarily mean that there 
is no possibility to forge a public civic virtue, as will be discussed later in this section. Since the 
virtue or virtues have been developed in certain context in which individuals grow and learn, the 
conception of virtue is different for one person to another; yet is not necessarily conflictual. To 
forge a shared common virtue, a civic virtue, it needs to be situated in an ongoing process of 
deliberative discussion where different conceptions of virtue are articulated, contested, 
questioned.  
Like ‘citizenship,’ ‘virtue’ is derived from the Greek, in this case arete, meaning 
excellence (Dagger 1997, p. 14). In general, it is used to refer to any outstanding performance of 
individuals, thus he or she possesses what may be called excellence. Within the discourse of 
citizenship, however, the meaning of virtue refers to the moral excellence of individual. An 
individual possesses a virtue when they show an excellent quality of moral behaviour in society, 
such as upholding justice and wisdom. A virtue can be understood as a set of ‘the disposition to 
act in accordance with the standards and expectations that define the role or roles a person 
performs’ (Daggers 1997, p. 14). Daggers argues that the value of virtues is that ‘they promote 
the good of the community or society, not because they directly promote the good of the 
individual.’ Due to this, a civic or public virtue could be defined as a disposition that always puts 
the interest and the good of the public above that of the private (Burtt 1990, p. 24). A virtue is 
not given, but is developed and cultivated in different spheres, from family to community, from 
informal to formal learning. Also, it is derived from values such as the constitution, religion, 
culture or tradition.  
Due to the importance of civic virtue towards the good of the public and apart from 
formal education, some initiatives, which are relevant to this project, have been taken by different 
actors (state and non-state) in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Among the state initiatives, the most 
notable is Forum Komunikasi Umat Beragama (FKUB). This forum was introduced by the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs through their joint decree No. 
9 2006 and No. 8 2006 on Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala 
Daerah Dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan 
Umat Beragama, Dan Pendirian Rumah Ibadat (‘Guidelines on Tasks Implementation of 
Heads/Deputy Heads of Regions in the Maintenance of Religious Community Harmony, 
Empowerment of Interreligious Forum and the Establishment of Places of Worship’). Part of 
the function of this forum is to engage in dialogue with the religious and community leaders, 
listen to their aspirations and disseminate government regulations or policies related to religious 
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community harmony and society empowerment. From this description, it could be argued that 
the virtue that is expected to develop from this forum is a religious law-abiding disposition.  
At the non-state actor level, some initiatives are taken by NGO activists and the leaders 
of mass organisations in Surakarta such as FLAG. The NGO activists in Surakarta initiated a trip 
for children to different places of worship in Surakarta with the aim of introducing the principle 
of tolerance and respect to different religious communities. They believe that cultivating such 
virtue from early period is important so that their children can play with others from different 
communities without any prejudices.  
As previously discussed, the FLAG forum was initiated by several leaders of religious 
organisations in Solo to facilitate a discussion between the leaders. One of the topics discussed 
was related to the local election in 2015, as they were worried that the tensions between the 
supporters of two candidates would escalate and lead to horizontal conflict. This forum is 
organised regularly to promote a constructive dialogue between the leaders of the community, as 
one of the initiators of this group believes that meetings and dialogue are easily organised between 
the leaders, which is not always the case at the grass-roots level. The virtue being developed in 
this forum is that of developing a religiously tolerant attitude.  
Similar forums were organised in Yogyakarta by one of the oldest non-governmental 
organisations to facilitate discussion between different groups. This organisation co-ordinates 
regular public discussions and invites diverse groups of people, including those who have tolerant 
perspective and those who are radical or intolerant. This is because the leader of this non-
governmental organisation believes that a bridge needs to be built between them and other 
groups, particularly those who have different ideas on interfaith dialogue, tolerance, religious 
freedom, or pluralism. For this leader, campaigning for tolerance in public but at the same time 
building a wall to separate groups that are identified as intolerant is neither consistent with the 
values of tolerance nor is it likely to be effective. Instead, this wall needs to be broken down. As 
the discussions progresses, it is hoped that the virtue of religious tolerance among the people will 
increase and that this in turn will help prevent religiously intolerant actions from occurring in 
Yogyakarta. 
Despite these initiatives, in practice, such virtues are highly contested, not only because 
they are developed and cultivated in different contexts, but also because they draw upon various 
sources. The way actors also define public good is different. Paraphrasing Gibson (2007) about 
the concepts of the symbolic form of knowledge (traditional, charismatic, and modern), the 
source of virtue could be derived from religion, culture, or other modern forms such as the 
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constitution. Based on this, there are at least three different virtues exercised in Yogyakarta and 
Surakarta. The first one is religious virtue, a moral principle or behaviour that is obtained through 
performing religious obligation; the second one is cultural virtue, a personal disposition that is 
derived from cultural values, while the last is modern virtue, one that is forged and promoted by 
the Constitution.  
This contestation over religious and modern virtue is evident in a series of actions 
performed by the Islamist groups in Solo and Yogyakarta. In Solo, the public campaign against 
the election of non-Muslim leaders to public office is motivated by certain religious virtues, such 
as being righteous, religious, or Islamic. This is not to deny that there might be other motives 
such as politics behind this action. However, the argument or performance of religious 
obligations could be understood as promoting values or virtues within religion as they interpret 
them. In other words, to be a good Muslim then is to behave according to Islamic rule. 
 Informing the public about the necessity to prevent non-Muslim leaders from being 
elected becomes central to how this virtue is acted out. This is contested by the virtues promoted 
by the Indonesian constitution that do not discriminate against people based on their religious 
identity. The virtues promoted by the constitution focus more on fairness and equality. However, 
this virtue is contested by religious virtue as it proposed by the Islamist groups in Solo. 
The contestation between modern and religious virtue could also be seen from the 
intimidation towards the Raushan Fikr group in Yogyakarta. As they were associated with Shia 
groups and accused of practicing blasphemy, it was suggested that they be warned. One of the 
arguments used to justify this action was that when one sees something wrong, one needs to speak 
up. Without doing so, all the people will fall into fault. This line of justification claims the virtue 
of being pious or righteous. In this case, the existence of Raushan Fikr, or Shia community, is 
not prohibited in Indonesia. This is different from the Ahmadiyah group, for example, where a 
regulation has passed to regulate their activity. Furthermore, the blasphemy accusation has not 
yet been proven. In this regard, the constitution guarantees every person the right to express their 
ideas, to organise and to assemble; therefore, the constitution promotes freedom, but is contested 
by the religious virtue of being pious or righteous as it is interpreted by this Islamist groups.   
Different virtues that come from various sources do not always have to be pitted against 
each other, since at some points they share similar values. Dahlsgaard, Seligman and Peterson 
(2005) show that some virtues such as courage, justice, humanity, temperance, wisdom, and 
tradition are shared among Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Athenian philosophy, 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Certain virtues, such righteousness, are also shared by different 
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religious traditions and cultures. Virtues inherent within the idea of Wong Solo, for example, 
which emphasise being kind-hearted, harmonious, wise and tolerant, are shared by different 
groups. The ways in which they are acted out and translated might differ, but this does not mean 
they are unrelated.  
Nevertheless, cultural virtue does not always come into consideration. The protest over 
the Church at Busukan, Mojosongo, is an example of this. While the issue is superficially 
procedural, it involves deeply-held religious motives to prevent imagined Christianisation in this 
area. From the point of view of the Christian leaders who are involved in mitigating the protest, 
the protesters stand as being intolerant as they have refused to accept the fact that the Church 
community has obtained a full permit. This tolerance here could be understood in a Javanese 
cultural sense of tepo sliro (mutual understanding), which is a virtue that goes beyond the 
procedural argument. 
 
5.5.1 Civic Virtues and Representation 
Despite some efforts in crafting civic virtues by state and non-state actors through different 
forums, the contestation over different virtues remains. Regarding these forums, one issue that 
needs to be highlighted is that of representation. One example is the FLAG forum in Surakarta 
where participants share a similar perspective on the issue or tolerance. However, Islamist groups 
are not involved in this forum. The six officially recognised religions are represented 
proportionally within FKUB, Muslim representation being the largest. However, people from 
outside these groups are not represented and the Islamist groups in Surakarta are still reluctant 
to engage in a constructive dialogue with the non-Muslim community. This makes the idea of 
crafting shared civic virtues among diverse groups challenging. 
From a theoretical perspective, religious identity representation has been and remains a 
contested issue. Indeed, whether such a representation may truly take place, the extent to which 
all people are being represented and what kind of political arrangement would facilitate this 
representation all remain matters of public contestation. To complicate the discourse of 
representation further, it can be more challenging when it comes to the discussion of 
representation for marginalised or vulnerable groups. The proponents of deliberative democracy 
believe that political or social deliberation must involve different groups in the society. To 
participate in the deliberation process, all groups need to act as citizens, not as representing 
particular identity, so a shared general interest could be articulated (Williams 2000, pp. 134-135). 
While this process may sound reasonable, it might not necessarily work so well for marginalised 
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groups since for them acting on behalf on their particular identity would further contribute to the 
deliberation process. Their voices may disclose the existed social structure, that by and large, has 
inflicted harm to them. Phillips (1995, p. 147) argues that demanding the marginalised groups to 
give up their interests on behalf of general ones would ‘lock them into the very structures they 
are trying to dislodge’, thus representation in deliberation process becomes unattainable.  
Furthermore, another issue to consider is the way that representation is being arranged 
and pursued in the public domain. It is worth noting here that the norm and the structure of 
social and political-decision making process are not universal, but culturally specific instead. To 
some degree, it may represent or be derived from the existing structure that, in turn, normalising 
the whole process of social and political deliberation. At this point, the norm or structure of 
representation may act as a form of power that further marginalise the vulnerable group. Because 
of this asymmetrical power relationship, the voices of the marginalised groups may not be 
favoured (Williams 2000, p. 135). Representation thus remains challenging and it is at this point 
the concept of representation proposed by Young need to be considered further.               
Representation, as Young (2000) argues, is not about substitution, whereby people 
present on behalf of another’s absence. This is because an individual’s identity cannot be 
substituted by that of another. Young (2000) proposes the idea of representation in a relational 
term that involves the historical relationship between the represented and the representatives. 
Here representation may function as ‘speaking for’, not ‘speaking as.’ Representation might 
occur when it comes to matters of interest, opinion, or perspective. Interest here may refer to 
something material or non-material such as religious expression. Opinion, on the other hand, 
may refer to ‘principles, values or priorities’ (Young 2000, p. 135), while perspective refers to ‘a 
set of questions, kinds of experience and assumptions with which reasoning begins’ (Young 2000, 
p. 137). This perspective derives from the way people view some issues, due to their social 
position in relation to other groups. People may share the same perspective even though they 
come from different groups.  
Referring to this concept of representation, the findings suggest that the existence of 
different forums does not always mean that they adequately represent the distinct groups in 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Part of the reason for this is that the groups here tend to be 
understood more as aggregates, as places where people who share similar attributes may 
converge. A Muslim group might simply be put in one bracket since, to an extent, all Muslims 
share similar attributes, such as performing the five pillars of Islam (namely shahada, the 
profession of faith, salat, the prayer ritual, sawm, fasting during Ramadan, zakat, almsgiving, and 
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hajj, pilgrimage). The problem with this simplistic approach to aggregation is that it tends to 
undermine the different opinions and perspectives among Muslim groups. The Ahmadiyah are 
not included in the forums mentioned above and as a result their perspective is not represented 
either. The viewpoint on social and religious issues that come from a position as a vulnerable 
minority group is most unlikely to be represented because the people involved are from 
mainstream groups. 
Therefore, to forge a civic virtue which benefits the public, there should be a mechanism 
where various groups are involved in social and political decision-making processes. Since there 
are so many diverse groups, those involved in this process should represent them in terms of 
interests, opinions, and perspectives. Engaging in this process is challenging precisely because it 
involves different opinions and perspectives. However, it can start with what Parekh (2000, p. 
267-269) calls ‘operative public values’ that are attached in three levels: (1) constitution; (2) laws; 
and (3) norms governing the civil relationship between members of society. In the Indonesian 
context, the constitution may refer to UUD 1945, while laws refer to regulations related to some 
issues being discussed in this project. Civic norms may refer to religious, tradition or cultural 
values. The participants in the dialogue need to be open to being questioned and evaluated based 
on public operative values.  
*** 
As discussed earlier, contestation over virtues (religious, cultural, and modern) occurs in 
the two research sites when some groups of people perform their citizenship practices. Even 
though initiatives that seek to forge a common civic virtue have been initiated by different actors 
(state and non-state), the contestation continues to occur. This project found that one of the key 
drivers is the issue of representation. Some religiously vulnerable groups for example, despite 
being part of majority groups, do not find representation in the majority groups. Within Muslim 
groups, the Ahmadiyah community, which is currently being marginalised socially, culturally, and 
politically, is generally not represented unless the representatives share a similar perspective to 
that group.   
This contestation is normal in the democratic process. While this contestation might 
hinder the effort to cultivate a more democratic and inclusive citizenship project, it does open it 
up for dialogue. This dialogue, however, needs to start with and based on public operative values 
as Parekh (2000) suggests, and every group, therefore, needs to be open to question and 
evaluation. As highlighted by this research project, one of the issues in forging a more mature 
citizenship in the research sites, particularly in Yogyakarta, is that of recognising interests that are 
 153 
shared among different social and cultural groups. Thus, promoting a shared common civic 
virtue remains a challenging process. It is at this point that public operative mechanisms that 
represents the interest, opinion, and perspective of diverse groups are likely to facilitate and forge 
a shared common civic virtue among separate groups.  
Exercising rights and bearing public interests are important to citizenship practices which 
are aimed at weakening class divisions, identity politics and differences (Bendix 1964, cited in 
Turner 2006, p. 227). Individual rights and public interests are not necessarily in contradiction 
with each other. Autonomy might serve as a necessary condition for individuals to act in the 
name of community and public virtue (Blanken 2012). Without autonomy, individuals would 
not have the capacity to consider what is best for them, as individuals and as part of the 
community. To forge common civic virtues, traditional bonds, or associations such as those 
found in religion and culture, need to be oriented towards ‘external protection’ rather than 
‘internal restriction’ (borrowing from Kymlicka). These differing orientations, however, must be 
open to being contested and interpreted differently since what is understood by ‘protection’ and 
‘restriction’ may vary from one group to another. 
 
5.6 Paralleling the State Power and Authority: Pancasila at the Crossroads? 
The findings of this research indicate that while some citizenship practices offer optimism 
regarding the future of religious citizenship practices in Indonesia, the challenges posed by the 
Islamist groups in Yogyakarta and Surakarta are not to be overlooked. As mentioned earlier, 
religious citizenship practices in Yogyakarta and Surakarta have been coloured with tensions, 
violation and intimidation against minority groups. These practices occur frequently and are 
often justified by the religious arguments and existing regulations as they perceive them. 
Reflecting further on the findings of this research, the questions remain as to how religious 
citizenship in Indonesia shall be regulated and/or whether special rights for minority groups 
should be formulated. On these questions, this section will discuss further on key issues within 
multicultural citizenship and differentiated citizenship. A discussion on Pancasila will be 
provided as it is the state ideological foundation, which navigate statecraft and citizenship 
practices in Indonesia.  
One among the many features to highlight from multicultural citizenship is its proposal 
to address properly the challenges coming from different cultural or religious groups. It is worth 
noting that the context of multicultural citizenship proposed by Kymlicka is Canada, with the 
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challenge of francophone Quebeckers, or Western liberal countries in general. Kymlicka 
suggests that religious or cultural groups that wish to incorporate into the larger society and 
demand only recognition (not separation) may be entitled to special group rights. However, he 
adds that for them to have these special rights, they need to comply with basic liberal tenets such 
as freedom and autonomy. If these groups practiced what he calls ‘internal restriction’ by limiting 
basic civil and political rights of the members, they would not be entitled for these rights.  
Kymlicka’s proposal about these special rights seems to be problematic in Indonesia. 
One of the main issues that would likely instigate the debate is how the category of religious 
minority shall be defined. While the category minority is western liberal framework is associated 
with particular demands of certain groups, Kymlicka (2005) outlined, at least four different 
groups of minorities, namely (a) minority nationalism such as Quebeckers in Canada or the 
Catalans in Spain, (b) indigenous people with the example of Inuit in Canada and the Aborigines 
in Australia, (c) immigrant groups, (d) metics referring to ‘migrants who are not admitted as 
permanent residents and future citizens’. This group may refer to those enter the country legally 
and illegally with the students or guest workers who overstay at the host country as the obvious 
example for the former (Kymlicka 2005, pp. 23-28).  
While these groups might be clearly identified in western countries, it would be difficult 
and challenging, and to some degree could be misleading, when it comes to Asian countries. He 
and Kymlicka notes (2005) that applying the western concept of minority in Asia would 
potentially simplify the different nature of these kind of groups in Asia. The category of national 
minorities would be problematic to be used as general labelling toward the Aceh people in 
Indonesia or the Tamil groups of Srilanka despite the fact that they may share some 
commonalities with that of the Catalans or the Basque. A further careful investigation is needed 
as the movement initiated by the Aceh people, for example, while it might have ethnic and 
linguistic base, but they may not necessarily share the self-determination concept as the national 
minorities in the West.  
Kymlicka and Norman (2000, pp. 18-19) did ‘renew’ the category of minority by adding 
religious groups on the list. They classify religious groups into two categories: isolationist and 
non-isolationist ones. The former refers to religious groups who do not actively participate in 
public life. They do not care about marginalisation and remain unconcerned instead since they 
believe that the worldly institutions ‘as corrupt’ (Kymlicka & Norman 2000, pp. 22-23). To 
exemplify this is the Amish groups in the United States who maintain their original traditional 
way of life. The non-isolationist groups refer to those who do not isolate themselves from political 
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and civic life. Instead, they shield themselves from some aspect of the mainstream culture and 
seek for an exemption such as that of the Sikh community from military and police dress codes. 
Again, this category is based on, allegedly, the nature immigrant groups.  
Another issue with minority is that it is generally attributed by the state of the outsiders. 
The groups themselves might not necessarily acknowledge this attribution. Mahmood (2016) 
notes that the Copts in Egypt proclaim themselves to no constitute the minority groups. So as the 
human rights activists who seldom call them as minority groups despite their experience of 
marginalisation by the majority groups. Similar notion is shared within so called the minority 
groups in Indonesia as the findings suggest that the representative of this group rejected the label 
of minority for them. This means that the attribution of minority groups remains problematic 
and highly contested.                          
For some Islamist groups in Indonesia, his idea of minority rights proves challenging. His 
classification of religious or cultural groups as having to choose integration or separation to be 
eligible for minority rights, so as the classification of isolationist and non-isolationist one, seems 
simplistic compared to what happens in the field. Despite their claim of representing the majority 
groups, at some point, they tend to see themselves as constituting a ‘minority’ compared to the 
bigger Muslim groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Furthermore, they also proclaim 
themselves as being marginalised by the government and feel as being excluded from the political 
and social-decision making process. Indeed, the Islamist groups in Surakarta, as one of the 
leaders argue, are reluctant to be fully integrated into the national culture. This can be seen from 
their unwillingness to have a national identity card since it may mean recognizing the socio-
political architecture of Indonesia, which they deny. However, they wish to be involved in the 
political decision-making process and request their demands to be incorporated into a regulation. 
An example of this is their request for alcohol prohibition to be included in a local regulation, 
while the idea proposed by the local government is to manage its circulation.  
What happened in this particular case justifies Young’s critique (1997), where she argues 
that some religious or cultural groups might demand to be able to access economic opportunities 
and be involved in the decision-making process, but they reject full integration into the national 
culture. Furthermore, they aim not only for separation, but for a gradual re-establishment of the 
national political architecture. Instead of the nation-state, they demand what they call khilafah 
islamiyah ala minhajin nubuwwah, a global Islamic caliphate. This is a system where states or 
territories will be governed by the principles of Islamic law. They believe that under the 
implementation of Islamic law, non-Muslim groups would be treated justly.  
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The Islamic political practices that can be seen from the Madinah Charter indeed 
propose an inclusive community where the rights and obligations of the Muslim and non-
Muslims communities are equal. Within the millet system, non-Muslims may hold high positions 
such as state Ministers (Vezirs) or Prime Ministers (Grand Vezirs). However, the case of the 
Islamist group is Surakarta campaigning against non-Muslim leaders suggests that the position of 
Muslims and non-Muslims as members of political community is not equal. This raises a 
question as to what kind of Islamic system they propose, if their actions are different from the 
political practices of earlier Islamic communities.  
Before discussing the implications of the findings of this project for Pancasila, the state 
ideology of Indonesia, its history will be briefly sketched below to gain a better understanding of 
its context. Pancasila was established on 1 June 1945, but the discussion over Pancasila had been 
ongoing since May that year. It started from the discussion initiated by BPUPK (Badan 
Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan, Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for 
Independence). The members of this committee consisted of 69 different representatives 
(among which were two women), including Muslim people, bureaucrats, nationalist and other 
groups such as people of Chinese and Arabic descent (Latif 2011, p. 9). It can be argued here, 
as Latif (2011, p. 10) notes, that BPUPK members represented the different social political 
groups at that time.    
The discussion over what shall be included as the state ideological foundation had been 
proposed by different group members at that time. The inclusion of religious values in the 
principle of believing in God, for example, was proposed by nationalist and religious figures such 
as Muhammad Yamin (one of the nationalist leaders), Agoes Salim, Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo 
(the Head of Muhammadiyah), Soepomo and Mohammad Hatta (the first vice President of 
Indonesia). Similar to this were the idea of humanity, unity, consensual democracy (democracy 
permusyawaratan) and justice and social welfare. The values of Pancasila were agreed upon by 
all members of BPUPK at that time, and thus it can be considered as representing a national 
agreement (Latif 2011, p. 9-10).  
Following this meeting were several discussions organized by key figures within nationalist 
and religious groups such as Sukarno, Hatta and Agoes Salim. The five principles of Pancasila 
were set. The debate between the nationalist and religious groups emerged when it came to 
translating the first principle into the Constitution (Latif 2011). Some Muslim representatives 
proposed the inclusion of seven words, the so called as the Jakarta Charter, which are ‘dengan 
kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya’ (‘with the obligation to 
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implement Shariah Islam for its adherents’) within the ‘believing in God’ principle. This idea was 
rejected by the nationalist groups because it may potentially disintegrate the unity of Republic as 
a neither religious nor secular state. After significant lobbying, the seven words were removed 
from the first Principle and were replaced with the words ‘One and Only God’ (Yang Maha Esa) 
(Picard 2011, p. 12). On this removal, Hatta argues that it does not reduce the importance of 
religious values in Indonesia. The acceptance of Pancasila minus the Jakarta Charter represents 
the concept of kalimah sawa’ in Islam, a common platform for different groups (Azra 2004, p. 
50).  
The inclusion of the believing in One God in the first principle agreed upon by the 
founding fathers and mothers of Indonesia suggests that Indonesia considers religion to play an 
important role in the country’s social, cultural and political life. In Sukarno’s words during a 1945 
speech, Indonesia is a state in which each of its citizens believe in God and can perform the 
rituals and obligations accordingly and conveniently. Sikarno called this ‘believing in God in a 
civilized way’ (ber-Tuhan secara kebudayaan) in which people were to respect to each other 
regarding their religious belief (Latif 2011, p. 17; Saksono 2007, p. 21). Furthermore, as Hatta 
argues, placing the belief in One God as the first principle would not change the state ideology. 
Instead, it would strengthen the moral foundation of the state and its political practices (Latif 
2011, p. 78).  
With this, Latif (2011) states that the inclusion of the religious values among the five 
Principles of Pancasila is distinction of the role of religion and politics in regulating public life. 
Religious values as they are represented in the first principle would be the moral foundation for 
political governance foundation as they are represented in the other four principles (Latif 2011, 
p. 78). In other words, the first principle of Pancasila ‘not only allows, but encourages’ religion 
to inspire the realization of the idea of humanism, national unity, representative democracy and 
social justice (Hosen 2005, p. 424). This is reminiscent of the idea of differentiation. Casanova 
(1994, p. 221) argues that secularization theory consists of three different propositions. The first 
one is secularization as a separation in which the role of religion and politics are strictly separated. 
Islam, as Hatta argues, does not recognize this kind of separation, so that it is different from that 
of Christianity tradition (Latif 2011, p. 106). The second one refers to privatization, in which 
religion may function in private spaces such as mosques or churches. The third one is 
differentiation, which refers to the different role between religion and politics in public life.  
This differentiation may serve as a concept to facilitate what Stepan (2000, p. 37) called 
twin toleration, which is ‘the minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be 
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crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and 
groups vis-à-vis political institutions.’ In this ‘minimal boundaries’, Stepan argues that the 
individuals and groups shall have the freedom to perform their religious obligations and to be 
involved in civil or political society as long as they do not violate civil liberties and democratic 
values. They should not be prohibited to form a political party and the prohibition over whether 
the party violates democratic principles should be determined by the courts, not to the 
government (Stepan 2000, p. 39-40).  
While Pancasila has laid the foundation for navigating the statecraft and religious 
citizenship practices, the principles are too general to be implemented in social and political 
practices. Due to this, during the history, Pancasila was interpreted differently from one regime 
to the other. During the Sukarno presidency, an attempt to interpret Pancasila was expressed in 
Manipol-USDEK (Manifesto Politik, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Sosialisme Indonesia, 
Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin dan Kepribadian Indonesia – the Political 
Manifesto – the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, 
Guided Economy, and Indonesian National Identity) (Morfit 1981, p. 843-844). This political 
manifesto was aimed to realise the vision of just and human society as it is outlined in the 
Pancasila. The Manipol-USDEK was translated into courses and taught not only to civil servants 
but also to students at primary, secondary and university level. While there was a question as to 
whether this political manifesto synthesized political orientations in Indonesia, Sukarno’s attempt 
to oppose the political aspiration to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia was clearly identified 
(Morfit 1981, p. 844).     
When the Old regime collapsed and the New Order was established in 1966, Suharto 
attempted to translate Pancasila in a more practical way by introducing what he called Demokrasi 
Pancasila (‘Pancasila Democracy’). During his speech in 1967 (cited in Suroso 2001, p. 15-16), 
Suharto criticized the implementation of Pancasila by the Old Order Regime by claiming that 
practices such as Sukarno’s introduction on the concept of Nasakom (Nasionalisme, Agama dan 
Komunis – nationalism, religion and communism) deviated from Pancasila principles. This 
concept that facilitated communism within Pancasila was against the principle of believing in 
God, since communism, as Suharto perceived it, is against God. Also, social justice principles 
were far from turning into reality since the guided economy served only those who had a close 
connection to the elites; the people’s power turned into the elites’ power too.  
In implementing Pancasila Democracy, Suharto introduced a program called P-4 
(Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, ‘Guidance for the Realization and 
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Implementation of Pancasila’) in 1970s. These programs were not only for government officers 
and civil servants, but also for students at the junior and senior high school level. This added to 
the existed Pancasila indoctrination programs for students, such as PMP course (Pendidikan 
Moral Pancasila, Pancasila Moral Education) (Weatherbee 1985, p. 134). For the New Order 
Regime, Pancasila democracy aimed to achieve ‘harmony, cohesion, and consensus’ and within 
this framework continuous development was strived for to consolidate independence 
(Weatherbee 1985, p. 134). One feature of Pancasila democracy was ABRI’s special role 
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), as 
it did not only serve for security purpose but also to ensure development projects ran smoothly.  
Under the New Order Regime, opposing their interpretation of Pancasila would be 
considered against the regime and thus against the state itself (Weatherbee 1985, p. 134). Any 
opposition to the state would be considered an extremist position, either left (communism) or 
right (radical Islam) (Weatherbee 1984, p. 189; 1985, p. 134). The establishment of the New 
Order Regime occurred after the extermination of the PKI in 1965: with the large number of 
members of this party, the regime considered that communism would be a source of social and 
political threat (Abdullah 2013, p. 80). Similar to communism, Suharto’s regime was suspicious 
of any political activity organized by Muslim fundamentalist groups in the 1970s (Ismail 1995, p. 
200). Moreover, the regime’s attitude toward Islam also posed a political dilemma especially for 
Islamist political groups to articulate their political aspiration (Abdullah 2013, p. 80). On this, it 
is argued that among the political agendas of the New Order Regime was to ‘contain political 
Islam’ (Baswedan 2004, p. 671). The political fusion was introduced in 1973 where four Islamic 
potical parties were forced to merge into one single party, namely PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, the United Development Party) (Baswedan 2004, p. 671).   
In stabilizing the power and politics, Suharto introduced the policy of Pancasila as the 
sole foundation of political parties and mass organisations in Indonesia in 1982. This policy 
instigated different reactions from different groups, but PPP, a party that was seen as representing 
the voices of Muslim groups, had no choice but accept this policy, although they refused to 
replace their political party symbol, which was ka’bah (Ismail 1995, p. 229). Many mass 
organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah accepted this policy, with some of them opposing 
it. Part of the reasons for opposing the proposal was, at first, that Pancasila would replace Islam 
or it would be considered as equal to religion, or it would restrict any religious activities they 
organized (Ismail 1995, p. 239-240). Although the government stated that Pancasila would not 
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do this, and become a concern for them (Ismail 1995, p. 240), the idea to implement shariah 
Islam has never faded among Islamist groups.     
After the collapse of the new order regime, Pancasila is open for new interpretation. 
Abdullah (2013, p. 75) argues that in this period, the responses of Muslim community towards 
the relationship between religion and the state can be seen as a continuum, from the extreme 
ones that are intolerant toward pluralities to broad-minded ones that are open to plural 
expressions and opinions toward religion and the state. It is at this point that different religious 
attitudes towards state and society are being widely expressed. The politics of identity in the name 
of religion are emerging in many places across Indonesia, often leading to conflict and violence 
involving religious matters (Abdullah 2013, p. 84). In terms of politics, PPP and the new Islamic-
based political parties, such as PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party) and 
PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Star and Crescent Party) demanded to reinstate the seven words of 
the Jakarta Charter on the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution (Raillon 2011, p. 95). Adding to 
this is the local shariah regulation (Perda shariah) at the municipality level, which begs the 
questions of the boundary between the state and society (Abdullah 2013, p. 77).  
Within this reform era, whether certain actions are acted out as based on the Pancasila 
principle is a subject of great debate. The policy on P-4, TAP MPR II/1978 was revoked in 1998 
(Fahcrudin 2018, p. 14), and so was the BP-7 (Badan Pembina Pendidikan Pelaksanaan 
Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Supervisory Body for Implementation of 
Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila), a special body that monitors the 
indoctrination programs during the New Order regime (Abdullah 2013, p. 84). Thus, there is no 
single interpretation of Pancasila. Many consider that Pancasila, as representing national 
consensus, guarantees Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). For Islamist groups leaders 
such as Hidayat Nurwahid, one of the leaders of PKS, claimed that Pancasila is often used by 
some people to serve their own interests such as those who campaign against shariah Islam but 
claim to be supporters of Pancasila (Fachrudin 2018, p. 16). Another figure such as Adian 
Husaini, a Muslim writer, (2010, cited in Fachrudin 2018, p. 16) argues that the first principle of 
Pancasila is tauhid (the Islamic principle emphasising the meaning of the One and Only God). 
Husaini criticized those who consider Pancasila as something secular.  
The contention between non-Islamist groups and Islamist groups regarding Pancasila 
interpretations continues to colour the public space. Regarding the concept of citizenship, there 
are different interpretation offered. Eddyono (2013) explores three higher education citizenship 
education books: Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan (Citizenship Education, Sumarsono 2008), 
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Pendidikan Kewargaan: Demokrasi, Hak Asasi Manusia dan Masyarakat Madani (Civics 
Education: Democracy, Human Rights and Civil Society, Ubaedillah 2008) and Pendidikan 
Kewarganegaraan di Perguruan Tinggi Muhammadiyah (Citizenship Education at 
Muhammdiyah Higher Education, Taniredja 2009). Despite being listed as national textbooks, 
Eddyono (2013, p. 340) found out that they offered different ideals of citizenship, which are 
secular citizenship (Sumarsono 2008), pious-multicultural citizenship (Ubaedillah 2008) and 
pious-Islamic citizenship (Taniredja 2009). In short, it can be argued here that Pancasila 
interpretation has been situated on a continuum in which different groups of people can interpret 
it based on their own worldview. 
The findings of this research reflect this continuum. Religious citizenship practices 
between the state, civil society and individual actors have been exercised differently and 
competed with each other in certain contexts. In a more performative sense, the religious act of 
citizenship is aimed to break the secular and religious order, as can be seen, for example, from 
the social political imagination of the Islamist groups in Solo to implement Islamic law and 
establish the Islamic caliphate, khilafah Islamiyah, in Indonesia. Also, the series of actions are 
justified as being the responsibility of individuals in order to pursue the public good. Their acts 
in the name of civic virtues derived from the constitution, religion and culture are also contested.  
Playing alongside this continuum, as the findings suggest, has allowed Islamist groups to 
find their own strategy. The Islamist groups in Surakarta, while proposing the argument of 
Islamic law or khilafah Islamiyah, took advantages of the idea of democracy and the rights to 
express idea as is guaranteed by the Constitution. It was suggested earlier that one of the leaders 
of the Islamist groups rejects the idea of modern state or democracy; if they were to accept them, 
it would be a matter of emergency because they have no choice or power to change them. While 
problematizing places of worship such as churches, these groups acted in the name of the 
regulation. Also, when they campaign publicly against the election of non-Muslims as leaders, 
they use their own Islamic interpretation to justify their actions. The Islamists groups in 
Yogyakarta do not reject Pancasila, but they play with it. They justify the actions they commit 
with local regulation or their own religious understanding.  
As Turner argues, the religious and secular memberships, while they are separate but 
parallel, tend to be at odds in many respects when they are exercised with regard to dominating 
public sphere (2017, p. 3). With this in mind, I argue that playing strategically alongside this 
continuum has made the Islamist groups parallel the power and authority of the state in regulating 
public life. Power here is not defined as something possessed or hierarchical, but more according 
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to the Foucaultian tradition, where it is always ‘out there’, in relations with others and can be 
analysed when it is exercised (Foucault 1982, p. 786; Foucault 1991, p.26). They exercise their 
power over minority groups, Muslim and non-Muslims, and act as those with the authority to 
decide who is right, who is wrong, who is a law abider and who is a law breaker. Even if their 
actions were regarded as breaking the law, they believe that the state apparatus are breaking the 
law too, as one of the head of Islamist groups in Yogyakarta claimed. Therefore, breaking the 
law is being normalised. These groups took over the state duty in disciplining ‘the law breakers’ 
without any qualms. In other words, there are two different powers and authorities: the state and 
the Islamist groups, and these are exercised in public to regulate religious citizenship practices 
that make minority groups feel inconvenient and vulnerable, as the findings suggest.  
Also, the findings remind us of Stepan’s observation that for religious organisations to 
participate in political space to not being privileged to ‘mandate public policy’ so that they might 
‘deny critical freedoms’ of the citizens (2000; 2017). However, paralleling the power and 
authority of the state becomes possible due to the existence of some regulations that grant 
extremist groups power and authority that parallels those held by state. Adding to this is that, as 
the mass organisation bill states, the mass organisations are assigned a role to maintain public 
order so that regulating public life in the name of ‘maintaining public order’ become possible. 
Having said this, this project does not neglect that there are other factors that navigate these 
actions, as the discursive practices involved different discourses from religion, to politics, to 
economics. This discursive confusion implicates individuals as nation-state citizens who have 
rights, obligations and responsibilities, and as members of religious groups who require them to 
perform certain obligations; and this has been exploited by Islamist groups in order to exercise 
power and authority at the expense of religious minorities.    
In a different sense, playing into a continuum has been a powerful strategy to achieve 
political goals. The works of Sian Lazar (2008) on everyday practices and resistances of 
indigenous people in Bolivia have shown that, by and large, these performative actions have 
successfully overthrown the White government and began the new era of Indian leadership in 
this country. One of important features of Lazar’s work is how the citizenship is articulated in a 
different range of claims, thus as a continuum, from individual, groups, to professional 
membership such as trade unions. The articulation through different sites has challenged the 
very notion of citizenship in western tradition which emphasize on individual. Furthermore, the 
idea of group rights proposed by Kymlicka, for example, has been inadequate to capture this 
dynamic since his idea is limited by whether such groups intent to separate or integrate to the 
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country as for them to be eligible for special groups rights. This is so with the case of the Islamist 
groups in Indonesia who often play along the notion of individual citizen and part of religious 
community (to act for collective groups) when they claim their demands and pursue their own 
interests.  
On June, 7, 2017, President Joko Widodo created UKP-PIP (Unit Kerja Presiden-
Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila, A Working Unit on Guidance of Pancasila Ideology). This 
working unit aimed to assist the President in formulating the general concept to implement 
Pancasila. President Joko Widodo argues that the function of this unit will be different from that 
of the New Order Regime, which was more about indoctrination (Kuwado 2017). Also, Yudi 
Latif, as the head of this unit, argues that this working unit would be different from BP-7 under 
the New Order Regime (Ihsanuddin 2017). Part of the role of this unit will be re-examining 
existing regulations and government policies to determine whether they are in line with Pancasila 
principles (Kuwado 2017b). This working unit has recently changed into a special body called 
BPIP (Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila, A Supervisory Body for Guidance of Pancasila 
Ideology) to keep it in existence despite the change of President (Setiawanto 2018; Egeham 
2018).  
While the products of this unit have yet to be seen, two months after the creation of this 
working unit, the President issued President Regulation No. 2 2017 (Perppu, Peraturan 
Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang) to substitute bill No. 17 2013 on Societal Organisation. 
One feature of this new regulation is adding the meaning of ‘ideologies that are against Pancasila’. 
In Bill No. 17 2013, these ideologies refer to atheism, communism, Marxism and Leninism. 
This regulation adds to those ‘any ideologies that are aimed to replace Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution’ (Fachrudin 2018, p. 1). Furthermore, with this regulation, the government can 
disband any organisations that are considered to be against Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution 
without first going to court, although this decision can be reviewed via court process after that.  
This regulation was soon implemented and the HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Hizbut 
Tahrir of Indonesia) was disbanded. This organisation actively and publicly campaigns for 
khilafah Islamiyah, rejects the idea of nation-state and denounces the idea of democracy. Instead 
of them, they propose shariah Islam under a global caliphate governance. The reason to ban this 
organisation is to safeguard Pancasila as a pluralist state ideology and the 1945 Constitution. This 
decision instigated a debate among citizens, with some of them agreeing on this decision (because 
the ideology proposed by the HTI has clearly threatened the state ideology) while other disagreed 
as this is against Indonesian constitution (Ghazali 2017). The HTI objects the government’s 
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decision and go to court to review this decision. However, their proposal was rejected 
(Astungkoro 2018).  
What can be learnt from this case is that every regime in Indonesia has attempted to 
implement Pancasila in a more practical way. In the Old Order Regime, this attempt can be seen 
from the creation of the Manipol-USDEK, while the New Order Regime introduced P-4 and 
several similar courses such as PMP. In the Reform Era, the creation of UKP-PIP (later BPIP) 
was meant to provide guidance to translate Pancasila at a practical level. What might be different 
from the previous regime is that both the Old and Order Regime (ab)used Pancasila to stabilize 
and consolidate the power of the regime and eliminate all those considered to be against them. 
Meanwhile, in the Reform Era the government use Pancasila to eliminate all ideologies that are 
clearly identified to be against Pancasila, such the HTI (which publicly campaign for their 
ideology to replace the state foundation). Furthermore, Indonesia is not the first country to not 
allow this organisation to operate. Other countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
Uzbekistan, China, Rusia and Germany have already banned this organisation (Counter 
Extremism Project 2018). 
The attempt of the government to outline the boundary, though it remains general and 
open to multiple interpretations, needs to be respected and left open for further discussion. One 
of the issues could be that the boundary outlined by the government as it is stated in the President 
Regulation No. 2 2017 works only for registered social organisations. Meanwhile, as the findings 
of this research suggest, the religious citizenship practices in the two research sites have led to 
tensions and violence, either physical or mental, to minority groups in Indonesia. The 
perpetrators of this violence are not all registered and not all of them publicly campaign for 
ideologies that threaten Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. As one of the leaders of the Islamist 
groups in Yogyakarta stated, he clearly supports Pancasila. However, their practices have led to 
violation of basic rights or have posed a threat for minority groups.  
Unless the government attempts to further deal with these actions, these will not only 
spoil the efforts to cultivate a democratic and inclusive citizenship in Indonesia but also place 
Pancasila at the crossroads, as the Islamist groups will play strategically alongside its interpretation 
in a continuum. In order to place Pancasila as the common platform and dealing with continuous 
violence against minority groups, Stepan’s minimal boundaries might be further considered. 
However, Stepan’s argument on whether a political party or a mass organisation could not to be 
banned prior the courts might be contextualised. In Indonesian case, the government did ban 
HTI before the court process, but this decision could be reviewed via legal process in order to 
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prevent the absolute authority of the state in regulating the mass organisation in Indonesia. It is 
at this point, the historical background might take into consideration. Indonesia has, at least, 
experienced three critical junctures in which the national political design has been questioned. 
Though these critical situations could be secured, as the history suggests, this does not mean that 
the government could not prepare for a preventive action to defend the society and the state 
ideology regarding the threat of violent extremism. 
For a comparative approach, Neumann (2013) introduces two different approach in 
dealing with violent extremism. The first one is the Anglo-Saxon approach in which the state may 
take actions against individuals or groups whenever they have an intent to break the law. This is 
the limit of where the state can intervene. The state tend to disregard the political ideas or 
motivations of individuals or groups, whether they are divisive and anti-democartic, as long as 
there are expressed in a peaceful manner. Freedom of expression is nearly absolute within this 
approach (Neumann 2013, p. 885). The example of county using this approach is the USA. 
Different from Anglo-Saxon, the European approach tend to see the radical, extremist idea not 
only dangerous but also potentially lead to violence. This approach believes that when the 
proponents of this radical and extremists ideas have successfully ‘exploited and manipulated’ the 
freedom within democratic system, it is highly likely that they might instigate an active extremist 
movement that may threaten the state and the society (Neumann 2013, pp. 886-887). The 
example of state adopted this approach is Germany.  
Regarding the decision to ban the HTI, the approach taken by the Indonesian 
government seems quite close to the European approach, however regarding the challenges to 
deal with the extremist Islamist groups who are not publicly campaign against the state ideology, 
the government tend to align with the Anglo-Saxon approach. Considering the frequent violence 
cases against minority groups in Indonesia, the current approach, whatever it is, taken by the 
government seems to be inadequate to deal with this issue. As the finding suggest, the challenges 
posed by the Islamist groups are prevalent and need to be dealt with in due time.  
Indeed, the idea to acknowledge and recognise the different religious and cultural 
expressions, as it is highlighted in multicultural citizenship, might be further reflected upon, as 
during the New Order regime this kind of expression was muted. However, it shall be noted that 
there should be a boundary in which this expression could be accommodated. The idea of 
representation in terms of opinion, interest and perspective as it is highlighted in the concept of 
differentiated citizenship might also be considered further so that the vulnerable minority groups 
would be properly represented in the social and political decision-making process. They may not 
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be granted a religion, not religiously, differentiated citizenship, however, the government need to 
ensure that their voices are freely expressed in public space without being intimidated by the 
extreme religious groups. As the findings of this research suggest, the government might consider 
to create framework in which the active involvement of the vulnerable minority groups could be 
performed.    
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the research findings in relation to the theoretical framework 
used in this research project. This theoretical framework highlights the dynamic practices of 
citizenship whereby different state and non-state actors interact and compete with each other in 
navigating citizenship practices. Within the context of this research project, religion plays a key 
role in crafting citizenship. Despite the fact that it has been positioned in a binary opposition 
toward citizenship due to its allegedly secular nature, religion has, all along, been a key part of 
the citizenship project in Indonesia. This makes the discussion over religious citizenship 
proposed by Hudson (2003) particularly insightful in understanding the role of religion in 
citizenship practices in Indonesia and, specifically, the two research sites. As Hudson (2003) 
argues, religious citizenship can take different forms and be exercised into state, civil society, and 
personal domains.  
The religious citizenship practices at the state, civil society and personal level are 
contested to varying degrees across the two research sites. An example is the intimidation toward 
an organisation in Yogyakarta suspected of spreading Shia teachings, which are considered heresy 
by a certain religious group. While the state guarantees the rights to assemble and express ideas, 
some religious factions compel other groups to halt their activities, and thus violate such rights. 
In other cases, the phenomenon of the Ahmadiyah also shows how state religious citizenship has 
led to the restriction of some of the basic rights of that community, including their right to express 
their ideas in public. Their critics maintain that their rights can only be returned to them once 
they return to Islamic teachings as the majority understand it.  
Apart from religion, culture also plays a significant role in navigating citizenship practices. 
The cultural concepts discussed in this chapter refer to symbols, terms, or practices. As the 
research sites of this project are situated in close proximity in Central Java, and are therefore 
predominantly Javanese, cultural symbols linked to the kraton (palace) and the Sultan are of vital 
importance. The study found that the function of these cultural symbols has been declining, or 
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at least they are no longer central to the discussion, due, in part, to the involvement of the palace 
in investment projects which are seen to disadvantage many people. Furthermore, traditions 
involving the Sultan appearing among the people, such as performing prayer in the public 
mosque, are no longer upheld as they were in earlier times. As a result, the social and cultural 
bond between kawula and gusti (servant and master) is no longer seen to be as robust as it once 
was. 
Other than cultural symbols, some cultural terms such as Wong Solo (a person from 
Surakarta), Solo rumah kita (Solo is our house), Wong Jogja (a person of Yogyakarta) and Jogja 
istimewa (Yogyakarta is special) are referenced as navigating citizenship practices in the two 
research sites. Wong Solo and Solo rumah kita function to reinforce a sense of collective identity 
and are thus inclusive. Properly understood they mean that citizens of Solo bear some 
responsibility to protect their home, and thus show respect and tolerance towards each other. In 
sharp contrast with this, Wong Jogja and Jogja istimewa tend to be interpreted narrowly, invoking 
a sense of exclusivity. Nevertheless, both research sites share many similarities in terms of their 
Javanese cultural practices which can bring different communities together. These practices 
include selamatan and tahlilan, communal cultural rituals used to celebrate a new birth, to pray 
for the dead, to give thanks and ask for blessing when moving to a new house, and so forth. The 
research project found, however, that these practices can be undermined when neglected in 
favour of modern activities to craft citizenship such as discussions, workshops, or seminars. 
This chapter also discussed, from the perspective of theory, the practice of citizenship 
seen through the lens of habitus and the act of citizenship. As a habitus, citizenship practices can 
be seen to form the everyday activities performed by Muslims, Christians, and members of 
Dukuh Manggung. In Surakarta and Yogyakarta citizenship practices are oriented to maintain 
order, which is understood to be a harmonious relationship between separate groups. As a 
habitus, the practices of citizenship in this area are structured by the norm. When members of 
the society internalise the norm and act based on this, the structure is strengthened. Any activities 
or events that might disrupt these relationships are avoided so that the habitus, which changes 
overtime, will always remain synchronised with the field and with the structure. 
Seen through the lens of acts of citizenship, citizenship practices can also be aimed at 
rupturing order. The series of actions performed by the Islamist groups in Surakarta are good 
examples of how citizenship acts can aim to cause a rupture with the secular order. The demand 
for the implementation of Islamic law instead of national law, and the dream of establishing an 
Islamic caliphate to replace the nation-state and republic, represent acts of rupture. Their actions 
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are breaking with traditional religious worlds since their conceptions of Islamic law and Islamic 
caliphate does not represent mainstream Islamic tradition. The political form and membership 
in Islam has been a subject of contestation between Muslim scholars. The initiative of establishing 
a human rights workshop for pesantren community members could also be seen as aiming to 
break the order of secular and traditional religious education, in which they are seen as excluding 
each other. The human rights, gender and equality discourses have been excluded from most 
pesantren education, although this does not necessarily mean that there are no such concepts 
within Islam.  
As citizenship practices are aimed to weaken class divisions, identity politics and 
differences (Bendix 1964, cited in Turner 2006, p. 227), a shared civic virtue is needed so that 
the public interests would be the priority. Virtue is not something given, but rather something 
that needs to be developed and cultivated throughout life. Apart from formal education, different 
actors, state and non-state, have initiated some efforts to forge shared civic virtues. In practice, 
however, contestation over virtues, be they religious, cultural, or modern, occur repeatedly. 
While a certain degree of contestation is normal in democratic process, when it is overexercised 
it leads to tension between different groups. This is evident in the case of the accusation of 
blasphemy toward an organisation associated with Shia Islam. This action is performed in the 
name of pious and righteous virtue. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the implementation of Pancasila has 
been contested among different groups; so is the conceptualisation of virtue and citizenship. The 
government interpretation of Pancasila, as the history suggest, has led to the abuse of these 
principles to serve only the power, with the example of the Old and New Order regime. Due to 
this, any attempts from the government to interpret Pancasila have been viewed with suspicion. 
The new organisation initiated by the President Joko Widodo is the first serious initiative to 
formulate Pancasila at the practical level during the Reform Era. While the products of this 
organisation are yet to be seen, the challenges over religious citizenship practices in Yogyakarta 
and Surakarta urgently call for further investigation.    
To mitigate this contestation over religious citizenship practices, a constructive dialogue 
is needed. As diverse groups have different opinions and conceptions of virtue, it is paramount 
that a dialogue be started with public operative values: constitution, laws, civic norms. This 
dialogue needs to facilitate the representation of different social groups in terms of their interests, 
opinions, and perspectives. Although it is difficult to put them into practice, such mechanisms 
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have the capacity to forge common shared virtues, and thus, democratic and inclusive forms of 
citizenship.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
This thesis discussed the citizenship practices in Indonesia’s multi-faith society, employing a case 
study approach in two cities, Yogyakarta and Surakarta. The two cities were selected because, 
despite some similarities in term of historical and cultural backgrounds, they show important 
differences in terms of their respective approach to religious matters. Based on the latest survey 
by the SETARA institute in 2017, Surakarta ranked among the top 10 of the most tolerant cities 
in Indonesia. In contrast, Yogyakarta ranked among the bottom 10 of the list, meaning that 
Yogyakarta is now seen as a significantly less tolerant city – a fact that surprised many. This thesis 
does not aim to verify this survey, instead it investigates the dynamic of the citizenship practices 
at the everyday life activities by mainly doing observation and conducting interviews with the 
participants who were purposively selected for this project.  
The participants for this research project are grouped into three categories: activists from 
non-governmental organisations; religious community leaders; and government representatives. 
These three groups represent different voices, though not necessarily conflictual, regarding the 
practices of citizenship in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. The religious groups selected for this project 
vary in terms of their religious understanding, from moderate to extremist, thus ensuring that as 
many different voices as possible were captured during the data collection process. There is a 
gender distribution imbalance regarding the number of participants, particularly for religious 
community groups. Indeed, religious and political leaders are mostly male, meaning that it was 
difficult to find enough suitable female participants to interview.   
The perspective used to investigate citizenship in this project is more sociological than 
legal/normative. This is not to say that the legal-normative perspective is not important but 
investigating the citizenship practices using only this lens would be insufficient to capture the 
dynamic and complex manifestations of citizenship in Indonesian society. Drawing on the work 
of Turner (1993) and Isin (2008; 2015), this study emphasises the importance of every day 
performative activities and interactions between different groups in public space, participation in 
community events or public protests. The framework developed in this project defines 
citizenship as dynamic and involving contestation between the state, community and individuals 
over the discursive construction, the meaning-making process and lived application of 
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citizenship. It is not a mono-directional process, but rather a pluri-directional one in which 
certain conceptions of citizenship are always in the process of being questioned, problematized 
and exercised by different actors.   
In the process of conceptualizing citizenship, this project uses the operative public values 
framework developed by Parekh (2000, p. 267-272). Operative public values consist of values 
derived from constitution, law, and civic norms. The first refers to a value that ‘lays down the 
basic legal and moral design of the polity including the fundamental rights and sometimes the 
obligation of its citizens’. While law refers to legal frameworks or regulations that regulate the 
daily life of citizens, civic norms can be defined as values that govern civil relations between the 
members of society. Civic norms signify the ‘intermediate realm’ between private life and public 
life (Parekh 2000, p. 268). These three operative public values navigate the type of data gathered 
in this research project. 
As culture and religion play an important role in the way individual or people define 
themselves and understand their world (Taylor 1994), these two were paid special attention. This 
is because a particular understanding of cultural and religious values will significantly affect the 
way people see and interact with each other. In turn, this will influence the way they participate 
in public life and navigate their actions in the civic engagement process. These values of culture 
and religion might not necessarily go hand in hand when it comes to the interpretation of different 
communities (e.g. syncretism and harmony in Javanese culture vs purification within Islamic 
tradition), and this will affect the way they conceptualize operative public values. The particular 
understanding used to justify the citizenship practices was the focus during the interview and 
observation process.  
The findings of this study suggest that citizenship practices in Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
are characterised by persistent conflict and tensions, and in the case of Yogyakarta outright 
violence. The conflict over places of worship occurred in Yogyakarta and Surakarta, with the 
arguments revolving around procedural requirements and substantive concern over exercising 
rights. The tensions over this issue, as the findings suggest, sometimes go beyond the procedural 
requirement debate, which is only used to cover the intention of preventing religious 
proselytization in certain areas. The issue then moves to whether the plan to build places of 
worship would disturb the social order. Even though building permit requirements are met, this 
does not necessarily mean that the issue can be solved effectively. 
The tension over religious and socio-cultural practices also impact the citizenship 
practices in the two research sites. The arguments focus on whether such practices are seen as 
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being essentially cultural or religious. The case of the cheap food program in Surakarta and an 
Easter celebration for elderly people in a public area in Yogyakarta exemplify this. Islamist 
groups consider these activities to be religious and suspect Christianisation of Muslims people; 
thus they reject both activities. While this Christianisation effort is denied by the organizers, the 
suspicion remains. The cheap food program, which had lasted for many years, was stopped and 
the Easter celebration was organized in a number of churches instead of in public area.  
Other tensions regarding the citizenship practices in Yogyakarta and Surakarta are due 
to the perceived conflicting ideas of performing religious obligation and exercising basic rights. 
This can be seen in the case of the public campaign against the election of non-Muslims to 
political positions in Surakarta, and an intimidation toward Raushan Fikr, an organisation 
associated with the Shia community, in Yogyakarta. In both cases, Islamist groups believe that 
their actions fall under religious obligations. Meanwhile, the Indonesian constitution does not 
prevent non-Muslim people to participate in elections, since every citizen, regardless of their 
background, is entitled to such political rights. Also, the constitution guarantees every citizen the 
rights to assemble and to express ideas.  
The findings also suggest that some deliberate discursive constructions have informed 
and directed citizenship practices in certain way often leading to inter-communal tensions. These 
discursive constructions are reflected in the form of political-religious events , for example with 
the anti-election and anti-Shia campaigns cited  above; religious-legal context is exemplified by 
the opposition to more places of worship being built for minorities, such as churches because  of 
regulations introduced by the government; and the socio-economic factor refers to the economic 
interests that affect the way religious citizenship practices are exercised in the two cities.  
Some alternative discourses are also proposed by different actors such as NGO activists 
and religious community leaders. The human rights discourse is translated into the training or 
workshop on human rights, peace building and conflict resolution for religious groups. The 
religious pluralism discourse is reflected in the form of initiation of meetings between different 
groups to discuss contemporary issues in their area. It is also embodied in the initiative for 
children to travel to different places of worship in Surakarta, with the aim to introduce the 
concept of tolerance and respect, as well as the promotion of tolerance within a social cultural 
activity such as donating blood (in which the participants were told that donating blood may 
contribute to tolerance since their blood might be used by people from different religious 
communities).    
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6.2 Significance of the Study 
This study, focusing on religious minorities in plural society, uncovers challenges that still 
endure in relation to the problematic understanding and instrumentalised application of certain 
notions of citizenship. This leads to a diminished if not an absence of protection for minority 
groups from the state’s as well as extremist groups’ excesses. The state various agencies in 
particular compound the (ab)use of religious teachings and regulations often used to justify 
violent actions. This implies that without further actions from the government to seriously deal 
with violent actions against minority groups in Indonesia, their position would become more 
vulnerable. Their rights would be continuously violated.         
This project also highlights some features that might shed a light of optimism toward 
cultivating a more democratic and inclusive citizenship in the two research sites. The 
commitment to maintain harmonious relationship shown by the church and mosque community 
in Surakarta and the active participation the members of Dukuh Manggung in Yogyakarta need 
to be further promoted. The cultural activities of communal feast such as selamatan and tahlilan 
that facilitate discussion and deliberation among different groups need to be scaled up so that 
the violence against particular groups might be minimised through this vernacular form of 
everyday conversation.  
 
6.3 Contribution of the Study  
Empirically, this study has shown that citizenship practices in Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
are far from simple because they involve different actors and motives in exercising their rights 
and perceived obligations toward the state and religion.  
Theoretically, this study has enriched the debate over the idea of religious citizenship, 
the role of culture in navigating citizenship practices, and the importance of performative acts in 
the framing of citizenship. Furthermore, this study’s findings contribute to the debate over the 
limits of multicultural citizenship in particular in relation to cultural recognition and special group 
rights, differentiated citizenship on the idea of representation and identification of social groups, 
the Islamic version of citizenship that is interpreted rather differently by various Islamist groups, 
and Pancasila citizenship conceptualisation and its implementation throughout history.  
The findings of this research and their theoretical implications indicate that the challenges 
regarding the religious practices in Indonesia urgently call for further normative as well as policy 
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consideration. The government’s initiative to create UKP-PIP (later BPIP) might be seen as a 
first attempt to outline a general rule to implement Pancasila at a practical level to navigate 
citizenship practices in a social, political, and cultural sphere. As the discussion of the findings 
suggest, currently Pancasila has been placed on a continuum where different groups may 
interpret it based on their own ideology and political economic interests. With the trend of 
violence against minority groups in Indonesia, placing Pancasila in this ambivalent position would 
only endanger the vulnerable groups, while at the same time ‘giving’ the power and authority to 
extremist groups to pursue their objectives by using violence (if necessary) through the existing 
regulation discussed in this project. 
However, it is also important to note that providing general guidelines to implement 
Pancasila need not be treated as final and closed to different interpretations. History suggests that 
a monopoly over the interpretation of Pancasila by the state would lead to the abuse of the 
Pancasila as a political instrument. Therefore, these general guidelines should not be treated as 
dogma but rather need to be open for debate and interpretation. There is a need for a more 
organic engagement with mainstream society so that more considered deliberations among 
different groups can take place in order to ensure a broad-based participation and representation 
in defining the actual meaning and value of Pancasila in particular as an important framework 
for regulating public life.        
 
6.4 Limitations of the Study 
As with any similar research project, there are some methodological limitations that need 
to be acknowledged in this study. Firstly, a there is a limitation in relation to actual sampling. 
Indeed, the participants in this research project are, mainly, the leaders of each of the institutions 
or someone who has been appointed by the leaders of the same institutions. This means that the 
voices of ‘ordinary’ members of the community are not consistently heard. The main 
consideration in deciding to focus on the leaders was that they have been the ones most actively 
involved with the conflict. Also, it is these leaders or their representatives that are involved in 
campaigning or producing certain discourses in the public space.  
Secondly, and due to scope and time constraints, even when more individuals could have 
been included for some groups, this study’s scope dictated that only   one representative was 
invited to formally take part in the study. There may be an issue here regarding whether this one 
representative adequately represents the different voices of the organisation or the relevant 
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community. It is, in fact, acknowledged by some participants involved in this research project 
that there are sometimes different opinions on certain issues between the leaders of these 
institutions. In other words, there are often competing factions within these organisations and 
this sometimes makes it difficult to obtain opinion truly representative perspective. With this in 
mind, it is not the intention of this research project to generalise the findings on the basis of the 
opinions articulated by the participants. Rather, they are seen and acknowledged as being among 
multiple voices coming from these organisations. Therefore, further research can examine this 
issue further within different design in order to obtain more representative insights from similar 
groups and organisations.  
 
6.5 Future Research 
Any examination of religious citizenship practices in societies where Muslims are the 
minority group would be inherently interesting and likely to yield valuable insights. This project 
is conducted in two cities in which Muslims are the majority, therefore, Islamic arguments would 
tend to shape discussions, particularly when it comes to justifying actions committed by extremist 
Islamist groups. Similar studies in Indonesia for example involving mainly non-Muslim cities, 
such as Bali, might offer a different insight into the citizenship practices.  
Furthermore, and going beyond Indonesia, studies on religious minorities and their 
citizenship claims and practices in a non-predominantly Javanese society would be most useful 
generating useful insights. For example, studies examining the role of culture or religion in 
accessing and navigating citizenship rights in other culturally and religiously plural societies would 
contribute to this important body of knowledge. As it is argued in this project, Javanese cultures 
emphasises harmony, consensus and order, and due to this any violent conflicts tend to be 
avoided. A different culture might emphasise different values that may affect the citizenship 
practices exercised by different actors in that particular area.  
Finally, this research project offers unique empirical insights aimed at understanding the 
limitations of democratic and inclusive forms of citizenship in contemporary Indonesia. The 
research findings offer cautious optimism regarding the cultivation of democratic citizenship in 
the everyday practices of everyday citizens in particular among minority groups. The project’s 
findings, in addition to contestations and tensions, also highlight an active public participation 
and community engagement between different groups in some areas. This commitment towards 
maintaining social harmony and inter-religious tolerance can be seen in the form of grassroots 
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community activities such as regular meetings and mutual support for celebrating religious rituals 
and ceremonies. These kinds of everyday practices need to be scaled up so that the foundation 
for a more inclusive and democratic citizenship may be solidly forged, not only in these two cities, 
but also in many areas across Indonesia.        
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Appendix 2: Sample of Language Plain Statements and Consent Forms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO: Interviewee  
 
 
Plain Language Statement  
Date: 
Full Project Title: Citizenship in Multi-faith Society: A Case Study of Indonesia  
Principal Researcher: Professor Fethi Mansouri 
Student Researcher: Muhammad Khoirul Muqtafa 
Associate Researcher(s): Muhammad Khoirul Muqtafa  
 
 
You are invited to take part in this study.  Please read this Participant Information Statement in 
full before deciding whether or not to participate in this research. If you would like further 
information regarding any aspect of this project, you are encouraged to contact the researcher 
via the email address listed below. 
 
You have chosen to participate in this research because you have responded to the information 
given by organizations where the research team of this project has made initial contact with. You 
meet the criteria of the participant groups of this research project because you are political 
leaders, religious or community leaders, member of non-governmental organizations or ordinary 
members of religious communities and you are above 18 year old. Further, you accept that there 
is no remuneration and that participation is voluntary. 
 
The aim of the study is to understand how citizenship is conceptualized, developed, and 
practiced in Indonesia which has experienced dramatic social, cultural and political changes 
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throughout its history. As to what extent these changes affect the way you practice citizenship will 
be studied in order to reflect and learn about the possibility of forging a more plural and 
democratic society in the world’s most populous Muslim country that is also renowned as one 
the most diverse countries in the world. 
  
The study involves an interview which will be audio recorded. The interview will take half an 
hour to one hour, and will take place in a mutually agreed upon location. 
 
The benefits from this research include the opportunity to share your understanding and 
perspective about the concept of citizenship and what kind of factors which affect the way you 
understand citizenship. This will help to forge a more democratic and inclusive form of 
citizenship where people from different cultural and religious background could live in peace 
and harmony.  
 
It is not expected that your involvement will cause inconvenience and/or discomfort to you. A 
pseudonym will be used to de-identify your contribution to this project. 
 
Data collected will be stored in accordance with Deakin regulations. The interview recordings 
and transcripts will adhere to University regulations and be kept on University premises in a 
secure electronic file and locked cupboard/filing cabinet for 5 years. The project has been funded 
by Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University. 
 
Being in this study is voluntary and you are under no obligation to consent to participate. If you 
do consent to participate, you have the right to withdraw during the interview or at any stage after 
the interview. If you withdraw from the interview, you will not be penalised or disadvantaged in 
any way. To withdraw your consent after the interview has finished, please contact either 
Professor Fethi Mansouri or Muhammad Khoirul Muqtafa directly (contact details below). 
 
Professor Fethi Mansouri  
Director 
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation 
Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia 
Email: fethi.mansouri@deakin.edu.au 
 
Muhammad Khoirul Muqtafa 
PhD Student 
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation 
Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia 
Email: mmuqtafa@deakin.edu.au  
 
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or any 
questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact:   
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The Manager, Research Integrity, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood Victoria 
3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Please quote project number [2015-202]. 
 
 
Thank you, 
 
 
 
Professor Fethi Mansouri  
Deakin University 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Interviewee  
 
Consent Form 
Date:  
Full Project Title: Citizenship in A Multi-faith Society: A Case Study of Indonesia  
Reference Number: 
 
 
I have read, or have had read to me in my first language and I understand the attached Plain 
Language Statement. 
I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain Language 
Statement.  
I have been given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep. 
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including where 
information about this project is published, or presented in any public form.   
 
I consent to the following: 
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Participant’s Name (printed) …………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Signature ……………………………………………………… Date ………………………… 
 
 
 
Muhammad Khoirul Muqtafa, School of Humanities and Social Science 
Bld EB.2.22 Deakin 
University, Burwood Campus 3125  
Phone: +61 3 9244 5135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Yes No 
I agree to be interviewed by the researchers   
I agree to allow the interview to be audio recorded   
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate 
in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without 
being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
  
I understand that any information I provide is confidential and that no information 
that could lead to the identification of any individual will be disclosed in any reports 
on the project, or to another party. 
  
I understand that I can request a transcript of this interview for my approval before 
it is included in the write up of the research. 
  
I understand that the interview audio file will be kept in secure storage and accessible 
to the research team. I also understand that the data will be destroyed after 5 years 
unless I consent to it being used in future research. 
  
I understand that any data that the researcher extracts from the interview for use in 
reports or published findings will not, under any circumstances, contain names or 
identifying characteristics, unless I request it. 
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Appendix 3: Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965 on the Prevention of 
Blasphemy and Abuse of Religions 
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Appendix 4: The Joint Ministerial Decision on the Establishment of Worship 
Places 1969 
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Appendix 4: The Joint Ministerial Decree on Guidelines on Tasks 
Implementation of Heads/Deputy Heads of Regions in the Maintenance of 
Religious Community Harmony, Empowerment of Interreligious Forum 
and the Establishment of Places of Worship 2006 
 
 
 
 206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 212 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 215 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 216 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 218 
Appendix 7: The Joint Ministerial Decree on Warning and Order to 
Ahmadiyah Believers, Members, and/or the Members of Board of 
Ahmadiyah Community of Indonesia and the Members of Community 
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